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Thesis Abstract 
Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon live in a protracted refugee situation. 
They remain under- researched by ethnographers and anthropologists. This 
thesis seeks to address this lacuna. Using qualitative research techniques, 
of semi-structured interviews and observation, the thesis examines issues 
surrounding identity, belonging, memory, attachment to place and 
homeland. These are viewed through the lens of the traditional pillars of 
Palestinianness. The subjects of this research are known colloquially as 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (The generation after the war). Commencing the 
thesis, the research aims are enumerated and the scope and nature of the 
research is outlined. A review of the literature incorporating the theories 
surrounding identity follows and this relates those to the Palestinian 
situation. An exploration is undertaken of the importance of memory, 
tradition and the homeland as facets of identity through the prism of al-
Nakba (events surrounding the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians). 
Attachment to place and homeland are investigated amongst this 
generation through their concept of Haq al ‘Awda (right to return) and 
what form of return is envisaged. Attachment to place is explored further 
through the issue of Tawteen (naturalisation). An examination of 
emigration (Hijra) elicits the concepts which this generation hold and how 
they envisage the availing of this opportunity will affect their identity. This 
research has found evidence of intergenerational changes in how 
Palestinian identity is perceived by the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb. Factors 
existing in the socio-economic and physical landscapes are offered as 
reasons for these changes. The findings also point to a heterogeneity 
amongst this generation of their concept of Palestinianness which seems to 
contradict the portrayal by previous researchers, of Palestinian identity as 
homogenous. A number of recommendations are suggested which may 
assist policy makers and NGOs to develop appropriate solutions to the 
Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon. 
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Chapter 1 
In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimated that there were 11.6 million refugees worldwide in a ‘protracted’ 
situation (Preamble to UNHCR:2009 defines a protracted situation as one 
in which refugees have been in exile for five or more years after their 
initial displacement); with 4.1 million, who were in a protracted refugee 
situation for in excess of twenty years (UNHCR 2016: 22). In addition to 
those figures, United Nations Relief Works Agency in the Near East 
(UNRWA) estimates that there are 5.7 million refugees registered globally 
with them, of which 1.6 million were registered in Palestinian Refugee 
Camps (PRCs) throughout the Middle East (UNRWA, 2016)1. In the 
period leading up to and after the founding of the State of Israel, over 
750,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out of the British Mandated State 
of Palestine. They were dispersed to neighbouring states including 
Lebanon, where an estimated 150,000 arrived (Khalidi, 1984: 37; Peteet, 
2005 :6). When the UNHCR and UNRWA figures are taken together, there 
are an estimated 18 million refugees in a protracted situation.2 In 2016, 
UNHCR estimated that there were in excess of 22 million refugees 
worldwide, of which 17 million were under its mandate, the balance being 
mainly Palestinian refugees UNHCR (2016: 2). According to the same 
report (UNHCR 2016: 3), Lebanon hosted the largest number of refugees 
relative to its population (I in 6, or 169 refugees per 1,000 Lebanese, 
excluding those under the UNRWA mandate). Chaaban et al (2016: 8) 
report that there are over 1.1 million Syrian refugees and 42,000 
Palestinian Syrian Refugees (PRS) in Lebanon, in addition to the 495,985 
registered Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRLs)3.  Not all Palestinian 
                                                 
1 UNRWA published a caveat to these figures which stated that ‘these figures are based 
on data supplied voluntarily to UNRWA by registered refugees and hence may not 
represent statistically valid demographic data.’ Nonetheless they represent ‘best estimates’ 
and are probably as close to true numbers as it is possible to calculate. 
2 UNHCR defined a protracted situation for refugees as one in which refugees have been 
in exile ‘for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate 
prospects for implementation of durable solutions.’ (Preamble to UNHCR, 2009, UNHCR 
Ex Comm. 2009). 
3 Chaaban et al (2016: 44) note that whilst there are 495,985 PRLs registered with 
UNRWA, ‘it is estimated that the actual number of PRLs residing in Lebanon is between 
260,000 and 280,000,’ due they say to continuous emigration from Lebanon. It should be 
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refugees are eligible to register with UNRWA4. Almost all of the Syrian 
refugees have been in Lebanon since 2011/2012 and so come under the 
definition of ‘protracted refugees’. Urban (2017) has stated on her blog that 
over 65 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced from their 
natal homes and that 60% of them are hosted by the world’s most fragile 
states. Lebanon, a relatively modern state, still recovering from the effects 
of a prolonged civil war and occupation by both Israel and Syria and 
composed of deeply divided communities along confessional lines, is 
considered such a fragile state.5 
The stark reality of the enormity of Lebanon’s refugee population provides 
the backdrop for the research for this thesis. Given the protracted nature of 
the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon, an examination of issues 
around identity for the present generation of refugee youth was considered 
important, due to the probability of intergenerational change 
(Hoffman:1984; Trommsodorff: 2006; Trommsodorff and Nauck, 2006); 
the possible diffusion of Palestinian identity (Allan:2014); the break with 
the older generations political constructs (Erni: 2013) and the constant 
struggle to form their own definition of Palestinian refugee identity (Erni: 
                                                 
noted that as frequently related to the author in 2015 and 2016, all figures are estimates 
only, as registration is voluntary and not all refugees are registered. Many PRLs, residing 
abroad, remain registered as a contingency in the event of failure in their new country; and 
also, as a means of claiming their right to return to Palestine, should a solution to the 
Israel-Palestine problem be implemented. 
 
4 UNRWA (2016) defines a Palestinian refugee as: ‘persons whose normal place of 
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both 
home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.’ UNRWA services are 
available to all those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are 
registered with the Agency and who need assistance. The descendants of Palestine refugee 
males, including adopted children, are also eligible for registration. When the Agency 
began operations in 1950, it was responding to the needs of about 750,000 Palestine 
refugees.  It should be borne in mind as Zureik (1996: 9-10) notes that there are 
Palestinian refugees who are unable to register with UNRWA, due to that organisations’ 
definition of who constitutes as a Palestinian refugee. These include inter alia:  
• Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war who settled outside UNRWA’s area of 
operations.  
• Residents of Gaza and the West Bank and their descendants who were displaced 
for the first time in the 1967 war.  
• Palestinians who were outside British Mandatory Palestine when the 1948 and 
1967 wars broke out and were prevented by the Israelis from returning. 
5 UNHCR (2016: 21) reports that Lebanon, which it rates a ‘middle- income country’ 
suffered a’ notable burden on its economy’ due to the increased influx of refugees since 
2011. 
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2013). This research will provide a greater understanding of Palestinian 
refugee youth in the PRCs. This will allow decision-makers at the local, 
regional and international levels to devise policies with greater certainty 
and knowledge. It will also assist service providers and NGOs to shape and 
provide more suitable assistance and permit a more nuanced and focussed 
delivery, in the context of ever diminishing resources.6  
This study explores the nuances of Palestinian refugee youth identity, 
amongst PRLs in the PRCs of Lebanon. There is a surprising paucity of 
research in this area given the possibility that new forms of identity are 
emerging amongst this generation, caused in part by a worsening of the 
socio-economic landscape; the desperation amongst this cadre caused by a 
lack of agency; and the effects of exposure to other cultures facilitated by 
increased access to the internet and mass media. This research is focussed 
on the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the generation after the war), with an age 
group between 18 and 35 years.7 This study marks the first critical 
assessment of this generation. Extensive research has been published on 
Palestinian refugee identity, much of it centred on Lebanon (Sayigh: 1977, 
1994, 2012; Masalha: 2009; Hanafi: 2003, 2010; Ramadan: 2009; Roberts: 
2010).8 These studies have investigated Palestinian identity, emphasising 
                                                 
6 Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) were established in Lebanon during the exodus from 
Palestine, during the period 1947-1949 (Peteet, 2005: 6). Originally there were sixteen, 
but this number has been reduced to 12 over the years, due to violence associated with the 
Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989) and the War of the Camps (1985-1988) (Fisk, 1992: 
358-381; 604-609). In addition to these 12 camps, administered by UNRWA, there are a 
number of unofficial ‘gatherings’, of small clusters, of Palestinian refugees, mainly in the 
urban centres throughout Lebanon. The camps are located from the North (near Tripoli) to 
the South (near Tyre), and from the West (around Beirut) to the East (in the Bekka).  
Appendix ‘A’ describes in greater detail the disposition of the PRCs in Lebanon today; the 
demographics of; and the living conditions of; the Palestinian refugee population in 
Lebanon. Appendix ‘B’ provides a profile of Shatila PRC, which is typical of the camps 
in Lebanon. 
7 It has been noted by Swedenburg (2007: 1) that the period of ‘youth’ has been elongated 
amongst populations in the Middle East mainly because of economic pressures, which are 
exacerbated for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, due to the restrictions imposed upon 
them by the Government of Lebanon, in respect of opportunities for work and achieving 
agency, for themselves.  
 
 
8 Although Chatty and Hundt (2005, 2001) have carried out studies in this area, their 
research has focussed on a much younger age group, which is not the focus of this 
research. There is a paucity of research which specifically targets this generation.   
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nationalist and collective identity perspectives. It is argued here, that these 
studies have assumed that these are identity priorities for all Palestinians, 
regardless of age and generation. Personal or alternate concepts of 
individual identity have tended to be overlooked. The degree to which 
individual Palestinians ascribe loyalty to a nationalist dialogue or indeed a 
collective identity have been ignored or subsumed. Additionally, 
ethnographers and anthropologists have tended to assume that this 
nationalist identity is homogenous and static for all Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. This thesis seeks to determine if this portrayal is accurate for the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb and whether or not a more appropriate designation 
of this identity is one which is heterogenous and dynamic in nature. This 
study also seeks to examine the factors which are influencing that 
heterogeneity, such as restrictions imposed by the physical, socio-
economic and socio-political landscapes, in addition to some of the 
influences of globalisation, such as greater access to the internet and the 
uneven spread of development as noted by Massey (1994).  It is imperative 
that policymakers, NGOs and the Lebanese government recognise any 
change in the identity of the Palestinian youth, in order that the existing 
framework of solutions is adjusted to take account of a more pragmatic 
visualisation of that identity. Policies formulated by governments, NGOs 
and regional bodies depend on accurate information. Any change to the 
basis for policy formulation requires a consequent alteration in policy 
structure. This study indicates that an assumption of a homogenous 
Palestinian identity which formed the basis for policies of dealing with the 
Palestinian refugees is no longer correct. The assumption that this identity 
is static, bounded and conforming to traditionally ascribed notions of 
Palestinianness is no longer valid. Ignoring the changes in this 
demographic has the possibility of encouraging radicalisation; increasing 
violence as membership of factions could become more attractive; or 
causing this generation to adopt more desperate measures to alleviate their 
dire economic prospects.   
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Analytical Frame 
The conceptual framework for this thesis was developed by reference to 
the available published literature on the subject of identity, with emphasis 
on refugee youth identity. This analytical frame proposes that the nature of 
Palestinian refugee identity is in a process of evolutionary change. This 
theory proposes that inter-generational differences in this identity have 
been exacerbated by socio-economic factors, political stagnation, exposure 
to the effects of globalisation, and a growing sense of hopelessness. This 
theory focusses on four aspects of Palestinian identity: al-Nakba; Hijra; 
Tawteen and Haq al ‘awda. It proposes that the relevance of the Nakba for 
this identity is losing its significance for the Jeel ma baa’d El harb. It 
suggests that Hijra has become an extremely important means of achieving 
agency for them. It posits the view that Tawteen, previously thought to be 
abhorrent for all Palestinians, is now becoming increasingly palatable for 
this generation. It advances the claim that Haq al ‘awda, which is regarded 
by Palestinians as an inalienable right is now being interpreted by this 
generation in a different manner from their antecedents, and a myriad of 
solutions are being offered as to how it can be achieved. Finally, it 
proposes that there is indisputable evidence that these evolving concepts of 
Palestinian refugee identity can no longer be considered as homogenous. 
Primary Research Aim  
The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the 
degree to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb subscribe to the traditional 
Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers. This is 
bounded in a memorialisation of the Nakba (events surrounding 1948, 
known as the ‘catastrophe’), an absolute rejection of tawteen 
(naturalisation) and total loyalty to a haq al ‘awda (right of return) to the 
Palestine of the British Mandate (Sayigh:1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 
2009; Masalha:2009; Khalidi: 1997; Peteet:2005). This study also seeks to 
identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that identity. 
This is important because it will add to the body of academic work around 
issues of identity, memory, belonging and place. It will, as outlined above, 
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assist in providing more focussed and appropriate strategies for NGOs and 
inform policymakers at the international, regional and national levels to 
formulate solutions to the refugee problem.  
Primary Research Objectives: 
• To assess the extent to which former political loyalties are still 
relevant to the younger Palestinian Refugee youth in Lebanon, 
through qualitative survey.  
• To evaluate the socially constructed identities of the self at the 
individual and collective levels of this generation.  
• To explore how this identity is expressed through interviews and 
landscape analysis.  
• To identify the factors contributing to contemporary fluidity, which 
may be causing alterations to the traditional Palestinian refugee 
identity as described by previous researchers.  
This Research Aim and associated objectives are important because as will 
be shown, in this thesis, identity is not moribund. On the contrary, it is 
dynamic and changes not just in the normal progression from childhood 
through adolescence to adulthood; but also, in response to changes in the 
physical, socio-economic and socio-political landscapes, surrounding a 
community such as the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in Lebanon. The availability 
of the internet and through it the exposure to other cultures has to be 
considered as one of the influences which is imbricating Palestinian 
refugee identity. It would be remiss if ethnographers, policymakers and 
anthropologists were to ignore the potential for change in concepts of 
identity in this generation, and to discount the possibility of heterogeneity 
amongst them, even though this is the accepted norm for members of their 
peers in the West (Calhoun, 1995: 293; Whitebrook, 2001: 137). This 
possibility for change has consequences for the future development of 
Palestinian aspirations for return, for a nation state, for Middle Eastern 
politics in general, and a resolution of the Palestinian- Israeli dispute. 
While this thesis has a singular overarching aim, I have identified a series 
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of subsidiary aims, which form the basis of each of the core data chapters, 
or articles in this thesis.  
Subsidiary Research Aim 1 
This subsidiary research aim was to establish the relevance which the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb ascribe to events surrounding the Nakba (catastrophe). 
Al-Nakba occurred in 1948 with the formation of the state of Israel and the 
flight of the Palestinian people, either through fear or force, from the 
British Mandated territory of Palestine. Al-Nakba forms the basis for exilic 
Palestinian history and has been described as the ‘lynchpin of Palestinian 
identity’ Allan (2014: 41-45) and a ‘watershed in the development of 
Palestinian identity’ (Peteet, 2005:3; Khalidi, 1997:22). Knowledge of the 
origins of the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon has been held to be 
one of the pillars of their identity (Knudsen: 2007; Sayigh: 1977). Any 
diminution in this knowledge would indicate a weakening of this pillar and 
could also indicate a weakening of the memories passed on by the 
antecedents of this generation.  It could also indicate that forgetting, the 
negation of memory, is occurring either on a deliberate or subconscious 
basis (Battaglia:1992; Nietzsche: 1873, 1983).  
 Research Objectives 
• To ascertain what knowledge this generation, possess of their 
historical origins and how this impinges on their identity.  
• To ascertain, using qualitative survey what importance the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb attach to al-Nakba. 
• To identify any factors which interfere with the intergenerational 
transmission of knowledge of the Nakba. 
 
Subsidiary Research Aim 2 
This research aim was to assess the relevance of the concept of haq al 
‘awda for the Jeel ma baa’d El harb in Lebanon today. Haq al ‘awda 
refers to the right of return, to pre-Israeli Palestine, and was the codified by 
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UNGAR 194 (UN Documents 1948). This has been a core aspiration of 
Palestinian refugees through the years. Haq al ‘awda has been one of the 
central tenets of Palestinian national identity as iterated by academics 
through the years (Knudsen,2007; Khalidi, 1997; Suleiman, 1999; Sayigh, 
2001; Abu-Sitta, 1999).   
 Research Objectives 
• To determine by qualitative survey the amount of loyalty the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb possess to haq al ‘awda.  
• To investigate using qualitative survey the degree of attachment to 
place amongst this generation. 
• To investigate any factors which may be altering that attachment to 
place. 
 
Subsidiary Research Aim 3 
This research aim was to evaluate whether or not this generation were 
willing to accept or reject tawteen. Tawteen is a problematic term variously 
translated as assimilation, settlement, naturalisation, and implantation. It is 
a highly emotive term, in a country where the divisions of the recent civil 
war remain unhealed. It is subject to political hijacking by politicians who 
want to use it to convey alarm for the Lebanese population. This thesis 
adopts the meaning of naturalisation, which is the most neutral and 
probably the least contentious definition. Tawteen is regarded as one of the 
pillars of Palestinian national identity (Knudsen: 2007), and has been 
regarded by some academics as abhorrent to all Palestinians (Sayigh,1977; 
Masalha,2009; Bianchi,2014). Within the concept, dimensions of 
attachment to place, collective identity, homeland and belonging are 
intertwined.   
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 Research Objectives 
• To evaluate, using qualitative survey, the extent to which the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb reject or accept tawteen and the level of 
awareness of what this might entail to their concepts of Palestinian 
identity and belonging. 
• To assess, using qualitative survey, attachment to place, either in 
Palestine, Lebanon or elsewhere. 
• To investigate what factors are altering the traditionally accepted 
view of attitudes to tawteen, amongst this generation. 
Subsidiary Research Aim 4 
This research aim was to establish how hijra, usually translated as 
emigration, impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this 
generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% 
of Palestinian refugee households in Lebanon reported having immediate 
family abroad. The importance of hijra as a means of achieving agency for 
the Palestinian refugees given their precarious existence in the PRCs and 
how they achieve that agency is deserving of investigation. This research 
seeks to ascertain the destinations to which they aspire to travel and how 
they visualise these destinations will affect their Palestinianness. 
 Research Objectives  
• To determine, using qualitative survey, the degree to which the Jeel 
ma baa’d El harb desire to avail of hijra. 
• To assess, using qualitative survey, the extent to which this 
generation realise how achievement of hijra will impact on their 
sense of identity and belonging. 
• To identify what factors are causing this generation to seek hijra, 
• To assess, using qualitative survey, the degree to which the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb are willing to forgo their traditional Palestinian 
identity in pursuit of hijra. 
10 
 
 
 
 
Methodology: 
This research followed a qualitative research design and used a case study 
methodology. The rationale for a qualitative research methodology was 
determined by a review of the available published material for Palestinian 
refugee youth identity. This indicated a lack of quantitative and qualitative 
material on the subject. The choice of a qualitative research design allowed 
for a greater understanding of the world of the Palestinian refugee youth 
and provided a more complete reservoir of data for this study. The case 
study format was selected as the most apposite due to the level of 
flexibility it provided and the depth of information gained; thereby 
enhancing our understanding of concepts which they hold about their 
identity. The research design commenced with an extensive literature 
review surrounding the subject of identity, and specifically refugee 
identity. A reconnaissance - visit to Lebanon followed which identified 
gatekeepers and tightened the focus of the research. 
In order to maximise the time and opportunities available, three Palestinian 
Refugee Camps (PRCs) were chosen in the Beirut area: Mar Elias, Shatila, 
and Burj al Barajneh. During the data collection an opportunity arose to 
interview additional respondents from Ein el Hilweh in the South. In all, 
sixty-one respondents were interviewed from the Jeel ma baa’d El harb 
and an additional seventeen interviews were conducted amongst NGOs 
working with Palestinian refugee youth. Not all the respondents lived in 
the camps; some resided in unofficial gatherings adjacent to the PRCs, or 
in the Beirut city area. Semi-structured interviews were utilised, enabling a 
richer fund of data and flexibility in adjusting the direction of the data 
collection. Additionally, observation techniques were employed to better 
understand the lives of the Jeel ma baa’d El harb and the influences on 
their lives. 
Data analysis was initiated on the first day of data collection and was a 
continuous process. Coding was employed and interview responses were 
grouped as emergent themes were identified. As patterns became evident, 
the development of theory became possible. The author was aware of the 
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dangers of researcher bias and every effort was made to retain objectivity. 
A paramount ethical concern was the safety of the respondents and the 
security of the data collected. A system of anonymising the identity of the 
respondents was utilised and the key to this was kept separate to the 
collected data at all times. Each respondent completed a consent form prior 
to interview and was provided with a data sheet which explained the 
parameters of the interview. The detailed methodology for this thesis is 
outlined in Appendix ‘C’. This format is the recommended layout under 
University of Ulster guidelines. 
Thesis Outline: 
Following on from this introduction, which seeks to set the context and 
principal aims and objectives of the thesis, Chapter 2 opens with an 
examination of the literature pertinent to this research. It focusses on the 
subject of identity which is central to it. The development of scientific 
theory is examined and the different hypotheses, surrounding identity are 
presented. The importance of place is considered given the relevance of 
Palestine to the refugee diaspora. Themes developed in this chapter include 
tradition and memory; culture and belonging; home; nationalism; diaspora 
and globalisation. These themes will be explored throughout the following 
chapters and their relevance and importance to the Palestinian refugee 
youth will be investigated. 
Each of the following four chapters beginning with Chapter 3 is a discrete, 
self-contained paper targeted for publication in a peer reviewed journal. 
Despite this separateness, each is a vital constituent to the overall success 
in achieving the research aims and objectives of this thesis. Chapter 3 
examines issues surrounding the Nakba (the catastrophe). Al- Nakba as 
will be discussed is the reason why the Palestinians are in Lebanon today. 
As Allan (2014) posits this is the lynchpin of Palestinian identity. This 
chapter explores the degree to which this event has relevance to the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb and what part it plays in their concepts of national, 
collective and personal identity. The history of the events in the period 
preceding and following 1948 is presented. The transmission of this history 
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through the generations is explored and this chapter drives forward our 
understanding of how concepts of memory, tradition, belonging and 
collective identity are considered in respect of this generation. 
Chapter 4 continues to examine concepts of loyalty to the Palestinian 
national identity using the right of return (haq al ‘awda) as a foundation. 
As will be shown, the Palestinians regard this right as fundamental to their 
being, their raison d'être. This chapter examines whether the Jeel ma baa’d 
El Harb consider this as an absolute right, as their precedents do- 
envisaging a return to a homeland as it was pre-Nakba- or as something 
else entirely. Issues of agency, attachment to place and homeland are 
explored and how socio-economic and socio- political factors might be 
impacting on the traditionally held view of haq al ‘awda are examined. 
Globalisation is posited as one of the factors which might be causing an 
alteration, in this regard.  
Chapter 5 probes one of the most contentious issues for Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon and both the GOL and the Lebanese polity, that of 
assimilation (tawteen). As will be discussed, in this chapter, rejection of 
tawteen has been considered one of the pillars of Palestinian national 
identity. This chapter explores whether the level of loyalty to this issue is 
as important to the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, and specifically examines 
whether there is a willingness on their part to accept some alteration to the 
purported rejection of tawteen as a solution to the Palestinian refugee 
situation. Concepts of nationalism, collective identity, place identity are 
among those considered in this chapter. Suggestions are made as to how 
this issue could be a partial solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in 
Lebanon. 
Chapter 6 continues to investigate Palestinian identity at the collective and 
individual level and the search for agency amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb, through the desire for emigration (hijra). Emigration has long been 
an outlet for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, but has been long 
frowned upon by the Palestinian nationalists and factions in the camps; as 
it is considered as being disloyal to haq al ‘awda. This chapter explores the 
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willingness of this generation to emigrate, and the reasons why they are 
willing to attempt to leave, most often by illegal means. The availability of 
the internet, a by-product of globalisation, is examined to ascertain if this a 
factor. The internet, which was not so readily available to previous 
generations, allows this generation to view life and imagined futures 
elsewhere. Other factors considered include the increasing pressure on this 
generation caused by a degradation in the physical and socio-economic 
landscapes. An analysis is made to quantify what this generation considers 
to be the most likely identity at the personal and collective levels as a result 
of hijra.  
The concluding chapter, Chapter 7 summarises the thesis, revisits its 
contributions, and offers some conclusions which ensue from the research. 
A review of how the research aims and objectives have been met is 
presented and some recommendations are offered for policymakers and 
academics.  
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Chapter 2 
 The Literature Review: Conceptualising Place and Identity. 
Introduction:  
Torraco (2005:356) defines a literature review as a form of research that 
‘reviews, critiques and synthesises representative literature on a topic in 
such a way that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are 
generated.’ This literature review was initiated prior to conducting field 
work and has been conducted on an ongoing basis with the aim of 
informing the researcher of what research has already been completed in 
this area; and to identify any lacunae in those fields of study. It has also 
assisted an analysis of the data collected, and provided support for any new 
conclusions which may be drawn from that analysis. The purpose of this 
study is to explore some key conceptions which this generation hold on 
their Palestinian refugee identity in the PRCs of Lebanon. The parameters 
of, and configuration of Palestinian refugee youth identity and belonging is 
little known and understood. Ethnographers and anthropologists have 
assumed that all Palestinians subscribe to a homogenous Palestinian 
identity (Allan, 2014: 4-6). In order to progress this study, a critical review 
of the current literature on the subject of identity, was undertaken 
throughout the research project. This critical review established the cross 
and inter-disciplinary nature of studies of identity. A brief examination is 
presented of Personal Identity, Social Identity Theory, and Identity Process 
Theory. An overall understanding of these theories is important, because as 
shall be demonstrated hereunder, they have been incorporated by Place 
Identity theorists to validate their theories.  Place Identity will be examined 
in greater detail, as it shall be shown that it is central to the concept of 
identity, as Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996:206) maintain, and the 
categories of community, culture, ethnicity, nationality, memory, home, 
and homeland amongst other subsets which form the basis for this research 
project. The subjects of religious and gender identity, whilst being 
important across the Middle East, were not germane to the focus of this 
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research, which centred on the political and cultural identity of the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb in Lebanon. 
The study of identity has involved many disciplines over the years, ranging 
from Psychiatry:  Freud (1933), Jung (1964).; to Sociology:  James (1890), 
Mead (1934), to Human Geography:  Relph (1976), Proshansky (1978), 
Proshansky et al (1983), Twigger-Ross & Uzzell (1996), Hull et al (1994), 
and Massey (1994). The multiplicity of disciplines which have examined 
identity has resulted in a cross- pollination of theories and terminology, 
which has occasionally resulted in confusion and conflation. The subjects 
of personal and social identities were the main focus of the early theorists. 
Deschamps and Devos (1998:2) state:  
“Concepts of social identity and personal identity are based on the 
idea that every individual is characterised by social features which 
show his/her membership of a group…. on the one hand, and by 
personal features or individual characteristics which are more 
specific, more idiosyncratic on the other”  
Doise (1998:13) saw identity generally to be ‘considered as a very peculiar 
set of opinions, judgements, evaluations and attitudes manifested by a 
person towards him/herself.’ Doise (1998:14) considered identity as 
‘unique and singular in the personal sense; shared group membership 
involves common characteristics’ Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (2002) 
suggest the same. 
Personal Identity: 
Following on from the pioneering work of James (1890), the field of 
personal identity has been the subject of much research during the last 
hundred years. Mead (1934); Blumer (1969); Stern (1985); Stryker (1987); 
Burke & Stets (2009) are some of the theorists who saw identity as the 
means by which persons both understand and act within and with their 
environments. All agree that personal identity is substantially socially 
constructed through contact with other people and how those people 
behave towards them. However, there are unique facets to each individual 
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which Mead (1934) called the ‘I’ and the social constructs the ‘me’. Both 
of these facets were dynamic, always developing, although most of the 
development process was carried out in the childhood years. In this 
formulation, identity is a cognitive process, dependent on the perceptions 
of the situation in which people find themselves. These perceptions depend 
on personally experienced memories and learned memories, which enables 
the person to project the actions of the person and others into the future. A 
key consideration for identity is what James (1890: 310) termed ‘self-
esteem’. Stern (1985) highlighted the term of ‘agency’; the persons 
comprehension that they have control over their ability to influence their 
environments and which is integral to their ideas of who they are. Stryker 
(1987) and Burke and Stets (2009) introduce the idea of identity hierarchy 
and salience; which establishes the ‘pecking order’ of identities and which 
identity is likely to be adopted in any given situation. 
The study of identity has also resulted in various theories which tell us that 
people possess a number of identities that are operating simultaneously 
(James, 1890). In Sociology and Psychiatry identity is defined as the nature 
of a person, which sets him or her apart from others-the recognition by the 
person and others of the ‘self’. Other words could be used to define 
identity such as personality and personhood.  Casey (2001: 405-406) put 
forward the theory that identity is both an internal process (in the mind) 
and an external one through the socialisation of the person with others, in 
the world i.e. in ‘place’.  Mead (1934: 135) highlighted the difference 
between the physical self and the concept of a psychological self which is 
not present at birth but which develops ‘in the process of social experience 
and activity’ as a result of ‘his relations to that process as a whole’ and to 
other individuals within that process.  Mead (1934: 136-140) describes a 
reflexive cognitive process, in which the individual is both subject and 
object, which allows the self to see himself as others see him. Mead (1934: 
140) finds it impossible to separate the self from society, because it ‘is 
essentially a social structure and it arises in social experience.’ Stryker 
(1987) was one of the first to use the term ‘structural symbolic 
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interactionism’ to describe this relationship of the self with society and 
also to assign importance to role identities  
 James (1890: 294) wrote that: 
‘Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are 
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their 
mind…. but as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally 
into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different 
social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose 
opinion he cares’. 
 He was followed by Mead (1934: 142):  
‘We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different 
people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. 
There are parts of the self which exist only for the self in 
relationship to itself.’ 
Together they were the first theorists to recognise that we possess multiple 
selves, which are activated by our interaction with society, giving rise to 
the dictum ‘society shapes self, shapes social behaviour’, as related by 
Stryker and Burke, (2000: 285). For James, Mead, and Stryker and Burke, 
humans possess multiple identities, which correspond to the number of 
selves which they possess. 
Social Identity Theory 
One of the main proponents of Social Identity Theory (SIT) was Henri 
Tajfel (1981). It was developed to explain a person’s self-concept as a 
member of a social group. John Turner (1987) developed a theory of Social 
Categorisation and worked with Tajfel to synthesise the two concepts 
(Turner and Tajfel, 1978; Turner,1999).  These theories examine the socio- 
cognitive impact of groups and social categories on the development of 
personal identities. They examine the issue of group dynamics in the 
formulation of identity, in particular the way in which social identities 
reflect social categories, groups and the networks to which people belong 
and the behaviours likely to occur. Deaux and Martin (2003: 104) describe 
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social categories as ‘large-scale sources of identity that often provide the 
pretext for the formation of community level social networks and groups.’ 
Memberships of ethnicities, religions or gender categories are exemplars of 
such categorisations. By the very definition of a ‘category’ imaginary 
boundaries are set out to delineate members who are defined as ‘in-group’ 
from non- members who are the ‘out-group’ (Hogg and Turner, 1987: 327, 
Hogg et al, 1995: 259).  
 It is through social categorisation that individuals have a perception of 
themselves and attain self-concepts. At any given time, individuals will 
have different self- concepts and it is their perception of the ‘good’ quality 
of the group to which they belong which determines the degree of loyalty 
to the group and the salience of the group identity. Hogg et al (1995 :260) 
found that the core function of the group for its members was its utility in 
boosting self-esteem. Hogg and Williams (2000: 81-97) following on from 
Tajfel (1981) proposed that people are pre-disposed to view membership of 
the in-group in a positive light, going so far as to ignore negative aspects of 
a group, or indeed to re-interpret them as positive. Festinger (1954: 117-
140) was one of the first to propose the relative nature of the individual’s 
perception and evaluation of the group, a theory later supported by Hogg 
and Williams (2000), who stated that motivation, within the person, for the 
positive nature of discrimination of the in-group from the out-group arises 
when the in-group becomes a part of a person’s self-definition. 
Identity Process Theory 
Breakwell’s (1986) identity process theory, which resonates strongly 
within the research, proposed the concept of identity as both a process and 
a structure. Identity is a social product resulting from the interaction of 
memories, consciousness and analysis. The structure is symptomized by 
thought action and affect, basically a memory system, which involves 
assimilation-accommodation. This absorbs new elements, both personal 
and social. Breakwell makes no difference between personal and social 
identity, but is in agreement with Mead (1935) that socialisation shapes 
personal identity.  
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Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory in Palestinian Refugee 
Identity 
Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1997:219) suggest that ‘identity is a 
cognitive scheme closely related to specific definitions in which we find 
ourselves.’ The ability to exercise agency in the development of that 
identity is critical: ‘when people recognise that their power to influence 
their material and social environments is critical to their ideas of who they 
are’ (ibid: 219). For Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon, the 
ability to exercise their agency is limited by the physical and socio-
economic landscapes which surround them. Within those constraints, some 
agency is afforded to them and their identity has evolved.  Identity 
formation is a continuous process. This process is influenced and 
reinforced by how we see ourselves and how others see us. In the case of 
Palestinian refugees, identity is strongly influenced by the condition of 
displacement from their ancestral homeland. Mi’ari (1998:48), in a study 
on identity on Palestinian refugee youth suggested that identity for them 
was a ‘social object frequently re-evaluated by the person and others.’ He 
delineated three categories of Palestinian refugee identity. The first was 
objective public identity (the person as viewed by others). The second was 
public identity (the person’s perception of how others view him). The third 
was self-identity (how the person views himself). Mi’ari (1998) suggested 
that the first two classifications of Palestinian identity have been lionised 
through depictions in the media and even by academics and often rendered 
into a stereotypical, homogenous construct. Clemens (2007:110) also 
bemoans Western media for portraying Palestinians in a typified manner, 
without understanding their diversity.  The third classification of self- 
identity was more problematic, as it is an internal construct, and as 
Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1998:221) relate, in their research on 
Palestinian identity, there is always a difficulty in trying to understand the 
self -identity of others, as the observer is’ always on the outside looking 
in.’ Mi’ari (1998) nevertheless, identified a hierarchical nature of 
Palestinian refugee youth identity. The first position in this hierarchy was a 
national identity (Palestinian). Secondly, was a local identity (place of 
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residence). This was followed by an Arab identity. A religious identity was 
in fourth place and lastly was a clan identity, what Hourani (2012: Preface, 
xxi) terms asabiyya9. Each of these components of self -identity sits in a 
refugee identity, which gives them a right to the admittedly minimal 
UNRWA aid and assistance. Most importantly it also codifies their right of 
return (haq al ‘awda) to the lands from which they were displaced and 
reminds the world of that displacement, and its responsibility to right that 
wrong.    
Place and Place Identity. 
Creswell (2009: 4) outlines the currently accepted relationship between 
space and place, originating in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
which he says is the ‘most important contribution of humanistic 
geography’- the distinction between an abstract realm of space and an 
experienced and felt world.’ 
Edward Casey (2001: 404-405) explains the difference between Space and 
Place, which emerged in the 1970’s and is now accepted by many theorists 
in the field: 
‘I maintain that “space” is the name for that most encompassing 
reality that allows for things to be located within it; and it serves in 
this locator capacity whether it is conceived as absolute or relative 
in its own nature. “Place”, on the other hand, is the immediate 
ambience of my lived body and its history, including the whole 
sedimented history of cultural and social influences and personal 
interests that compose my life- history. Place is situated in physical 
space, but then so is everything else, events as well as material 
things; it has no privileged relationship to that space, either by way 
of `exemplification or representation.’ 
 Prior to the late twentieth century, space was considered to have primacy 
over place, which merely served to designate a locational point with 
                                                 
9  Hourani notes that asabiyya in its original meaning denotes a patriarchal family system, 
which is typical of Arab societies. He states that it has now come to mean ‘a corporate 
spirit oriented towards obtaining and keeping power.’  
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specific relations to other points in space. However, as Casey (1997: 51-
52) relates, the significance of place had been recognised much earlier, as 
far back as Aristotle (384-322 BC). Aristotle believed that everything had 
to have a place, which was a point in the void of space. 
Relph (1976: 43) was one of the first to think anew about place, and to 
consider the importance which it plays in human experience:  
“The essence of place lies in the largely unselfconscious 
intentionality that defines places as centres of human existence. 
There is for virtually everyone a deep association with and 
consciousness of the places where we were born and grew up, 
where we live now, or where we have had particularly moving 
experiences. This association seems to constitute a vital source of 
both individual and cultural identity and security...”  
 He utilised a research method which he called a ‘phenomenology of place’ 
(Relph, 1976: 4-7) to examine human diurnal experience, which carries on 
unselfconsciously. This involved investigating the obvious assumptions 
which are taken for granted, in particular concerning nature as a dimension 
of human experience. For Relph, space and place are part of a logical 
disputation, which allows humans to understand space as containing the 
places we inhabit, which in turn derive their meaning from their spatial 
context. Relph (1976: 45) saw that people recognise identity of place (‘the 
persistent sameness and unity which allows that to be differentiated from 
others’) and that there were three parts to this phenomenon: physical 
setting; the activities, situations and events carried on there; and the 
meanings of both individuals and groups created by the experience of 
people in regard to that place. He used the idea of ‘insideness’ to 
demonstrate the concept of identity with place and in doing so formulated 
the concept of place attachment. He proposed that the more inside a place a 
person feels –the more his identity will be tied to that place. The 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have been portrayed as having a strong 
attachment to Palestine, even though most of those still living have only a 
vicarious experience of it (Sayigh: 1977; Sayigh:2001; Ramadan: 2009; 
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Allan:2014). Palestinian narratives, as Siddiq (1995:88) suggests contain 
numerous descriptions of an identity which is ‘out of place’, in a state of 
constant flux, which ‘are an effort to counteract their dispersion by an 
overriding concern: how to reassemble a continuous recognisable 
Palestinian discourse.’ He adds that Palestine is the place for which ‘these 
narratives are a sustained quest for a return to homeland, selfhood and 
nationhood.’ (ibid: 89)  
 For Relph (1976: 20) home: ‘the central reference point of human 
existence’ is the place of greatest significance in a person’s life- where the 
degree of insideness is felt to be most profound. Home was also important 
for Tuan. ‘Home is at the centre… home is the focal point of a cosmic 
structure’ (Tuan, 1977: 149).  Siddiq (1995:94) suggests that, in the case of 
Palestinian refugees, to be deprived of home and country, is to be 
‘deprived of all individual identity.’ Tuan (1977: 197) differed from Relph 
(1976: 21) however on the concepts of ‘rootedness and ‘sense of place’, 
which have often been conflated by other writers. For Tuan (1977: 156-
159), ‘rootedness’ was an unselfconscious and secure state of being in a 
place.  Merely being at home in that place has the possibility of causing the 
person to lose sense of the passage of time and the world beyond his 
immediate surroundings. For Tuan (1977: 3-8) sense of place is a faculty 
used by the person, in a self- conscious act, to create meaning by 
connecting with the physical setting of place, being as we are aroused by 
the landscapes which we experience. Sense of place is not as strong as 
rootedness. Cox (1968: 422-424) presented a good example of the 
difference between the consciousness of a sense of place and the 
unconsciousness of rootedness, through a narrative of long term attachment 
to place even though the physical setting of that place may have 
disappeared. This can be applied to the Palestinian situation as Pappe 
(2006) relates the obliteration of former Palestinian villages by the 
Government of Israel, has not diminished the level of attachment of the 
refugees in the diaspora.  
The diametric opposite of Relph’s term of ‘insideness’ was ‘outsideness’. 
This is a location where people felt alienated from place. He postulated 
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that the human condition operated both of these feelings about every place, 
which modulated the degree of place identity that each place holds for 
individuals or groups. Schulz and Hammer (2003:86) describe the 
Palestinian refugees as living in a rootless condition, which triggers 
nostalgic interrogations of the past, ‘nurturing a constant dream of 
reversing the past condition of denial, exclusion, humiliation and 
estrangement into a triumphant return.’ For the Palestinians in Lebanon, 
the camps represent ‘outsideness’ and Palestine, either real or imagined 
represent ‘insideness.’  Relph (1996) was later to offer a self –criticism on 
his earlier work, in particular on what he called a ‘lack of conceptual 
sophistication’. Relph felt that because he conceptualised his theory using 
diametric opposites (insideness/outsideness; place/placelessness, etc.), he 
was confined in his exposition to a black or white rigidity, with no 
allowance for intermediate shadings. Massey (1997: 323) further criticised 
him for his seeming attachment to place over placelessness, which perhaps 
demonstrates a failure on her part to understand his message, rather than an 
actual partiality on his part. Most importantly Relph was one of the first to 
elevate the concept of place from being a point on a map to a centre of 
human action.  
Following the ground-breaking work of Relph (1976) and Tuan (1974 and 
1977), Harold Proshansky published the results of his studies on place 
identity (Proshansky, 1978; Proshansky et al, 1983). Proshansky (1978: 
154) proposed the idea that the development of self-identity was intricately 
bound with places and things and that commencing in childhood this 
process is dynamic and can occur at any stage in a person’s lifecycle. This 
concept was novel because he proposed that  
‘the subjective sense of self is defined and expressed not simply by 
one’s relationship to other people, but also by one’s relationship to 
the various physical settings that define and structure day-to-day 
life’ (Proshansky et al, 1983: 58).   
For Proshansky as for Mead, the self operates at both the conscious and 
unconscious level, in order to allow the person to regulate behaviour. 
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Proshansky et al (1983:58) note that Erikson (1950) and Rosenberg (1979) 
have ‘stressed the role of the social environment in the development of 
individual identity.’  Allan (2014: 33) noted how the social environment in 
the PRCs in Lebanon had affected the development of individual and 
collective identities, which were divergent from those traditionally 
ascribed to them. 
Proshansky’s work was different from more traditional identity theories, 
because it did not assume that a person’s identity (encapsulated in the self) 
was stable and unified. Proshansky was of the opinion that the self was 
constantly changing, in response to changes in the person’s life cycle and 
the social and physical environment, in which he is situated. Proshansky et 
al (1983: 59) defined place-identity as a sub-structure of self-identity, 
consisting of ‘cognitions about the physical world… representing 
memories, ideas, feelings, attitudes, values, preferences, meanings and 
conceptions of behaviour and experience’ within that environment. 
Furthermore, these ‘have served instrumentally in the satisfaction of the 
person’s biological, psychological, social and cultural needs.’ Proshansky 
et al (1983: 61) cite the work of   Relph (1976), Cooper (1974), and Fried 
(1963) and identify a deficiency common across their work, in that their 
conception of place identity fails to go beyond the home to other physical 
settings. An individual will encounter a vast array of place settings in the 
course of his lifetime and they consequently must have an influence on the 
development of that person’s place identity. Peteet (2005:25) maintains 
that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon  
‘construct and participate in the local while remaining connected to 
and participating other distant locales via communicative 
technologies, economic networks of exchange, and travel. Identities 
are profoundly shaped by and referenced within these exchanges.’  
  In the structure proposed by Proshansky et al (1983) the place identity of 
the person is contained in ‘a potpourri of memories, concepts, feelings’ 
(ibid: 62). However, these memories are subject to distortion, as the person 
and the physical setting change over time; in effect, these cognitions 
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lodged in the memory of the person are stylised and highly selective, and 
some cognitions will be lost. This process is largely subconscious and it is 
only when ‘a physical setting becomes dysfunctional that a person 
becomes aware of his or her expectations for that setting’ (ibid: 75).  In 
essence Proshansky et al (1983: 80) set out their position on place identity, 
by stating that  
‘place identity cognitions express and reflect the physical settings 
and the properties they support and are directly relevant to the 
social roles and attributes that define who the person is …. any 
change in cognitions of place identity are caused by changes in the 
social roles and social attributes of the person and therefore in his 
self-identity’.  
Peteet (2005:28) suggests that, for Palestinian refugee identity in Lebanon, 
place was a ‘crucial and constitutive component in formations of identity, 
while identity shaped place.’ This symbiotic relationship has persisted 
from times when Palestinian refugees were ‘victims’, to times when they 
were ‘returnees’ to the present day when they are ‘refugees’ again.   
Korpela (1989: 241-256) while acknowledging the contributions of 
Proshansky (1978) and Proshansky et al (1983) in understanding place 
identity, criticised their failure to ‘make use of an organising principle that 
would help account for conduct that is influenced by a person’s place 
identity at any given time’. The essence of his work is that a person, both 
consciously and unconsciously, uses place- based meanings to regulate 
their self- definition by focussing on meanings that balance or respond to 
the pressures of diurnal, existential living.  Korpela (1989: 245) stated, in 
contradiction to Proshansky et al (1983) that place-identity is ‘not a 
confused potpourri of images and feelings about physical settings.’ It has 
its own internal logic and coherence as a result of self-regulation, which 
serves to cluster different cognitions together and ‘it applies to every 
physical environment and object that has a role in one’s self-regulation’. 
Additionally, whereas Proshansky et al (1983: 62) proposed that place 
identity went beyond emotional attachments and belonging, Korpela 
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(1989: 246) maintains that place-belongingness is the basis for place 
identity, not merely one aspect of it. Korpela (1989: 245) was in agreement 
with Proshansky et al (1983:61) that place identity was not restricted to the 
home environment only, but extends far beyond considering it as essential 
and wholly comprising a person’s place identity relationship. Peteet 
(2005:219), in like manner, states that for Palestinians in Lebanon, who 
have never left their ‘homes’, ‘Palestine is envisioned in the desire for the 
security that place can provide and the rights entailed in being a citizen.’ 
They are keenly aware of the complex relationship between place and 
identity and for them ‘going to Palestine remains more than an issue of 
belonging and justice.’ 
In a somewhat similar vein, Stokols (1981: 396) described place-based 
meanings, in transactional terms, as: 
‘an index of the interdependence between groups and place in terms 
of the shared  sociocultural images that are conveyed by physical 
environments. These images constitute the non- material properties 
of the physical milieu –the sociocultural “residue” (or residual 
meaning) that becomes attached to places as a result of their 
continued association with group  activities’ 
 McCarthy (1984: 105) and Sack (1980) were in broad agreement that not 
only were place-based meanings constituents of identity, but that they were 
of more significance than other social mobilisers, because they are more 
stable and can be more readily constructed and maintained by the person. 
Sack (1980: 86) states that  
‘Places are significant, not because of their inherent value, but 
rather because we assign value to them…they become specific as 
we give them meaning in relation to our actions as individuals and 
as members of groups’ 
Hull et al (1994: 118) suggested that place identity is a significant 
construct because it enhances a sense of community and may be a subset of 
a sense of place: 
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‘Place icons serve as symbols of peoples’ memories and values and 
thereby make the experience of place more personal, more intimate. 
When these icons are encountered they may evoke the valued 
memories and/or other associations and thereby evoke a sense of 
place.’  
Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996: 206) maintain that ‘rather than there 
being a separate part of identity concerned with place, all aspects of 
identity will have to a greater or lesser extent have place-related 
implications.’ Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996: 218) make a significant 
contribution to our understanding of the way in which place is central to 
our identity in their assertion that ‘all identifications have location 
implications; place is part of the content of an identification’. Peteet 
(2005:30) maintains that the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon 
although places of confinement, were organised to represent the spaces that 
Palestinians left behind, after the Nakba and are central to the 
consideration of Palestinian refugee identity. 
Massey (1994: 168-169) offered a view on the dynamic nature of place and 
identity which is similar to both Bourdieu (1977) and Hall (1991): 
‘What is specific about a place, its identity, is always formed by the 
juxtaposition and co- presence there of particular sets of social 
interrelations and by the effects which that juxtaposition and co-
presence produce. The identities of places are inevitably unfixed- 
because the social relations out of which they are constructed are 
themselves, by their very nature, dynamic and changing and 
because of the continual production of further social effects through 
the very juxtaposition of those social relations’.…. the identity of 
place is in part constructed out of positive interrelations with 
elsewhere. The identity of a place does not derive from some 
internalised history. It derives in large part from the specificity of 
its interactions with the outside’. 
 For Massey (1994: 167) places and identities are not static, in contrast to 
previous formulations of the concept of geographical place, which 
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associated it with stasis and with an enclosed security. Hall (1991: 21) 
maintains that ‘Identity is a structured representation which only achieves 
its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the 
eye of the needle of the ’other’ before it can construct itself’, even when 
considerations of place are involved. He agrees with Massey (1994) that 
identity, including that associated with place, is always a temporary and 
changing phenonomen, which is a product of recognising differences and 
temporalities. It is always incomplete and dynamic. Attachment to place 
and territory remain important in modern society despite (and possibly 
because of) the increased mobility of the population and the production of 
standardised landscapes. In the case of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 
this attachment to Palestine, either the stylised ‘frozen’ nostalgia of the 
older generations, or the more pragmatic attachment filtered through the 
‘global-aware’ vision of the youth, is still the bedrock for their identity, as 
Allan (2014: 66-67) suggests. 
Collective Identity 
 Collective identity is usually based on symbolic myths and sites of 
commemoration, which have a very specific and basic function in the 
construction of a culture, society and nation (Ohana and Wistrich 1996). 
Walzer (1983: 314) wrote ‘membership in communities constitutes an 
important part of our sense of individual identity’. Sandel (1984: 5-6) 
developed this further: ‘If we are partly defined by the communities we 
inhabit, then we must also be implicated in the purposes and ends of those 
communities.’ Palestinians refugees in Lebanon share a common origin, a 
common trauma of displacement, and the common experience in living in 
the harsh conditions imposed upon them by the Lebanese government. 
They have no shortage of myths and sites of commemoration. The events 
of the Nakba (catastrophe-refers to the displacement in 1948) have been 
passed on to subsequent generations, through families and latterly through 
media, such as films, books and the internet. The camps themselves are the 
embodiment of their exile and locations of massacres, such as in Shatila 
(1982,1985-1988) and Burj al Barajneh (1985-1988), perpetrated by the 
Christian Phalangists and Shia Amal. Schulz and Hammer (2003:88) 
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suggest that the ‘sharing of harassment and injustice, the denial and 
exclusion and this common experience formed the basis of a collective 
identity for the Palestinians.’  
 Myths internalize collective memory and they are usually spatial. The 
possibility of identifying a specific geographical site for myths makes them 
more accessible emotionally, through the meanings which we ascribe to 
that site. Goffman (1959) was one of the first to consider that the meanings 
which we ascribe to places and spaces as central building blocks in the 
process of social interaction. Others such as Reed (1982) developed this 
concept further and saw place and region as components of both individual 
and group identity. Groups can be formed because of identification with 
the same place or because of similar aspirations. The essential element of 
understanding the importance of place identity formation is the meaning 
which is ascribed to it. This ranges along a continuum from the subjective 
(personal experience understanding) to the objective (sense of place as 
location), and includes cultural symbols of place associated with a 
particular community. Veyne (1984: 32) writes that the ascription of 
meaning is accomplished by an identity using a process of emplotment, 
which gives a structure to the understanding of events, both as they 
happen, and after the event.  They are configured into narratives. Eastmond 
(2007: 254) relates how Palestinian refugees construct a meaningful world 
for themselves, emphasising agency and ability over victimisation. 
Individual and collective narratives ‘may also illuminate the reaffirmation 
of the self, in order to contest over-generalised and de-individualising 
images promoted in a camp situation.’ She contends (ibid: 257) that 
‘memories of al-Nakba, told over several generations attest to the 
transformation over several generations of Palestinians into a refugee 
nation.’   
Mc Intyre (1984: 221) suggested that a person’s social identity is 
inextricably intertwined in membership of a community, which has a 
collective identity. Carr (1986: 162) concurs with this view, ‘a community 
exists wherever a narrative account of a we which has continuous existence 
through its experiences and activities’ (emphasis in the original); for Carr 
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this relationship is dynamic. Bellah et al (1985: 153), in their study of US 
community encapsulates this concept of the dynamic nature of narrative 
and meaning in the understanding of and formation of identity at the 
personal and community levels. They state that a community is constantly 
retelling its constitutive narrative, re-stating its collective identity using 
examples of people who have been paragons in upholding that identity. 
These memories although situated in the past offer hope for the future and 
tie the aspirations of the person to those of the collective, allowing the 
individual to understand their contributions to a common good. As Allan 
(2014); Sayigh (1998); and Sanbar (2001) relate, the memory of the events 
surrounding the Nakba served to form the basis for the Palestinian refugee 
identity at both the collective and personal levels. 
Tradition and Memory 
What ties the concept of the community as illustrated by Carr, Mc Intyre 
and Bellah et al, is the concept of tradition. Traditions evolve from conflict 
and debate as well as agreement. Massey (1994: 141) writes: 
‘there are indeed multiple meanings of place held by different 
social groups… the question of which identity is dominant will be 
the result of social negotiation and conflict… the past is no more 
authentic than the present; there will be no one reading of it.’ 
 Traditions are shared and are fundamental to individual identity formation 
and group cohesiveness. Taylor (1989: 54) saw tradition as central to 
identity at both the individual and collective levels because the past and 
present dictate how we proceed to the future.  Hoelscher and Alderman 
(2004: 348-350) maintain that memory is tied to place, in an irrevocable 
bond and that it is continually unfolding. It is for them a social activity and 
serves as a binding mechanism of group identity, because although 
personal memory makes place out of space, collective memory is an 
important factor in peoples materialistic and symbolic understanding of 
place through shared knowledge of their surroundings, of historical 
occurrences, and of their sense of belonging to a specific place. Peteet 
(2005:204) suggests that the Palestinian commemorations of the massacres 
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associated with the events surrounding al- Nakba (1947-1949) and the 
more recent one of Sabra/Shatila (1982), although temporarally divided, 
are examples of ‘a collectivity deriving meaning at the heart of a common 
identity’ associated with Palestine.  
Connerton (1989) writes of social memories, which contain a mix of 
ambiguous narratives which flow seamlessly from nostalgia to critical 
memories, grounded in actualities. Cashman (2006) makes the point that 
nostalgia is not necessarily reliable and can be fluid and contradictory. 
Connerton (1989) also states that societies remember not only through 
social memory, but also by commemorations and bodily practices. Political 
leaders may attempt to cause the people to remember certain memories, 
pertinent to their political goals, but individuals will have personal 
memories. Halbwachs (1992) was criticised for being too deterministic 
when he wrote that collective memory has a strong influence on the 
memory of the individual and his capability to remember. A constant 
constituent to the subject of identity is that of the importance of memory. 
Assmann (2008: 109) describes memory as the  
‘faculty that enables us to form an awareness of self-hood 
(identity), both on the personal and collective level; identity being 
related to time, making humans diachronic identities. The synthesis 
of time and identity is effectuated by memory.’  
Halbwachs (1992) saw memory as dependent on socialisation and allows 
us to live in groups, which in turn builds group memories.  Assmann 
(2008: 112-114) prescribes three levels of memory called individual, 
communicative and cultural memory, which reflect the inner self, the 
social self and cultural identity respectively. She saw the different levels of 
memory as a dynamic- creating tension and transition between the different 
groups to which we belong. Memory she says is ‘knowledge with an 
identity – index; knowledge about oneself, as an individual, or member of 
a family, a generation, a community, or a nation’. Anderson (1991), 
Connerton (1989), Nora (1989) have stated that memory is integral to 
nation-building. These memories are both personal and individual; and 
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social and collective. Peteet (2005:111-112) iterates one way in which 
memory acts to preserve a collective identity for Palestinians in Lebanon. 
The naming of areas within Burj al -Barajneh refugee camp after villages 
of origin in northern Palestine was instituted in the early days of exile and 
these names persist to the present day, evoking memories of life before al-
Nakba. In this way, a collective identity was formed and maintained.  
Tradition involves individual and collective memory, what Halbwachs 
(1951, 1992) described as a current continuous thought which preserves, in 
a selective manner all that is important to the individual or group. Tradition 
also involves the negation of what is not considered important to 
maintaining it; the process of forgetting, either deliberate or subconscious. 
Battaglia (1993: 430, 440) writes that ‘forgetting gives rise to society, in a 
productive social action.’ In this way Palestinians ‘forget’ the hardships 
associated with the heavy toil of an agrarian existence, the inequity of their 
semi-feudal life, and their lack of political agency. All that is remembered 
is an idyllic ‘land of plenty’, where village relations are characterised by 
solidarity, unity and generosity. Rowlands (1999) wrote on the process of 
forgetting in relation to the interpretation of war memorials in memory 
construction and identity. He talks about the creation of an ‘appropriate 
memory’ and ‘remembering to forget’. The danger is that by doing so in a 
selective manner, veracity cannot be guaranteed as the process involves 
forgetting in the construction of memory, and identity. Mc Dowell and 
Braniff (2014: 68) also deal with the problematic subject of forgetting in 
memory- work  
‘Memory- work often contains an element of forgetting, usually 
deliberate and often this forgetting casts long shadows rendering 
recovery of memory difficult and the dissemination of important 
memory much more troublesome.’  
 Harvey (1989: 218) makes the case that community is the repository ‘for 
collective memory, for all those manifestations of place-bound nostalgias 
that infect our images of the country, and the city, of region, milieu and 
locality.’ However, this evokes concepts of stable identities and static 
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places, and undoubtedly both personal identity and sense of place are 
dynamic, as are the relationships between people and places, at the 
individual and collective levels.   
Community brings with it obligations and responsibilities; it links personal 
responsibility commitment and identification with other people. It is as 
Cohen (1985: 21) states important because its symbolic rallying points are 
‘polyvalent, providing an all-embracing concept which can contain the 
multiplicity of individual objectives and expectations.’ Community 
maintains this cohesion partly through the transmission of tradition and 
also through the narratives which it constructs. These two facets situate 
social practices and identities historically and ensure that they are repeated.  
These narratives are important to the form and formation of individual and 
collective identities. 
Culture and Belonging: 
Studies of culture in the late 19th, early 20th centuries saw culture as a 
concept of social evolutionism – a ‘complex whole including knowledge, 
belief, art, morals, law custom and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society’ (Tylor, 1871, 1924:1). This 
definition, which was open to accusations of racism, was disowned by later 
anthropologists such as Malinowski as described by Young (2004).    
Bernard (1972: 3) saw the members of a culture as  
‘sharing the same ways of behaviour, the same beliefs and 
institutions, the same language and historical background, the result 
not of biological or genetic traits, but part of their cultural heritage, 
formed out of common responses to common needs in the historical 
experience of their group.’ 
De Vos (1975: 9) offered a more succinct definition of culture as being 
composed of ‘members of a self-perceived group who maintain a common 
set of traditions, not shared by others, with whom they are in contact’.   
The connection between identity and culture was developed by Erik 
Erikson (1950), through his work with children, and showed that 
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personality was the end product of the internalisation of culture within the 
self and personality or identity was the projection of culture. Identity was 
now understood as a historically and culturally rooted self- image of a 
group of people which was continually enhanced and influenced by social 
contact with other groups. Importantly the identity of the individuals 
reflected the identities of their cultural group. Burke and Stets (2009: 126-
127) illustrate this point by asserting that person identities are verified by 
enacting processes that define the social system, within groups, thereby 
receiving recognition, approval and acceptance from others within the 
group, and that individuals change their behaviour and identity when it 
differs from that of the group.  
The current understanding of culture is that it is dynamic, fluid, and 
inclusive of diversity, no longer considered as ‘bounded’. Wright (1998), 
Hall (1996), Cohen (2000), Bauman (2001) have written on the effects of 
globalisation, which have caused this newer concept of culture. Wright 
(1998) sees culture as a political process of contestation among individual 
members or groups to define social situations. Hall (1996) proposed the 
term ‘identification’ over ‘identity’, in order to make the concept of culture 
less essentialist in nature. Hall (1990: 223) offers two conceptualisations of 
cultural identity. In the first, he writes about the ‘shared culture’, which he 
terms the ‘one true self’ hiding inside the many ‘other superficial or 
artificially imposed ‘selves’, which people with a shared ancestry and 
history hold in common. He argues that this ‘oneness’ is stable and 
provides unchanging frames of reference and meaning. However, in the 
second definition (ibid: 225), he goes on to offer the view that there are 
differences as well as similarities in ‘what we have become’. Identity then 
is contingent and not ahistorical and undergoes a process of 
transformation. Cultural Identities are the ‘points of suture’, which are 
made in the discourses of history and culture. Baumann (2001), added 
weight to Hall’s use of the ‘identification’ term, and stated that the 
individual within a culture is not tied to one identification, due to contacts 
with other cultures within the global society. This would lead to the 
assumption that globalisation has transformed the concept of culture as 
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stable because of the possibilities of contacts with multiple cultures in the 
modern age, in what Appadura1 (2001) terms: ‘the contact zone’. The 
inference which can be drawn from this hypothesis is that people are 
developing multicultural identities and hybrid identities as a result. (Ewing, 
1990: 253; Massey, 1994: 170-172; Bhabba, 1992: 57). 
Van Mejl (2008: 172-173) develops upon Wright (1998) by commenting 
on the dynamic nature of culture, which for him is not confined to one 
voice. For him, there is a continual competition for the ‘power to define 
social situations.’ Van Mejl (2008: 180) suggests that modern society has 
been transformed by globalisation, causing clashes between the ‘demands 
of their own culture’ and the ‘challenges of a global society’. This poses 
problems for adolescents in balancing the differences between their natal 
cultures and global society. He posits that a hybrid identity emerges, whose 
content requires constant combination and re-combination, resulting in 
‘multicultural identities’. Peteet (2005:220) touches upon this changing 
nature of Palestinian cultural identity and its hybridity. She asserts that 
Palestinians do not fit easily into past anthropological theoretical 
frameworks. She suggests that transnationalism, their nomadic existence 
and their engagement with other cultures, has transformed their cultural 
identity, while still retaining a desire for return to Palestine.  Despite 
identifying oneself with a culture and being so identified by others, it must 
be taken into account as Whitebrook (2001: 137) notes that groups are 
made up of people with ‘multiple simultaneous, sometimes even 
antagonistic commitments and allegiances.’ It follows therefore that 
cultural groups are composed of people with individual aspirations, points 
of view and sometimes conflicting allegiances. 
The Concepts of Memory and Belonging within Nationality 
Home is ‘where one best knows oneself’ as Rapport and Dawson (1998: 9) 
wrote, even though ‘best’ means ‘most’ if not always ‘happiest’. It is for 
them a cognitive place. Tuan (1977: 144) likewise describes home as an 
intimate place, where we experience life as real and (ibid: 149) as ‘at the 
centre of an astronomically determined spatial system- the focal point of 
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the cosmic structure’. Home is created through residence over time and 
involves both good and bad experiences. It is the interstice of place and 
self- history, a place to which one can ‘belong.’ In this way, a sense of 
belonging stretches from our past and includes all our life experiences 
along the way. The Marxist stand on home is that it is one of a social 
process involved in the construction of place, specifically because of 
capitalism. Harvey (1993: 5) questions whether or not the social 
construction of home as a place is used in a regressive or reactionary 
manner, as a means of a bulwark against some menacing ‘other’ on the 
outside. Home can also be a place of contestation and as Creswell (2009: 
5) points out feminist geographers have conceived of home ‘as a site of 
patriarchal authority often associated with extremes of abuse, boredom and 
back-breaking labour.’ Even so, home is generally conceived of as the site 
of the most intense sense of attachment and safety, a centre of meaning and 
identity. Allan (2014:194, 195) suggests that the Jeel ma baa’d El harb 
increasingly regard the camps as home; ‘places they authentically belong 
to and inhabit.’ She adds (ibid: 214) that identity and belonging are 
constituted through and enmeshed in the ‘local, material world that 
refugees inhabit’ and that   the PRCs (ibid: 217) ‘form part of the warp and 
woof of refugee identity.’ 
Memory is an important constituent in our realisation of ‘home.’ This 
sense of belonging is not ‘mere’ nostalgia, but much more complex as 
Boym (2001: xviii) describes 
‘reflective nostalgia dwells in the ambivalence of human longing 
and belonging and does not shy away from contradictions of 
modernity... At best reflective nostalgia can present an ethical and 
creative challenge, not merely a pretext for midnight melancholias.’  
Baumann (1996: 30) says something similar, but places nostalgia and 
homesickness in a temporal context:  
‘we need to distinguish homesick searching from nostalgic 
yearning-the latter is past- oriented, while the home in 
homesickness is in the future perfect tense…. It is an urge to feel at 
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home, to recognise one’s surroundings and belong there…. The 
value of home for the homesick lies precisely in its tendency to stay 
in the future tense forever’ 
Nationality is defined as ‘the status of belonging to a particular nation’; the 
condition of being national; ‘an ethnic group forming a part of one or more 
political nations’; and as ‘a patriotic sentiment’ (concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 1991: 789). Fairchild (1962: 201) defines it as a group that may 
exist without having a political identity or indeed any autonomy in political 
matters. He further identifies cultural homogeneity and a similarity in 
language, distinctive kinship patterns, ethical values and a desire for a 
commonly experienced lifestyle as markers for nationality. Lamser (1971: 
183) identifies four main ingredients of nationality: a common blood line; 
a recognisable race; a perceived origin; and a unique language. Ownership 
of the territory where this conjunction of traits meets is not a necessary 
pre-condition for nationality. National identity may also be defined in 
terms of a group with national-feeling, viewed as such by others. The 
Palestinians, the Kurds, and the Basques are cases in point, even though 
they have not yet achieved a national state, they are considered to have 
nationality. Smith (1983 :168-169, 174) describes the process by which a 
group, either ethnical or cultural in nature, transforms its identity to 
achieve nationality. He suggests that it is the intensification of national 
consciousness, attitudes and loyalties that are more important than 
doctrines or ideologies in the formation of nationality.  Members of a 
nationality strive to be differentiated from other peoples, by one or more 
attributes, based on racial and historical association.  
Nationalism is related to nationality in that it derives its substance from the 
same source. Smith (1991: viii) says that it ‘provides the most compelling 
identity myth in the modern world’. It is both a feeling of belonging to the 
nation and a corresponding political ideology. Ignatieff (1993: 4) provides 
the epitome of what is the modern concept of ethnic nationalism: ‘the 
national spirit comprised of the people’s pre-existing ethnic characteristics: 
their religion, customs and tradition’. Gellner (1983: 48-49) makes the case 
that nations like nationalism are constructed and that the idea that either is 
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‘natural’ or ‘God-given’ is a myth. In fact, he goes on to state that the 
reality is that nationalism can destroy pre-existing cultures. Hobsbawm 
(1990: 10) concurs with Gellner in this regard by his emphasis on the 
element of social engineering and artefact in the construction of nation-
building and by inference nationalism. Anderson (1991: 6) agrees with 
Gellner in defining nationalism as ‘not the awakening of nations to self-
consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.’ Anderson (1991: 
6-7) writes of the nation in terms of an  
‘imagined political community… imagined because members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow 
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind, each 
lives the image of their communion’.  
 Baker (2012: 23) argues that although Anderson’s ‘imagined 
communities’ imply that they are located ‘less in material place and more 
in imaginary place’, even imagined community is ’placed’ in some way as 
bodies ‘remain, though mobile, situated in one place or another.’ Yuval –
Davis (2011: 26) criticised Anderson for his comments on ‘imagined’ 
communities:  
‘the national imagination also includes former and future 
generations. The inability, therefore, to meet all members of the 
nation is not just as a result of the size of the nation, but is 
inherently impossible. Anderson’s definition seems to assume that, 
if all the members of the nation could meet face-to-face, 
imagination would be redundant.’  
Smith (1989: 361) goes even further than Anderson by stating that the 
‘nation which emerges in the modern era must be regarded as both 
construct and process’. Schulz and Hammer (2003: 15) assert that diaspora 
populations, such as the Palestinians often embrace nationalist programmes 
and ambitions in their specific memories of place, in an effort to reunite the 
people to their ancestral home and undo their traumatic separation. It is, 
they suggest, for the Palestinians a strategy of resistance by the 
marginalised. 
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Nationalism is a method to interpret social space and this is embodied in 
the creation of the homeland concept. Williams and Smith (1983: 505) 
consider that the homeland does not come ready made; instead it is the 
result of the national construction of social space. They go on (ibid: 502) to 
make the point that the land is intrinsic to our understanding of nationalism 
and our understanding of a national identity. The land is converted into a 
national ancestral homeland by the perceptions of the people being 
nationalised. Blood is linked to soil and is perceived as being unique to the 
subjects and reinforces the ‘them’ and ‘us’ paradigm; thereby gaining 
control over the homeland, whether or not political control is attained. 
Nationalism does not necessarily have to be territorialised as Salazar 
(1998: 116) states “there are conglomerates based on the principle of birth 
that may generate loyalties and attachments, as strong as, or sometimes 
even stronger than the nation-state” He further states “one of them is the 
attachment to a grouping that ignores geographical boundaries” and which 
he calls “stateless nationalism”. Schulz and Hammer (2003:17) support 
Salazar by stating that in the Palestinian case, stateless nationalism has 
succeeded in building a proto-state without territory, based on the idea of 
territory. Edward Said (1990:359), writing about Palestinian nationalism, 
described it as ‘an assertion to belonging in and to a place, a people and a 
heritage.’  Kaiser (2004: 231) offered the opinion, however, that homeland 
making is ‘the politicisation and territorialisation of the population 
represented as the indigenous or autochthonous ethnic community.’ In 
other words, homelands are constructed to instil not only a sense of spatial 
identity or emotional attachment to an ancestral homeland among the 
population being territorialised, but also a sense of exclusiveness. In this 
way, a ‘national’ identity is also constructed. Much of this identity 
formation is contained in memories, which range from family to state 
sponsored memories. Tuan (1977: 154-155) wrote that profound 
attachment to homeland is historical stretching back to the times of the 
ancient Greeks; homeland is the embodiment of the permanence of place 
and ‘hence reassuring to him, who sees frailty in himself and chance and 
flux everywhere’. He also cites Doob (1952: 196), in a description of the 
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term Heimat: ‘the mother earth who has given birth to our folk and race, 
who is the holy soil……is the landscape we have experienced… the land 
which has become fruitful through the sweat of our ancestors.’ Khalidi 
(1997: 21) and Allan (2014: 41, 7, 70-71) describe how Palestinian 
nationalism has been mobilised to define Palestinian refugee identity, often 
to the exclusion of other more pertinent constituents, a finding which also 
emerged during the 2016 research, in Lebanon for this thesis. 
Identity Symbols 
Harley (1988: 277-312) has described the resonance of cartographic 
depictions of homelands and the influence which they have in reinforcing 
the re-imagining of the homeland, in the perceptions of the recipients by 
their portrayal of images of the historic homeland to the ‘sacred soil’. He 
cites flags, and national anthems as potent symbols of nationalism which 
evoke strong emotional responses across all classes and genders. The 
homeland is sometimes sexualised, becoming for example in the case of 
the Palestinians and the French an intensely female persona, sometimes a 
mother figure, sometimes a beautiful young woman. 
.  
Figure 2.1. Copy of picture of a Palestinian woman wearing the 
keffiyeh in a home in Shatila. Source: O’Connor 2016. 
The use of a female symbol in this way is important as Massey (1994: 10) 
points out: ‘Woman stands as metaphor for Nature… for what has been 
lost (left behind) and that place called home is frequently personified and 
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partakes of the same characteristics as those assigned to Woman/ Mother/ 
Lover’. In Arab culture, the honour of men is associated with sanctity of a 
woman’s honour. (Hasso, 2000:495). The alleged actual rapes (ightisab) 
documented in Morris (1987) and Pappe (2006), against Palestinian 
women, were well known during the events of the Nakba and caused many 
to flee. Humphries and Khalili (2007:212-213) describe how the term 
ightisab Filastin (literally: rape of Palestine) has been used to describe the 
appropriation of the lands of Palestine by the Israelis.  Connor (1986: 16) 
maintained that homeland myths, images and symbols are being used to 
nationalise space and territorialise national identity: 
‘the ethnic homeland is far more than a territory. As evidenced by 
the near universal use of such emotionally charged terms as the 
motherland; the fatherland; the native land; the ancestral land; land 
where my fathers died; and not least the homeland, the territory so 
identified becomes imbued with an emotional, almost reverential 
dimension’.  
Aburfaha (2008:3 44) relates how products of the ‘land’ can be used as 
powerful symbols to evoke nostalgia, belonging and nationalism amongst 
both Palestinians and Israelis alike. He asserts that the ‘most prominent 
representations of nationhood and peoplehood has been their articulation of 
their rootedness in the land of Palestine.’ This is in the face of Israeli 
physical isolation of Palestinians. The cactus (Al-saber: also meaning 
patience in Arabic) was a Palestinian metaphor of community prior to 1948 
(2008: 346-348), being used not only to demarcate borders of cultivated 
land, but also providing fruit, even in times of drought.   After the Nakba 
(1948), the orange (Al-burtuqal) became a symbol of loss of the orange 
groves of Jaffa; of a robbed nationhood (2008: 348-352). In the meantime, 
the Israelis appropriated the symbol of the cactus and the term sabra was 
applied to the young kibbutzim who were transforming the desert into 
blooming arable land. (Almong, 2000) After the defeat of the PLO in 1982, 
in Lebanon, the olive tree (Al- zaytuna) became a symbol of Palestinian 
rootedness and nationalism (Aburfaha, 2008: 353- 358). After the Oslo 
Accords of 1993, there was a fear that Arafat was bargaining away the 
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right of return for the displaced Palestinian population. The cactus has once 
again been adopted in Palestinian consciousness ‘as a witness that refuses 
to die’. (Aburfaha, 2008: 363-366) The new symbolism of the cactus is a 
reaffirmation of their attachment to the soil, the land and their identity- 
within the same system of meaning (Turner, 1967).     
 
Figure 2.2 Depiction of al-saber alongside poster of Arafat and stylised 
housing in Palestine on a wall in Mar Elias PRC. Source: O’Connor, 
2016. 
Homeland is also constructed through the use of writers, poets, artists and 
composers.  Examples of the use of these devices to instil a sense of 
belonging to homeland and nation abound. Aburfaha cites the short stories 
of Ghassan Kanafani (2000) in which he communicated the thoughts of the 
Palestinian refugees, the effects of exile on their psyche and the new 
schemes of consciousness and identity formation, which they experienced; 
by this representation the experience becomes shared for new generations 
of Palestinians. Kanafani (1999) was to use a later novella (Return to 
Haifa) to demonstrate that the homeland is not just memories of the past, 
but how those memories are used for the future. Aburfaha (2008: 351) 
maintains that in this way Kanafani ‘drew a new exiled Palestinian 
consciousness that moved Palestine from an object in the past to an object 
in the future, from nostalgia to an aspiration’ (Emphasis in the original).   
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Shatz (2001) wrote that Mahmud Darwish was regarded as the Palestinian 
‘national’ poet and the Palestinian President declared three days of 
mourning after his death in 2008.  
Mc Dowell and Braniff (2014: 14-15) discuss the importance of symbols in 
their ‘ability to embody the past and stimulate remembering in fixed 
locales’ and the ability of ‘spatialisations of the past to construct identity 
and shape interpretation’ and by doing so ‘bind communities, societies and 
nations in the present.’ Buckley (1998: 14) cited in Mc Dowell and Braniff 
(2014: 19) relates that the meaning of these symbols is liable to change and 
different interpretations, as the individual or social group for which it is a 
signifier is also liable to change. In an example of this change, Khalidi 
(1997: 15-16) writes about the use of place names to strengthen national 
identity and the idea of homeland. The changing of the name of Silwan (an 
ancient village adjacent to the walls of the Old City in Jerusalem) to ‘City 
of David’ was carried out by Israeli settlers to establish their hegemony 
over Arab lands. Similarly, he cites the practice used by Israeli authorities 
to refer to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria, a process which he calls 
‘decisively submitting them (the Arab inhabitants) to Israeli dominion.’   
Kaiser (2004: 235-236) maintains that the construction of national 
monuments and commemorative sites are essential to the making of 
homeland. The ‘linking together of history and territory is essential for the 
conceptualisation of a land as a national homeland.’ This linkage acts to 
combine history and geography, by intertwining historical memory into 
spatial representation of nationhood and is a powerful motivator.  
 
Diaspora and Identity: 
Although connoted to refer solely to the Jews, the term diaspora has now 
come to mean any group of people who have been displaced under various 
criteria, which are similar in nature and which are examined below.  
Tölölyan (1996: 12-15) sets out six characteristics for defining a diaspora, 
which comprise a traumatic displacement and resettlement; a group 
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identity; collective memory; community boundaries; the perception of 
connectedness to other diasporic communities and the desire for return.  
Safran (1991:83-4) reduces these characteristics to four. Cohen (1996: 515) 
qualifies Tölölyan’s definition and adds three more including a troubled 
relationship with host societies; the possibility of a creative enriching life 
in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism; and an idealization of the 
putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, 
restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation. Cohen admits the 
possibility that the dispersion may be for colonisation purposes. Both 
Cohen (1996) and Safran (1991) see that shared identities are important 
factors, because without a diasporic consciousness there can be no such 
community. This does not presuppose that different identity formulations 
may be constructed within the same group due to differences in the 
experiences of that dispersal.  
Venn (2009: 4) refutes the assumption that the identities within diasporas 
are basically unchanging, homogenous entities, rather than the 
heterogeneous, polyglot plural, and existential entities which they are. He 
further asserts (2009: 4) that the ‘crossing of routes and roots’ must be 
reassessed in the light of the modern diasporic dispersions and that the 
traditional assumptions of a ‘sense of belonging or unbelonging’ must be 
re-examined. He also makes the point that dislocation caused by 
displacement ‘occasion mutations in subjectivity and identity.’  Brubaker 
(2005:12) also urges that a diaspora should not be considered as ‘a unified, 
bounded group connected to a specific homeland’, but instead as ‘a claim, 
an idiom, a category of practice’ which is used to articulate projects and 
formulate expectations and to appeal to loyalties. This is to move away 
from ‘essentialist’ conceptions of diaspora. In this Brubaker is in 
agreement with Sökefeld (2006: 265-267). Sökefeld interprets diasporas as 
not having ‘sentiments of belonging’ and ‘attachment to a home and place 
of origin’ as constituent factors; rather he sees diasporas as ‘discursive 
constructions of imagined communities’. What both writers state is that the 
notion of diaspora as static and having a fixed membership is false and that 
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the identities within these diasporic communities are dynamic and 
continually in a process of development.  
Werbner (2002: 9) also sees the diaspora as dynamic and it has the ability 
to ‘envision utopian features’, as part of an ongoing identity forming 
process. Hall (1990: 235) rebuts the essentialist conceptualisation of a 
diasporic people returning to a ‘sacred homeland’ in order to secure an 
identity, and introduces the concept of hybrid identities as epitomised by 
the inhabitants of America. He also rejects the notion that the diaspora 
‘must at all costs return’ to the homeland, ‘even if it means pushing other 
people into the sea.’ This is for Hall a ‘backward –looking conception of 
diaspora’. Hall (1990: 235) defines the diaspora experience as the 
‘recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity, by a conception of 
identity which lives with and through and not despite difference; by 
hybridity’. In essence, he envisages diaspora identities as constantly 
reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. 
Clifford (1994: 307) argues that members of a displaced community, who 
are the subject of rejection and prejudice ‘cannot be cured’ by merging into 
a new national community’. Instead they find resonance with ‘positive 
articulations of diasporic identity.’ This reifies their feelings of ‘otherness’ 
and reaffirms the diasporic identity. This is more difficult for displaced 
people due to antagonism and even racism amongst the host population 
and leads to the non-assimilation of diasporic peoples. 
Peteet (2007: 627-646) calls into question the basis for categorising the 
Palestinian population in the Lebanon as diasporic, rather than classifying 
it as a refugee population. This she asserts could devalue their refugee 
status and their identity. Her main arguments include firstly non-
integration with the host population (ibid :632); secondly lack of spatial 
depth (ibid :633); thirdly shallowness of temporal distance (ibid :633) and 
finally the risk of weakening the legal status as refugees (ibid :635). Upon 
examination, her arguments seem weak. The issue of non-integration with 
the host population or indeed outright hostility by the host population is 
one of the signifiers of a diasporic population as identified by Cohen 
(1996: 515) and Safran (1991: 83-84). Geographical proximity to the home 
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land has not prevented other populations from being considered as 
diasporic such as the Irish (McCarthy, 2005), and the Armenians 
(Tölölyan, 2012). Peteet (2007: 633) cites Marienstras (1989) as claiming 
that ‘time has to pass’ before a people can be called diasporic; however, 
she does not specify how much time must pass. The counter- argument to 
Peteet’s (2007: 643) assertion that their status as refugees will in some way 
be ‘eclipsed ‘is provided by Hanafi (2003: 167) where he states that 
‘diaspora need not be regarded as the negation of the refugee.’  Finally, it 
should be borne in mind that ‘refugee’ is a legal status, whereas ‘diasporic’ 
is an etymological classification. It is possible for a refugee to have a 
diasporic identity.  
Globalisation and Identity 
Massey (1994: 156) contends, in the Marxist tradition, that ‘Globalisation 
does not simply entail homogenisation.’ She asserts that globalisation of 
social relations (and identities) is yet another source of the reproduction of 
geographical uneven development. Yuval-Davis (2011: 21) cites both 
Giddens (1991) and Castells (1998) by stating that the effect of modernity 
and globalisation has made people’s sense of belonging more reflexive and 
that effective belonging has moved, in a process of deterritorialisation, 
from the civil societies of nations and states into reconstructed defensive 
identity communities. Lovell (1998: 1) also makes this point by saying that 
identity is now being questioned in the context of ‘displacement, 
dislocation and dispossession’ in contemporary debates about what 
experiences should be retained and by inference what should be forgotten. 
Schulz and Hammer (2003: 229-230) suggest that ‘there is a thinning out 
of homeland bonds, as the homeland disappears in distant memories of 
earlier generations’ of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, caused in part by 
the forces of globalisation. While this may be true, the severe alienation 
and ghetto existence, and the lack of agency for the refugees, has in some 
respects served to strengthen the desire to reach the homeland or some 
other land, in search of a better life. 
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One of the effects of globalisation which hooks (1991: 148) has recognised 
is that ‘home is no longer just one place; it is locations.’ She says that this 
has implications for our identity ‘as part of the construction of a new world 
order that reveals more fully where we are, who can become’. Tölölyan 
(2012: 11) also makes this point when he argues ‘we must be careful not to 
locate the diasporic’s home in the ancestral homeland too easily.’ 
Additionally, he states that as a by-product of globalisation, the diasporic 
possesses a hybridity of culture and identity, ‘or at the very least has 
developed a comfortable bicultural competence.’ Parekh (2008: 185) offers 
the following analysis on the effects of globalisation: 
‘Globalisation leads to a porosity of cultural boundaries, in turn 
leading to increasingly cosmopolitan multiculturisation; and finally, 
to a plurality of every society’. 
Parekh (2008: 192) sees globalisation, epitomised by Western moral values 
as causing a major destabilising influence on non-Western societies and a 
threat to their identities, through a disruption of culture and communities. 
Salazar (1998: 114) offers an alternate view by lauding the development of 
the ‘global village’ since he says it has had the effect of reinforcing 
ethnicity and national identities. Maalouf (2000: 93) bemoans the ever- 
increasing speed of globalisation, which in his view reinforces peoples 
need for identity certainty. He envisages religious communities as ‘global 
tribes’; and attractive to people because they ‘transcend national, regional 
and social affiliations’ and used by them to proclaim the universality and 
certainty of their identities. Maalouf (2000: 123) warns against the 
adoption of a victim identity as a panacea for countering the universal 
culture of globalisation: 
‘To imprison oneself in a victim mentality can do the injured party 
even more harm than the aggression itself. And this is as true of 
societies as of individuals……they are afraid of the future, of the 
present and of everyone else’.    
Salazar (1998: 123) also argues that globalisation does not give rise to 
homogeneity; the more probable outcome as he sees it is the development 
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of wider communities ‘on the basis of common elements, in which the 
sense of national identity is not eliminated, but transferred to a higher 
level.’ Van Meijl (2008: 166) however sees that increased transnational 
migration, a phenomenon of globalisation is ‘complicating culture and 
culture relationships’ and causing problematical dilemmas for the identity 
of the individual and the relations left at home. He urges a ‘dialogical 
perspective’ to take into account the ‘increasing number of voices and 
counter-voices’ that are represented in the multi-cultured and hybrid nature 
of identity in the global transnationals. Van Mejl (2008: 180) states that the 
core of modern society has been transformed by the globalisation process 
‘into a contact zone or a network society.’ Individuals are compelled to 
contend with the demands of both their own culture and the challenges of a 
global society. Bifurcation is the result. Their own cultural identity of 
origin pulls one way and a new global identity pulls in the other. Those 
who are successful in assimilating both may develop a hybrid identity 
which will continually re-combine due to other influences. Those who are 
not successful are involved in ‘a never – ending struggle to work out to 
which situation they ideally belong.’  Beck (2002: 24) observes that  
‘high mobility and increased mediation means that more and more 
people are living in a kind of place-polygamy. They are married to 
many places in different worlds and cultures, transnational place 
polygamy belonging in different worlds: this is the gateway to 
globality in one’s own life’. (Emphasis in the original)  
Castells (1998) asserts that modern society has become a globalised 
network society in which effective belonging has shifted from the civil 
societies of nations into reconstructed defensive identity communities, in 
other words more reflexive in nature. Van Meijl (2008: 166) sees the result 
of this globalised network as a complication of culture and culture 
relationships, with ‘an increasing number of voices and counter-voices that 
are represented in the self.’ 
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Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in Lebanon. 
 
Figure 2.3 Map of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon 2016. 
Source: Lebanese NGO Forum, 2016. 
The arrival of over 100,000 Palestinians as refugees to Lebanon (Sayigh, 
1994: 17) in 1948, was followed by in excess of 5,000 in 1956, during the 
Suez Crisis and several thousand more after the 1967 War and the events 
surrounding Black September in 1970, as Al-Natour (2007) relates. As 
Allan (2014: 10) recounts, most of the initial refugees came from Upper 
Galilee and the coastal towns of Mandate Palestine. Initially, there was 
little involvement by the Government of Lebanon (GOL) in assisting the 
refugees in an organised manner. Groups of families sometimes made their 
own ad hoc arrangements with owners of land, which later became 
formalised. The League of Red Cross Societies (LCRS) was instrumental 
in providing a more formalised and systematic approach as Roberts 
(2010:76-77) suggests. Working in conjunction with GOL, the LCRS 
provided accommodation in tents and former army barracks in locations 
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scattered throughout Lebanon. In addition, some religious organisations 
provided land for the refugees, such as at Mar Elias, outside Beirut.  
After the establishment of UNRWA, in 1949, GOL gradually handed over 
responsibility for the refugees to that organisation, a process which ended 
in 1955. In 1948, the refugee problem was considered to be temporary, and 
it was expected that the majority of the refugees would return to their 
homes, in the new state of Israel. As time went on the initial ad hoc 
arrangements became formalised and UNRWA took up leases with GOL 
and private landowners for the camps (Peteet, 2005: 6). As Roberts (2010: 
77) relates UNRWA had 16 Palestinian refugee Camps (PRCs) in Lebanon 
by the mid- 1950s. Of these only 12 remain, due to destruction during the 
Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989), (Hanafi, 2010); and the War of the 
Camps 10(1985-1987), as related in Suleiman (1999). One of the12, Nahr el 
Bared was partially destroyed in 2007, during a battle between the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Syrian-supported al-Qaeda affiliate 
Fatah al-Islam, who had taken up residence there (Schenker, 2012:68).  In 
addition to the PRCs there are upwards of 40 ‘gatherings’-unofficial 
agglomerations of Palestinian refugees, most usually adjacent to or situated 
in urban areas in Lebanon (personal interview with United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, Beirut, 2015). While the 
residents of the PRCs are entitled to the provision of UNRWA services, 
those in the gatherings are not all so entitled. Residents in the gatherings 
are dependent on the local municipalities for provision of sanitary and 
associated services, which are not always provided.  
The period between 1969 and 1982 was marked by the rise and dominance 
of a Palestinian military presence in Lebanon. This period is related in 
Cobban (1984), Sayigh (1977, 1994) and Fisk (1992) who suggest that it 
was a deliberate act to create a Palestinian national identity based on armed 
struggle and resistance. Chapter 4 of this thesis relates how the PLO came 
                                                 
10 Nabatiyeh refugee camp near Tyre was completely destroyed in an Israeli raid in 1974. 
Three other Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut, (Tal Al-Zatar, Jisr Albasha and 
Dikwaneh), were destroyed and depopulated at the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War.   
The War of the Camps refers to the attacks by the Shiite Amal on the remnants of the 
PLO, in the camps, after their withdrawal from Lebanon, in 1982. (Suleiman, 2006: 6) 
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to the ascendant after the battle of Karama in 1968. Karama is not only a 
place but is also the Arabic word for dignity (Khalidi,1997:196-197). 
Sayigh (2007:10) suggests that this period was one where the Palestinian 
refugees ‘re-discovered a national identity as Palestinians after two 
decades of ‘burial’ under the imposed and alien identity of ‘refugee’, the 
people of the camps felt reborn, activated, given a direction.’ The 
Palestinian youth of today are still searching for dignity, as evidenced by 
the respondents, in interviews for this research.  The construction of a 
Palestinian nationalist identity as an imagined community is suggested by 
Hassassian (2002: 50-55), which unites all Palestinians in the diaspora, as 
well as the Occupied Territories. Bowker (2003) and Litvak (2009) 
emphasise the importance of memory and mythology amongst the refugees 
in the construction of a Palestinian identity. Bowker (2003: 61-63) 
suggests that the narrative of dispossession and estrangement from the 
homeland were important factors leading to the rise in PLO ascendancy; 
and are vital components of the Palestinian refugee identity in the PRCs 
today.   
Researchers such as Sayigh (2012:23); Khalili (2007) and Peteet (2005) 
have assumed that the traditional values associated with the Palestinian 
polity in Lebanon have been maintained and even renewed. These are 
exemplified through knowledge of places of origin, identifying with those 
places, strengthened networks of family solidarity, and increased Islamic 
piety. Allan 2014 (49,61,97) calls into question whether these assumptions 
still hold water. She maintains that most youth in the camps have little or 
no knowledge of their villages of origin and identify with the PRCs where 
they are born. Allan (2014:30) identifies temporary networks of association 
and solidarity which are supplementing and overtaking the ‘moral 
familism’ noted by researchers such as Sayigh (1979,1994). Observation 
carried out during the course of the 2016 research noted that attendance at 
mosques in the PRCs was comprised of predominantly middle- aged 
worshippers; there was a notable absence of the subjects of this research.     
A number of researchers have reported on the poor socio -economic 
landscape and legal rights of the Palestinian refugees in the PRCs. Al-
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Natour (1997); Abbas et al (1997); Ibrahim (2008), and Chaaban et al 
(2010,2016) outline the marginalisation of the Palestinians in the camps, 
which is also documented by Peteet (2005), Bianchi (2014) and Allan 
(2014). Schulz and Hammer (2003:54) state that ‘exclusion and 
marginalisation remain the most prominent features of Palestinian 
experience in Lebanon.’ The present- day conditions in the camps are 
examined in Chapters 3 to 6 of this thesis, through the personal accounts of 
the respondents and additional information is provided from the available 
literature. A constant theme of the homogeneity of Palestinian identity runs 
through the published research of Sayigh (1977,1994), Masalha (2009), 
Ramadan (2013) and Bianchi (2014) amongst others. This thesis 
challenges that assumption and proposes that the emerging Palestinian 
identity amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El harb is heterogenous in nature and 
that there are palpable intergenerational differences in how that 
Palestinianness is conceptualised and expressed. 
Conclusion 
 This review has examined the concept of identity through the lens of 
personal, social and place identities. It has established the primacy of place 
over space. It has shown that place is a determining factor in all aspects of 
identity. Place is central to concepts of home, homeland, culture, ethnicity, 
nationality, nationhood. Concepts of diaspora, memory, symbolic meaning, 
and globalisation are all related to place identity. Far from being just a 
location on a map, or a point of reference, place is an essential component 
of a person’s identity and also that of the collective.  As Fried (1963: 156) 
stated ‘a sense of place is fundamental to human functioning’. Relph 
(1976:43) also saw place as a ‘centre of human existence’ which 
constitutes a vital source of ‘both individual and cultural identity.’ Cooper 
(1976: 436) wrote that place was integral to rationalising one’s own 
identity. Proshansky et al (1983: 57) saw that place was equally important 
for the development of self-identity to ‘the making of distinctions between 
oneself and significant others.’ Korpela (1989: 241) saw place as the 
means of maintaining ‘psychic balance’ and the ‘coherence of one’s self 
and self-esteem’; the basic components of personal identity. It is hoped that 
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this brief review of literature on identity has demonstrated the progression 
of our understanding of place from a bounded locale to place as a means of 
generating meaning and identity. This is a dynamic and ongoing process, 
incorporating historical understandings, imagined communities, and 
perceived realities. The end state of this understanding is as Hauge (2007: 
50) observes that places are ‘not only contexts or backdrops, but also an 
integral part of identity.’ In the case of the Palestinian refugee youth, the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, place continues to be an important component of 
their identity, as the research for this thesis demonstrates. Chapter 4, 
dealing with Haq al ‘awda examines whether the place in question ranges 
from the idealised place of Palestine, as passed on to them from the 
previous generations and through the symbolism transmitted through the 
literature and media; or a more pragmatic visualisation of what Palestine 
might be in the future.  Place as represented by the PRCs also has an 
important influence on the development of their identity as many of them 
are not able to recognise place of origin in Palestine as will be developed in 
Chapter 3 dealing with al-Nakba. The importance of place elsewhere-
imagined place- is also important for this generation as evidenced in 
Chapter 6, dealing with Hijra, either as a gateway to an eventual return to 
Palestine or as a base for a new home either in Lebanon (Chapter 5, 
dealing with Tawteen) or elsewhere.   
Conceptual Framework 
 This thesis seeks to present an understanding of the world which the 
Palestinian refugee youth, in Lebanon, inhabit and the social worlds which 
they wish to inhabit and how they transmit their concepts of these worlds 
to others. By drawing on theories and multi-disciplinary perspectives, this 
thesis explores the socio-economic and socio-political landscapes of the 
PRCs. Giddens (1979:206-207) described place as the locale – ‘a place 
spatially distinct from those with others’ which he said applies to all social 
interactions. For the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in Lebanon, place can mean 
either Palestine, or the PRC, or even places in imagined futures. This 
research seeks to capture the meaning of these locales for this generation 
and quantify what effects they produce on identity. In human geography, 
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the concept of lifeworld is central to an understanding of the totality of an 
individual’s interaction with place and the environment experienced in 
existential living (Pickles:1985; Christensen:1982; Buttimer: 1976). For 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, it encompasses the conscious endeavours 
which shape their lives, and the subconscious impacts of the world which 
they inhabit. This thesis seeks to present an understanding of how these 
two facets are altering traditionally held ideas of Palestinian identity at the 
personal and collective levels and demonstrate the level of heterogeneity 
which is common to any grouping of humans including those of this 
generation. 
The core elements of this thesis focus on place, identity, memory and 
belonging, in the context of this generation of PRLs and examines some of 
the factors which are thought to be causing a change in the long ‘accepted’ 
depiction of them, by previous researchers. The importance of place was 
increasingly recognised, in late twentieth century research, with the work 
of Relph (1976,1996); Tuan (1974, 1977); Proshansky (1978;1983); 
Korpela (1989); and Casey (1997,2001a; 2001b); amongst others, showing 
that place was central to the construct of identity. Previous to these writers, 
place was often considered as merely a geographical location, situated in 
space. Place became posited as an important constituent of identity, and the 
theory of place identity was born (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell, 1996:206; 
Massey, 1994: 168-169; Relph, 1976:45). It was also shown to be a 
dynamic concept, which changes in response to the perception of the 
individual and collective of the environment. In this thesis, place is 
considered, not just in terms of Palestine, but also with regard to the PRCs 
in Lebanon and imagined futures elsewhere. Mc Donald, Pini, Bailey and 
Price (2011); Thompson and Holland (2002) have published research about 
the imagined futures of youth but perhaps the work of Vigh (2009) on the 
imagined futures of would be immigrants in Bissau is most apposite in this 
context. The imagined futures elsewhere are a means to achieve agency for 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, who are striving to drive beyond the 
restrictions imposed on them through the legal, socio economic and socio-
political barriers in Lebanon. The varied nature of these imagined futures 
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indicate that they are intensely aspirational with a capability to exercise a 
limited form of agency, within the constraints of those barriers. 
 Identity has been the subject of research across scientific disciplines 
including Sociology, Psychiatry, Psychology and Geography. Many 
theories have been developed to explain the concept, some of which have 
borrowed from each other to form inter- disciplinary hypotheses. (Freud 
1933; Jung, 1964; James, 1890; Mead, 1934; Relph,1976; 
Proshansky,1978; Proshansky et al, 1983; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 1996; 
Hull et al, 1994; and Massey, 1994).  This thesis addresses aspects of the 
historical development of identity theories, and will explore some of the 
competing and complementary hypotheses. The influence of place on 
identity is considered due to the importance of Palestine, as place in 
Palestinian nationalist ideology as described by ethnographers through the 
years (Khalidi,1997; Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1977). Allan (2014:33) suggests 
that ‘placelessness, provisionality and poverty’ may be producing its own 
form of Palestinian identity, one which is separate from a national identity, 
which is based on ‘ancestral land and return’. This suggestion is 
unsurprising given that diasporic populations have been found to weaken 
the bonds to their ancestral home, with the passage of time (Venn, 2009:4; 
Sökefeld, 2006: 265-267).  This thesis seeks to ascertain what importance 
place holds for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb; to determine if Palestine, either 
as it was pre-1948 or some entity within the borders of that area, is as 
critical to their identity, as it was to their predecessors; and to see if places 
other than Palestine, such as Lebanon itself and places represented by 
destinations in the wider world, are factors in their concepts of identity. 
Memory is important for the maintenance of tradition and an important 
constituent in a person’s identity. This generation can only have a vicarious 
memory of Palestine and the events surrounding the exodus from Palestine. 
Khalidi (1992:22); Sanbar (2001:90) and Peteet (2005:3) all agree with 
Allan (2014:41) when she asserts that memory and knowledge of the 
events of al-Nakba serve as the ‘lynchpin of collective identity’ and the 
‘essence of their identity and humanity.’ The transgenerational 
transmission of memories is explored, in order to determine the importance 
60 
 
 
 
 
or lack of it as a constituent of identity for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, 
today. Belonging, which is closely allied to memory is examined as part of 
the research into the collective identity of this generation. An appraisal is 
made to ascertain if this generation have a concept of belonging to one of 
the many manifestations of Palestinianness such as a Palestinian nascent 
nation; a Palestinian polity; a Palestinian diaspora; a greater Arab or indeed 
Islamic umma, all of which are different entities. As iterated earlier, 
ethnographers have ascribed to them a strong sense of belonging, in a 
nationalist archetype of the concept. It is explored here whether this 
depiction still holds true for this generation. Diasporic identity is examined 
in this context, to see if this generation have been impacted by existential 
pressures, which might impinge on the traditionally ascribed Palestinian 
diasporic refugee identity, by previous researchers. 
Factors which may impinge on this generation’s concepts of identity, 
attachment to place, absorption of memory and concepts of belonging are 
explored. The socio-economic, socio-political and physical landscapes are 
considered, in this thesis, as elements which may cause aberrations in the 
traditional ascriptions of Palestinian identity, as reported by academics in 
the past and outlined above. Authors such as Ulrich Beck (1994:18-20) 
suggest that life (sub-politics, as he terms it) is dominated by issues such as 
wealth, health, security, public services, agency, and only occasionally 
deals with collective nationalist issues. Allan (2014: 26) suggests that 
‘placelessness, provisionality, and poverty may be producing its own form 
of Palestinianness’ (:33), one which is separate from a national identity, 
which is based on ‘ancestral land and return.’ Globalisation and the 
increasing availability and use of the internet are also examined. Both 
Massey (1994) and Parekh (2008) have noted that globalisation proceeds in 
an uneven way with the benefits not being equally distributed. Allan 
(2014) notes that Lebanon’s voracious consumer culture is putting pressure 
on the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, who aspire to have what their peers in the 
Western world have. By analysing the ways by which the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb achieve the social construction of places and the sedimented layers of 
meaning associated with those places, enclosed as they are in physical 
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space, this study attempts to capture concepts of identity and belonging for 
this generation, so that policymakers and NGOs can design better 
strategies for providing solutions and services. It will also assist academics 
to achieve a greater understanding of how identity is malleable and 
responsive to changes in demographics, socio-economic and socio-political 
landscapes and may inform analyses of other refugee situations.     
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Chapter 3 
Al-Nakba in the Twenty-First Century: Memory and Identity 
Constructs for Palestinian Refugee Youth in Lebanon. 
Abstract: 
Al- Nakba (the catastrophe)-resulted in the expulsion of thousands of 
Palestinian inhabitants at the foundation of the State of Israel. Knowledge 
of this primary causal factor of Palestinian refugee residence in Lebanon- 
has been consistently considered by academics, in the past, to be a central 
pillar of Palestinian refugee identity. It provides the root cause of their 
exilic existence. It serves as a reminder to the international community that 
Palestinians have been displaced from their place of origin and is at the 
crux of their belief in the right of return. This paper examines the degree of 
knowledge about this pillar amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the 
generation after the war), in order to measure their adherence to the 
‘accepted’ view of Palestinian refugee identity. The data for the paper 
emanates from interviews conducted with this generation in four refugee 
camps and urban areas in Lebanon between 2015 and 2016. Exploring 
concepts of memory, belonging and place identity, it documents 
intergenerational differences in the remembering of Al-Nakba and suggests 
that it is possible to detect a change in how the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb 
situate the Nakba in their personal and collective identities. Some factors 
which may account for these changes are proposed. 
Keywords: Nakba, Palestinian refugee, Lebanon, identity, ideology, 
collective memory, agency, civic rights 
Introduction:  
Constantine Zurayk (1956) was the first to coin the phrase ‘the 
catastrophe’ to describe events of the Nakba of 1948. May 15th 1948, 
associated with the foundation of the state of Israel, and the upheaval of the 
indigenous people of Palestine, has become synonymous to Arab scholars 
and the general populace throughout the Middle East, as the day of the 
catastrophe.  This paper proposes that the origins of the Nakba pre-date the 
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events of 1948, by perhaps 50 years and that the Nakba was pre-meditated, 
rooted as it was in Zionist colonial policy. It is not historically static, at 
least in the minds of the Palestinian refugees as they perceive it as 
continuing today. This paper presents an analysis of the factors which 
contributed to the Nakba.  Zionist colonial ambitions (Masalha, 2009); a 
lack of Palestinian unity (Khalidi, 1997); British mendacity (Barr, 2011); 
Western guilt over the Holocaust (Hirst, 2010); and regional rivalry 
(Masalha, 2009) were among the many factors which facilitated the Nakba. 
Western and in particular US support for the present day colonial 
ambitions of the state of Israel, continues to prolong the status quo of the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon today.  
The overarching aim of the research for this paper is to establish the 
relevance which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the generation after the war) 
ascribe to events surrounding Al- Nakba (the catastrophe). Al-Nakba 
occurred in 1948 with the formation of the state of Israel and the flight of 
the Palestinian people, either through fear or force, from the British 
Mandated territory of Palestine. Al-Nakba forms the basis for exilic 
Palestinian history and has been previously described by academics as the 
lynchpin of Palestinian identity and a watershed in the development of 
Palestinian identity. It has three core questions:  
• To ascertain what knowledge this generation, possess of their 
historical origins and how this impinges on their identity. 
Knowledge of the origins of the Palestinian refugee situation in 
Lebanon has been held to be one of the pillars of their identity. Any 
diminution in this knowledge would indicate a weakening of this 
pillar and could also indicate a weakening in the memories passed 
on by the antecedents of this generation.  It could also indicate that 
forgetting, the negation of memory, is occurring either on a 
deliberate or subconscious basis.  
• To ascertain what importance the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb attach to 
al-Nakba. 
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• To identify any factors which interfere with the intergenerational 
transmission of knowledge of the Nakba. 
 This paper challenges the conventional representation of Palestinian 
refugee identity. This representation has been narrated as that of a 
homogenous group whose identity was comprised of three main 
components. Firstly, an immortalisation of their eviction from the lands of 
their birthright, in 1948 (al -Nakba) (Peteet: 2005). Secondly, a blanket 
opposition to naturalisation or re-settlement in other countries (tawteen) 
(Sayigh: 2001; 2012). Thirdly, a rejection for any option which did not 
include a right to return (haq al ‘awda) to Palestine (Bianchi: 2014). In 
ascertaining if these concepts of Palestinian identity and belonging hold 
true for this generation, this paper investigates for the presence of any 
inter-generational divergences from the ‘accepted’ view. It also seeks to 
quantify some of the factors which may have caused such differences. 
 A conceptual framework for this paper is provided by Diana Allan’s 
(2014) study, in which she proposed that the protracted nature of the 
Palestinian exilic condition had altered their formulation of identity and 
identification at the personal level. These articulations of personhood and 
collective identity do not always coincide with those which are more 
oriented towards nationalistic expressions of Palestinian identity as 
advocated by the Palestinian Authority (PA); the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (PLO); and the Popular Committees (PCs) in the Lebanese 
Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) (2014: 26). Allan’s (ibid: 2, 8) study 
highlighted the daily poverty, the struggle to survive, and the lack of 
agency which have been largely hidden from view, by the ‘goals of 
Palestinian nationalism’. This, she states, is centred on a rejection of 
tawteen and a demand for haq al ‘awda.  She also maintains that ‘the very 
anomalousness of camp life and refugee experience’ may be producing a 
separate form of “Palestinianness”, ‘distinct from a national identity tied to 
ancestral land’ (ibid: 33); this is particularly noticeable amongst younger 
generations, ‘producing flickers of quiet personal resistance (ibid: 61). 
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The research for this paper was conducted using a case study methodology, 
through the qualitative research tools of interview and observation. The 
four PRCs of Ein el Hilweh, Burj al Barajneh, Shatila and Mar Elias were 
the primary sources of data collection. Additional data collection was 
undertaken amongst Palestinian refugee respondents in the urban areas of 
Beirut. The respondents were aged between 18 and 35 years and 
correspond to the demographic known colloquially as the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb (the generation after the war). This paper examines an area which has 
been overlooked in the past as it focusses on the next generation of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. There have been various general 
academic studies published on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, but none 
are specific to this generation. (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1977, 1994, 2001; 
Suleiman, 1999; Ramadan, 2009; al-Natour, 2007). This paper seeks to 
correct that imbalance by focussing on the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, in order 
to explore the effects of the deterioration in the physical, socio-economic 
and cultural prospects in the PRCs, on their conceptions of identity.  
 
Displacing Palestine 
Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement wrote in his diaries in 
1895 of transferring the indigenous occupants of Palestine to other Arab 
countries in the region and re-populating the land with Jews, in order to 
reclaim their ‘historic’ homeland, basing his right to do so on the Bible 
(Herzl, 1960: 88). He did not set a limit on how much territory should be 
appropriated, wanting an exclusively ‘Jewish’ state. This was to form the 
basis for Zionist ideology and the development of plans for the 
‘repossession’ of the biblical inheritance of Palestine. Two years later he 
was instrumental in founding the World Zionist Organisation, which 
rapidly gained the support of Christian Zionists such as Lloyd George and 
Woodrow Wilson, who saw the justice of a Jewish homeland in the ‘Holy 
Land.’ As Barr (2011: 32-35) outlines, the British also saw that the 
creation of a Jewish colony immediately East of Suez, would safeguard 
their control of the Suez Canal and at the same time create a favourable 
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impression amongst the Jewish diaspora. The Sykes- Picot Treaty of 1916 
split the Ottoman Empire between the French and British, and Imperial 
Russia was to get Istanbul and Armenia. In 1917 this agreement was made 
public by the Bolsheviks (Barr, 2011:60).  In 1917, Balfour the British 
Foreign Minister made his famous ‘Balfour Declaration’ (Pappe, 2006: 
13), which offered support for the ‘establishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jewish people.’ The declaration, published in a letter to the 
prominent British Zionist, Lord Rothschild never referred to the indigenous 
population by name, using the term ‘non-Jewish communities’, and stating 
that ‘nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights’ of these communities.   
 
Figure 3.1. Copy of the Balfour Letter. Source Wikipedia. Available 
at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration. Accessed 12 
Nov 2014. 
With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire (1918), Britain was authorised by 
the League of Nations as the Mandatory Power for Palestine (16 
September 1922). Increased Jewish immigration followed, much to the 
resentment of the Palestinian population, who found themselves 
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dispossessed by Jewish land purchases and the Jewish policy of using only 
Jewish labour (Shapira, 1992: 53 – 82). Resistance increased culminating 
in the Great Arab Revolt (1936-1939), which was brutally suppressed by 
the British, with Jewish assistance (Hirst, 2010: 34, 37; Pappe, 2006:16). 
The British operated a policy of ‘divide and rule’ amongst the Palestinian 
elite, supporting rival factions, such as the Hussaynis and the Nashashibis, 
dividing up public roles between them, thereby weakening the Palestinian 
ability to oppose Jewish immigration and preventing a unified, effective, 
oppositional, political base (Barr, 2011: 168-169). As time progressed, 
Palestinian –Jewish disturbances became increasingly violent and the 
British became targets when they tried to curb Jewish immigration. After 
the Second World War (1939-1945), the revelations about, and Western 
guilt surrounding, the Holocaust (Hirst, 2010: 47) made curbing Jewish 
immigration problematic and with the increasing inter-communal and anti- 
British violence, the British decided to hand the problem of Palestine over 
to the United Nations (UN), in late 1947, announcing a departure date of 
15 May 1948. This date marks the change of patronage of the Jewish 
proto-state from the British to the US, which was the ascendant 
superpower, in the region. 
The UN, in late 1947, proposed a partition of Palestine, which neither the 
Jews nor the Palestinians accepted. The inter-communal violence 
intensified and by 15 May 1948, when the new state of Israel was 
proclaimed, Jewish forces had already succeeded in expelling 350,000 
Palestinians and had destroyed 200 villages and towns Pappe, (2006:263; 
Preface xv). Masalha (2009:56) states that throughout 1948, the Israeli 
forces outnumbered all the Arab forces, both regular and irregular, 
operating in Palestine. Using Israeli military archives, he estimated that 
Israel ‘fielded 35, 000 troops, whereas the Arabs fielded 20,000-25,000.’ 
Pappe (2006: 44) puts the figures at 50,000 for the Israelis and 7,000 for 
the Palestinians, bolstered by 3,000 volunteers. Additionally, the Israelis 
were better armed in terms of artillery, tanks and aircraft, imported from 
the Eastern bloc. Masalha, (2012:71) asserts that the Arab coalition facing 
Israel was ‘the most deeply divided disorganised and ramshackle coalition 
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in the history of warfare.’  Pappe’s assertion would seem to cast doubt on 
the official Israeli narrative of a David and Goliath struggle between a 
small Israeli force and overwhelming Arab armies (Masalha, 2012: 68-70; 
Geertz, 2000: 5; Shlaim, 2004).    
Pappe (2006) has unequivocally described the events prior and subsequent 
to 1948 as ethnic cleansing. These include murder, rape, looting and 
appropriation of property in addition to the innumerable deaths caused on 
the trek of the displaced refugees to the neighbouring Arab borders. Pappe 
(2006: 208-211) is certain that ‘severe cases of rape did take place’, 
coupled with the robbery of women’s jewellery and in some cases, such as 
at Tantura, the murder of the rape victims. The fear of rape caused many to 
flee, as did the reports of Jewish forces killing prisoners after a village had 
surrendered. Pappe (2006: 258) states that using a combination of 
Palestinian and Israeli military archive sources, it is possible to ‘list thirty-
nine confirmed massacres’ perpetrated by Jewish troops between 11 
December 1947 and 19 January 1949. It is virtually impossible to estimate 
how many Palestinians died due to murder, battle casualties or on the long 
treks to escape Jewish forces. The tragedy for the Palestinians was that the 
euphoria which surrounded the announcement of a new state for the Jews 
occluded the brutalisation and displacement of the Palestinian people, who 
bore no blame for the events of the Holocaust or the various pogroms in 
Europe through the centuries. 
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Figure 3.2. Map showing Areas of Origin of Exodus of Palestinian 
Refugees in 1948.  Source: Suleiman (2006: 5). 
Over 150,000 Palestinians were displaced to Lebanon (Khalidi, 1984: 37; 
Peteet, 2005: 6), with the formation of the state of Israel in 1948.This 
displacement was accompanied by a number of massacres and destruction 
of some 418 villages (Khalidi, 1992), perpetrated by Jewish forces and the 
Israeli Army. Morris (1987; 2004: 165, 236) states that this policy was a 
decision to ‘destroy villages in strategic areas along crucial routes, 
regardless of whether or not they were resisting.’  Morris (2004: 348) 
suggests that after the mass exodus in 1948 the military necessity for this 
destruction became political- the thrust of which was to prevent a return of 
the Palestinian occupants. This became known to the Palestinians as the 
Nakba or ‘the catastrophe’, when 14% of the exodus came to Lebanon. The 
refugees were Muslim, in the main, and were initially welcomed warmly 
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by the citizens of Lebanon. In 1948, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution (UNGAR) 19411 was passed which guaranteed the right of 
return and/or compensation to the refugees, which Israel still refuses to 
observe. The UN established UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency in the Near East) in 1949 to cater solely for the Palestinian 
refugees in the Middle East12.   This organisation tended to the 
humanitarian needs of the refugees, but, crucially afforded them no legal 
protection. 
 Palestinian resistance to Israel increasingly became concentrated in 
Lebanon, during the 1960’s and in particular when the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) set up its headquarters there after their expulsion from 
Jordan in 1970. From this period until 1982, the Palestinian refugees 
benefitted from PLO power and remittances and they spurned the mantle 
of refugees, in an act of resistance, calling themselves ‘returnees’ (a’idoun) 
(Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 131). They no longer considered themselves 
as passive ‘victims’ (ibid: 131). The military operations carried out from 
Lebanon by the PLO resulted in many casualties, most of them innocent 
Israeli civilians. Israel’s response was to invade Lebanon, first in 1978 and 
again in 1982, going all the way to Beirut. The massacre carried out by 
Phalangist, Christian militias, with the support of the Israeli Army at Sabra 
and Shatila, 1982 (Fisk, 1992: 358-381), had a profound effect on the 
Palestinian psyche, in Lebanon, resulting in the re-adoption of the ‘victim’ 
identity and that of refugee and which still persists today. Politically, the 
Palestinians had become allied with leftist Muslim parties and militias and 
eventually were dragged into the Civil war in Lebanon. The expulsion of 
the PLO from Lebanon, in 1982 and again in 1983, left the refugees largely 
defenceless and Shia militias attacked a number of camps during 1985-
                                                 
11 UN Documents 1948, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, Available at: 
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm, Accessed11 July 2013. 
12 UN Documents 1949, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302, Available at: 
unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.../0/AF5F909791DE7FB0852560E500687282 Accessed 11 July 
2013. 
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1987, which became known as the War of the Camps (Fisk, 1992: 
604,609). 
12 Palestinian Refugee Camps survive in Lebanon, today. The Lebanese 
Civil War was finally ended with the signing of the Taif Accords (1989). 
The Palestinians became scapegoats for causing that war. O’Connor 
(2013:17-18) suggests that among the reasons for the practice of blaming 
the Palestinians was the refusal of the main sectarian groups, in Lebanon, 
to recognise their inherent differences and a lack of resolve on their parts, 
to find a means to peacefully bridge the gaps between them.  As Rogan, 
(2011:.479) says ‘Differences between the Lebanese had grown so 
profound that the Palestinians were no more than a catalyst in a conflict to 
redefine politics in Lebanon’. A secondary reason to blame the Palestinians 
was a failure of the Arab nations to take responsibility for their defeat by 
Israel and to engage in diplomacy with that state in order to find a solution 
to the Palestinian problem. Finally, a reason for the scapegoating of the 
Palestinians can be found in what Barash and Webel (2009:136-137; 183-
184) term as factors of racial intolerance, which they suggest explain the 
tendency to perceive the ‘other’ as hostile, while holding oneself 
blameless” and are useful in considering all the communities in Lebanon, 
at this time. 
   Consequently, the Government of Lebanon (GOL) re- introduced the 
harsh regime which had been in force prior to 1969. The Palestinians were 
now denied the right to work in anything but the most menial of 
employment, and suffered from a lack of civil rights. Their right to own 
property was stripped from them, and they were denied any prospect of 
integration into the Lebanese population. This situation remains largely 
unchanged today. Once again, Palestinian refugees refer to themselves as 
‘refugees’, because they see that label as bestowing on them access to the 
limited assistance provided to them by UNRWA; it also serves to remind 
the international community that it has an obligation to them; and 
importantly it signifies resistance and defiance in the wake of their 
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perceived abandonment by Arafat in the agreements after the Oslo 
Accords13.   
Context of al-Nakba within Palestinian Identity and Collective 
Memory: 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Palestinian Identity in Triadic Representation. 
Using Georg Simmel’s (1908, [1955]) geometric symbolism as a model, 
this paper encapsulates diasporic, refugee Palestinian identity as a triadic 
figure. One element is al-ghurba (exile) - a condition which spans history 
from the beginning of the Zionist colonialization of Palestine and which 
pre-dates 1948; existing today for those refugees in Lebanon; and likely to 
continue well into the future. A second element is the acceptance/rejection 
of tawteen (naturalisation) at both the personal and collective dimensions. 
Embedded within this factor are the concepts of the repression of the 
Lebanese government and the antipathy of large swathes of the Lebanese 
population to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The willingness to 
accept tawteen demonstrates the economic pressures on the refugees, 
                                                 
13 Interviews conducted by the author in Lebanon 2015/2016. 
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causing them to accept any solution to ameliorate their perilous situation. 
The rejection of tawteen by the Palestinian refugees epitomises the refusal 
to be subsumed into another nation and also to remind the world that the 
Palestinians have been wronged and that redemption is theirs by right.  The 
third element is the belief in haq al ‘awda (right of return), which has 
existed morally, since the first expulsions from Palestine and legally since 
UNGAR 194 was passed, in 1949.  In this representation, these three 
elements are grounded upon the Nakba, which effectively constitutes the 
base of a triad. Each is a component of al-Nakba, each interacts with the 
other through the Nakba, and each has the Nakba as a causal factor. This 
representation of Palestinian identity can be considered in linear terms on a 
timescale from past history (events surrounding 1948) through the present 
(the ongoing Nakba and debates over tawteen) to the hope for a future (haq 
al ‘awda). In this conception of Palestinian identity, the Nakba has shaped 
each of the three elements and has been as Peteet (2005: 3) and Khalidi 
(1997: 22) describe ‘a watershed in the development of Palestinian 
identity’ and a ‘potent source of shared beliefs and values’, which has 
reinforced both the collective and individual sense of Palestinian identity. 
Allan (2014: 41-45) states that ‘narratives about the Nakba have emerged 
as the symbolic lynchpin of collective identity and the bedrock of 
Palestinian nationalism’ and that the continued existence of Palestine and 
its people, it is assumed, now depends on a ‘consciously remembered 
history and cultural tradition.’ She cites Sanbar (2001: 90) as being of the 
opinion that ‘for refugees the memory of 1948 is presented as the essence 
of their identity.’  However, as she suggests this statement does not 
account for the ‘different experiences of the refugees’ and the passage of 
time, nor the ‘disparateness of individual memory. This institutionalised 
understanding of 1948 in ‘starkly political terms’, with refugees as the 
remnants of historic tragedy, ‘puts the burden of remembrance on those 
with the least resources to bear it’- the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb youth of 
today.       
Volkan (2004:1) opines that ‘members of a massively traumatised group’ 
cannot complete certain psychological tasks and they, then, transmit such 
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tasks to the children of the next generation(s) along with the ‘conscious 
and unconscious shared wish that the next generation(s) will resolve them.’  
He says that the ‘shared mental representation of the historical traumatic 
event’ may emerge as a ‘chosen trauma’, which becomes a significant 
marker for the large- group identity.  Khalidi (1997: 19- 34) charts the 
emergence of the collective Palestinian identity, which evolved over time, 
stating that it ‘emerged unevenly’, commencing in the early 20th century, 
and finding renewed strength with the foundation of the PLO. There can be 
no doubt that the events surrounding the Nakba were intensely 
traumatising for the Palestinians and that remembrance of these events is 
still strong amongst them. Volkan (2004: 4) proposes that if an event turns 
into a ‘chosen trauma’, what becomes significant is the fact that the group 
carries the mental representation of the traumatic event – along with 
associated shared feelings of hurt and shame- from generation to 
generation. During this transgenerational transmission, the mental 
representation of the event emerges as a significant large-group marker and 
the group draws the shared mythologised mental representation of the 
event into its very identity. Hirsch (1997: 22-24), although writing about 
the Holocaust, also suggests that traumatic memory transfer can be 
transgenerational with the transferred memory pervading the existential 
lives of subsequent generations, in what she terms ‘postmemory’. It can be 
argued that there is a limited postmemory for the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, even though post memory derives from lived experience, 
because the Nakba is still ongoing and furthermore it is yet to be widely 
known or acknowledged in the West.  
 Safran (1991: 83-84) sees the Palestinian diaspora as ‘something more 
than an ethnic minority resulting from migration.’ Diaspora connotes 
banishment, exile and estrangement from ‘home’ and the ‘homeland’; what 
is called al-ghurba in Arabic, ‘the term which most associate with the 
Palestinian condition’. For Safran, the origins of this al-ghurba are to be 
found in the Nakba. It is through the Nakba that one can find the origins of 
a specific Palestinian identity of suffering and struggle, which characterises 
their Palestinianness and enhances their desire for al- ‘awda -the return- to 
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the ‘home’ or the ‘homeland’. This has sustained them for three 
generations and ‘made the pain of exile passable but not acceptable’. 
Clemens (2007: 96) sees Palestinian identity as being strongly influenced 
by a ‘collective sense of victimisation and nationalism’, caused by the 
events surrounding the Nakba, which is ‘passed on to subsequent 
generations living in exile.’ It can be argued that the emergence of the 
PLO, during the 1960s concentrated the individual sense of loss, 
victimisation and feelings of nationalism and served to combine these into 
a collective sense of identity. It is to be expected, then that there should be 
a high degree of knowledge about this traumatic and seminal event 
amongst the present generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.      
The Palestinian refugee collective memory, in Lebanon can be envisioned 
as the consciousness of a group of people, or a diaspora embodying 
customs, traditions, myths, and beliefs shared by members of that group, 
who believe them to be true, without regard to their actuality or 
provenance being subscribed by historical veracity or reality. It is this 
collective memory that underpins and binds the collective identity of the 
society. As Edkins (2003: 8) suggests ‘by assuming a community exists we 
produce one.’ As members of a group we ‘reproduce that social institution 
at the same time as assuming our own identity as part of it.’ Collective 
memory then is an important constituent of collective identity and ipso 
facto individual identity, for Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon.  
During the gathering of data for this research, constant reminders of 
Palestine were in evidence in the PRCs. Through the proliferation of 
posters and murals depicting stylised representations of homes lost; 
reminders of martyrs; and the naming of localities and buildings after 
villages in Mandate Palestine the collective memory was stimulated. It is to 
be expected then, that the proliferation of these reminders would have 
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reinforced the knowledge of the Nakba. 
 
Figure 3.4. Mural with stylised house in Palestine with al-saber and 
Palestinian flag, on a wall in Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016. 
In addition, there were many posters on the walls at eye level and above 
which remind the observer of the supreme sacrifice of the shahid (martyr) 
in the cause of Palestine.  
 
Figure 3.5. Poster of a Shahid on a wall in Mar Elias PRC. Source: 
O’Connor, 2016. 
Posters and murals were also used to remind Palestinians in the diaspora of 
their place in the struggle against Israeli occupation of the homeland. 
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Figure 3.6. Flags and posters depicting the Second Intifada hung on a 
wall in Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016.   
Many of the streets and areas within the PRCs are named after places in 
Palestine, in the pre- Nakba era.  In Burj al Barajneh PRC, some areas are 
named after northern villages of Palestine such as Tarshiba, El-Kabri and 
Al -Chaab (Peteet, 2005 and El-Ali, 2010). The naming of service centres 
such as the Ramallah school in Shatila PRC and the Haifa hospital in Burj 
al Barajneh PRC after cities and villages of that time, re-iterate the 
memorialisation process and enhance the sense of belonging.  
 
Figure 3.7. Ramallah School Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016. 
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In many of the homes visited for this research, there were posters of 
Palestine and symbols such as keys (to represent the homes lost) and 
ornaments such as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, which serve as 
reminders of the homeland. Items of jewellery worn by young and old 
women included necklaces with representations of Palestine. Additionally, 
there has been a return to traditional modes of dress amongst this 
generation. All of the female respondents for this research wore Palestinian 
headdress, except two. These most often wore the hijab, although one 
respondent, who was involved in Islamic religious studies, wore the niqab. 
It was explained to the researcher that this was most often a matter of 
personal choice. However, a UNRWA Project Director told the researcher 
that it was part of the phenonomen of a return to some aspects of 
traditional Palestinian culture, amongst this generation, noted by UNRWA. 
He said that it was a rejection of the secular revolutionary ideals of the 
previous generation, known as Jeel al-Thawra (The generation of the 
revolution).  
Discussion: 
 As iterated previously, writers such as Peteet (2005) and Khalidi (1997) 
have described the narratives surrounding the Nakba as being central to the 
collective Palestinian refugee identity. It is to be expected then that this 
‘accepted’ view of the identity of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb should 
encompass a good knowledge of and memorialisation of the events 
surrounding the Nakba (including a knowledge of their places of origin in 
Palestine); a rejection of tawteen; and an adherence to haq al ‘awda. In the 
analysis of the data collected for this paper, a disparity became evident 
with the findings of previous researchers who had reported both a very 
good knowledge of the Nakba and of the respondent’s historical origins. 
Three distinct levels of knowledge became evident. 
Levels of knowledge about the Nakba 
In the first instance, this research shows that only 13 or 24% of all 
respondents had a good or very good knowledge of the Nakba.  Secondly, 
a total of 40 or 66% had a poor to fair knowledge of it.  Finally, and 
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unusually, 8 or 13% didn’t know anything at all about it. This is a 
surprising development, given the access to education and the internet 
amongst this generation. Many of those interviewed, did not pursue 
research into this cornerstone of the Palestinian al ghurba (exile) in 
Lebanon, beyond what they learned at school or from parents or 
grandparents. This is despite the fact that Wi-Fi and internet facilities were 
available to 77% of all interviewees. Amongst the three groupings noted 
above there was a strong positive correlation between education, 
employment and their knowledge about the Nakba and a concomitant lack 
of knowledge where these factors were diminished. There was no disparity 
between the genders in this regard. The reported rate of transmission from 
parents and grandparents was less than 50%, across all three groups, 
perhaps indicating that the practice of passage of information on this 
subject has dwindled and that this generation are less interested in their 
past. Across all three groups, this research noted a desire for agency; an 
expression of the poor socio-economic existential conditions; and an 
awareness of inter-generational differences in their loyalties to concepts of 
Palestinian identity. 
Levels of knowledge of historical origins 
This research has found a congruence with Allan’s (2014: 49) reported 
research findings in that up to 75% of participants know little more ‘than 
the name of, and the most generic facts about their ancestral village.’ 
Additionally, in those cases where an ancestral village could be identified, 
it was more often down to the personal knowledge, of the interpreters, of 
the families involved. Arguably, the respondent’s lack of precise details of 
origin does not detract from the importance of these places which lie in 
their remembered or metaphorical presence, and which can be as strong as 
tangible identification. Sayigh (2012: 26) also found that ‘most young 
Palestinians know little of their history.’ These participants identified 
themselves as Palestinians from whatever camp in which they resided. 
Taylor (1989: 47) says ‘In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to 
have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going’.   
Given the importance of Al-Nakba in Palestinian life through the 
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generations, and the traditional method of its transmission across the 
generations, it would be expected that Palestinian youth should have a 
good knowledge of, and interest in, it and finding out more about it. The 
question which this author asked was: ‘What has caused such difference 
between the findings of previous researchers and those of this research?’ 
As the data collection and analysis progressed, the importance of economic 
data became evident as a factor in trying to answer this question. This 
paper proposes that the deprivation caused by the physical, economic and 
cultural landscapes imposed upon them, has lessened their allegiance to 
nationalist imperatives.  
Importance of Economic Data for Research Outcomes 
Allan (2014: 97-98) suggests that the ‘existential bonds of suffering and 
indignities of daily poverty, in the struggle for survival’ have shaped the 
meaning of what it is to be a ‘Palestinian’ and on once sacred notions of 
the Nakba.  One of the significant pieces of information to emerge from an 
examination of the data collected for this research was the levels of 
unemployment and low earnings reported by the respondents.  
 
 
Figure 3.8.  Reported Employment Status Jeel ma baa’d El Harb 
Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
 
67%
33%
Reported Employment Status
Jeel ma baa'd El Harb
Employed 67% (41) Unemployed 33% (20)
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Figure 3.9. Reported Unemployment Status by gender: Jeel ma baa’d 
El Harb Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 20). 
31% of males and 34% of females reported being unemployed. 71% of all 
respondents reported earnings of less than $1,000 a month (includes 0 
earnings). This compares with 56.8% of their peers in the general Lebanese 
population (Lebanese Ministry of Finance, 2017:6). The dire socio-
economic conditions for the PRLs has worsened and led to a concomitant 
despair amongst some elements of the youth, so much that any solution is 
acceptable. Chaaban et al (2016: 82-83) report that the unemployment rate 
for PRLs, of all ages, is 21% (an increase from 8% for males and 32% for 
females in 2015, compared to a similar survey in 2010: Chaaban et al, 
2010). The research conducted for this paper found general youth 
unemployment at 33%, with slightly lower unemployment for males at 
31% but similar figures to Chaaban et al for females at 34%. Much of the 
employment was menial, temporary and illegal. The vast bulk of those 
working (86%) found sporadic employment within the camps, some with 
UNRWA (7%); the majority not.  
 Chaaban et al (2016: 9) also found that extreme and overall poverty rates 
are higher in the camps than without and have increased since 2010 in the 
Beirut area (by 9%). Furthermore, nearly all professions show poverty 
rates higher than 50%, ‘reflecting the low pay and precarious work 
conditions PRL still experience’. Chaaban et al (2016: 84) outline the 
1010
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prohibitions on gaining employment for PRLs, which are quite onerous, in 
particular with regard to the professions.  Despite some concessions after 
2010, ‘Low income is still the primary cause of high poverty rates amongst 
the PRLs’ (ibid: 54). Under Lebanese law, Palestinians are prohibited from 
owning property, and must make convoluted circumventions of the law to 
do so (Author’s interviews Beirut: 2015, 201614). The security situation in 
neighbouring Syria and within Lebanon, coupled with the large refugee 
influx and parliamentary stagnation in Lebanon, has put negotiations 
through the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) on the back 
burner. Some Palestinian youth in 2016 dismissed these as haki fadi 
(empty talk). The influx of refugees from Syria since 2011 has further 
eroded the prospect of employment, however menial, for the PRLs. There 
is anecdotal evidence that competition between PRL and PRS youth for 
these jobs has intensified, contributing to ‘an increase in unemployment 
rates among PRL in the already limited pool of low-skill jobs’ 
[conversations with UNRWA officials 2015 and Palestinian NGOs 2016; 
Chaaban et al, 2016: 84)].  
 An UNRWA official interviewed in 2015 supported this view:  
‘The camps are ghettos, pits of deprivation and misery. Two thirds 
live inside the camps, one third outside. Those outside have a better 
standard of life. You have people in Burj al-Barajneh, who have 
never been outside of the camp-even to Beirut, less than 5 kms 
away. They don’t see it as theirs-it’s terra incognito. All this 
history of deep misery is your identity. Relations between 
Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) and Palestinian refugees 
from Lebanon (PRL) have not been perfect. Some of the PRS have 
left the camps, astonished at the horrible conditions under which 
the PRL are living.’ 
The three groups with differing knowledge about al -Nakba amongst the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb are set out below.  It is accepted that the basis for 
                                                 
14 See also: Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 126-127). 
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determining the extent of knowledge about al-Nakba is open to the 
criticism of subjectivity, on the part of this researcher. Every effort was 
made to maintain objectivity by using the same methodology in probing 
for answers from the respondents. 
Group 1 (Good/Very Good Knowledge about the Nakba)15   
This group was divided between 10 males and 3 females. Members of this 
group demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to the ‘accepted’ view of 
Palestinian identity. Sami, a male aged 31 working with a Palestinian 
company exhibited a strong sense of a Palestinian identity, stating that he 
would refuse tawteen and insisting on haq al ‘awda. He acknowledged that 
his level of knowledge about the Nakba and its importance was unusual for 
his generation, and he attributed the general lack of interest in it to the dire 
economic reality of the PRCs: 
‘As a Palestinian refugee living in this country, I want you to know 
that I have pain and summud (steadfastness), on a daily basis. I live 
under circumstances which are not favourable and I have tried to 
find out more about Palestine.  Palestinian youth nowadays are a bit 
diverted, because they are busy in getting their daily needs. This is 
one of the issues facing the new generation of Palestinians their 
daily bread and they don’t have time to think about their future.’ 
Allan (2014: 98, 102) suggests that the ‘primacy of economic subjectivity’ 
has altered this generation and the ‘pragmatics of survival have weakened’ 
                                                 
15  9 had a university degree (these included:  B. Comm in I.T. Communications; B. Arts 
in Tourism; Masters in International Development; B. Comm in Business and Computer 
Science; B. Arts in Communications; B. Comm in Logistics; B. Comm in Accounting; 
Masters in Sociology and Islamic Studies and a B. Comm in Business and Commerce); 1 
had a university Diploma and 2 were students at university. The remaining respondent had 
failed to complete his Brevet. 4 had no job and depended on family for financial support. 
2 were working illegally in the city. 2 were working with Palestinian NGOs, 1 was 
working for UNRWA and 4 were working for a Palestinian company. 8 of the group had 
computers and all had access to Wi-Fi and the internet and Social Media. ‘In Lebanon, 
upon completion of Grade 9 (end of the basic cycle of education) students sit for the 
Lebanese official Brevet Exam, with those who pass awarded the Brevet Certificate, and 
able to progress to Secondary education. Approximately 62.8 per cent of the population 
over 15 years of age do not hold a Brevet compared to two thirds in 2010’ (Chaaban, J. et 
al (2016: 79). 
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the traditional Palestinian values and identity, in Lebanon. She points out 
that there has been a shift away from the ‘continuities of nationalism 
towards the contingencies of lived experience and material practice’ in the 
camps. Sami also stated that his parents and grandparents were still ‘living 
the Nakba since 1948’; however, while his generation were in the same 
situation, he wanted to move on and aspire to a better life, possibly 
elsewhere. 
Musallan, a 26-year-old male also framed his responses in terms of the dire 
socio-economic conditions, and the lack of civil rights for Palestinians in 
Lebanon. Bar-Tal (1998: 112) has suggested that group beliefs may 
function as ‘guiding forces for a group’ and may therefore ‘determine the 
direction, intensity and persistence’ of the individual behaviour and beliefs, 
within that group. During his interview, Musallan exhibited a strong 
commitment to the Palestinian national ideals, based on his understanding 
of the Nakba and his apportioning of blame for it on the Zionist colonial 
enterprise and on the international community, either because of their 
collaboration with the Zionists, or their silence. Others in this group 
expressed a wish to retain their Palestinian identity and yet attain a better 
standard of life than their parents, and stated their frustration at the 
inequities of their lives.  
Group 2 Fair to Poor Knowledge of the Nakba16 
This group numbered 40 and was split across the gender divide with 17 
being males and 23 females. Members of this group demonstrated varying 
levels of loyalty to the ‘accepted’ view of Palestinian identity. This group 
                                                 
16  7 had university degrees (including 1 Masters), 1 had a university Diploma and 10 
were university students; 1 left his university studies unfinished. 10 had a Baccalaureate, 8 
had the Brevet and 3 had a Vocational School qualification. 13 of these were unemployed 
and the others had employment within the camps, with Palestinian organisations, but none 
with UNRWA. Only 13 of this group had computers, and all except two had mobile 
phones with Wi-Fi and the internet and frequently used Social Media. ‘In Lebanon, upon 
completion of Grade 12 (end of the secondary cycle of education) students sit for the 
Lebanese official Baccalaureate Exam, with those who pass awarded the Baccalaureate 
Degree, and able to progress to University education. 15.2 per cent have a Baccalaureate 
degree compared to 14 per cent in 2010.’ (Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 79). 
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also demonstrated a high degree of intergenerational difference from their 
parents and grandparents, when compared to the first group. 
Mahdi, a 23-year-old male, said that his poor knowledge about the Nakba 
was because it did not have the same significance for him as for his 
parents: 
‘They have memories and they live on those, expecting that if they 
return everything will be ok again, without taking into 
consideration of ability to work or contribute to the country. More 
of the younger generation have experience of living outside, of 
Lebanon and Palestine.  We know nothing about Palestine; all our 
memories are of other countries and we want to return to these 
countries. It is causing internal conflicts within yourself, in what 
you think about yourself, or at least in what your parents made you 
think about yourself. They always try to make you not forget that 
you are Palestinian, then when you go outside you are rejecting that 
idea. Eventually young people want their own life and 
improvement and to be a bit selfish; they want to live, they don’t 
care about their country (Palestine) anymore.’   
Mahdi was of the opinion that agency for his generation could be afforded 
by the provision of better educational opportunities: 
‘The most important thing is to provide more scholarships for the 
Palestinians. The most powerful weapon is education; we lost too 
many people to war, to mafias in the camps who have weapons but 
no education, who are killing each other17. These Palestinians are 
not progressing in anything, and the only way to combat this is 
more education, to allow them to think for themselves. I really hate 
                                                 
17 Mahdi is speaking obliquely about the political factions in the camps and the members 
of the Popular Committees (PCs).  His comments reflect Allan’s (2014:102) suggestion 
that there is a rising rejection of these in the camps. The Popular Committee, also known 
as al –hakuma al –saghira, or the small government of the camp was established by the 
PLO, in each camp during the 1970’s. It is not elected. Representatives of each of the 
factions are members. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and 
remains a legacy from the time of Jeel al-thawra (generation of the revolution).  
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the idea of being a Palestinian; I would prefer to be called Muslim 
or Arab, not divided by our countries.’ 
Mahdi in common with many of the respondents found factional violence 
and the use of weapons to be abhorrent to them. Some of those respondents 
spoke in a positive manner of a young women’s group who had started a 
campaign against the proliferation of weapons in Mar Elias PRC.  
 
Figure 3.10.  Sign on a wall in Mar Elias PRC. Source: O’Connor, 
2016. 
Khalidi (1997), as recounted above, has iterated the issue of Arab and 
Muslim identities. Palestinians have always acknowledged their position 
within those communities. It is within those personhoods that Palestinian 
refugee identity resides, as some of the respondents, (such as Mahdi) in 
this research have espoused. Not all Palestinian refugees are Muslim, and 
this research was able to interview only one non-Muslim. Palestinian 
refugee identity, as Allan (2014) relates is evolving, in response to the dire 
existential situation within Lebanon. Not all are willing to embrace a 
purely Muslim or Arab identity, or indeed a Palestinian one, if some relief 
can be achieved through another. Maalouf (2000: 23, 25) suggests that 
‘identity isn’t given once and for all: it is built up and changes throughout a 
person’s lifetime.’ Identity amongst this youth group is not homogenous 
and is dependent on what influences are imposed upon them by the 
physical, cultural and socio-economic landscapes, in their daily lives.  
Mahdi’s self-conception as being Muslim or Arab first is not unusual 
elsewhere in the Middle East, despite the passage of time, since the death 
103 
 
 
 
 
of Nasser (1969), who propounded the ideal of Pan-Arabism. Mahdi was 
willing to take tawteen if it was offered to him and this taken with his 
comments about factional violence are representative of what Allan (2014: 
60-61) has noted about fractures appearing in the ethnographer’s 
‘accepted’ view of this generation. She has identified flickers of ‘quiet 
personal resistance’ amongst them because they are finding difficulty in 
absorbing the dogma of a ‘national belonging’ into their identity 
framework. This should not be surprising given that Palestinian youth now 
have access to the internet and are more aware of the world around them. 
Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1997: 222) found that the extreme rapid 
social change that communities have experienced over the past decades has 
been caused by the trauma of displacement and has resulted in a 
‘deterioration of family structures’ and changed the ‘socio-cultural 
structure of the Palestinian community’. This in turn has caused inter-
generational differences and alienation from their elders and their cultural 
roots, with the youth ‘pursuing modern lifestyles’ and having divergent 
concepts of their identities. Conversi (2004: 280-281) suggests that cultural 
globalisation, which is understood as being synonymous with 
Westernisation is pervasive and threatens to undermine the position of the 
family and clan and the socialisation of the youth within a group in its 
culture and traditions. This is altering the group identity at both the 
personal and collective levels. Robins (1996: 72) also notes that the 
increasing trans- nationalisation of markets, the growth of global media 
and communications, the ‘mobility of populations’ have combined to 
weaken significantly the ‘old rigidities in the national cultures.’    
Ennas, a 21-year-old female had a poor knowledge of the Nakba and said 
that she had never researched it, even though she spent a lot of time on 
Facebook. She saw her future in terms of the existential needs of the 
present. She wanted to continue her education, to degree level, so that she 
can get a job to support her family. She knew that she could never work 
legitimately in Lebanon, so the first thing she wants to do after graduating 
is to emigrate to the UAE. She said:  
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‘I think that after these couple of generations past, the desire for 
haq al ‘awda is fading away. The Palestinians who are living away 
are happy to live away from Palestine. We have a saying: Baeed an 
al Ayn, Baeed an al Kalb (away from the eye, away from the heart). 
I don’t want tawteen, because the Lebanese themselves cannot get a 
decent life. My grandparents have stronger feelings for Palestine 
than I do, I have never seen it.’ 
Farah, a female, aged 20, studying for a B.Sc. and Azni, a 24-year old 
Barman in Beirut spoke of difference between their generation and that of 
their parents. They reported that their parents ‘wanted to work, to survive 
day by day and wanted to return as if nothing had happened to the land as 
it was when they left 68 years ago.’ They spoke of wanting civil rights, the 
right to own property and to travel. They also aspired to another nationality 
and agency for themselves. 
Group 3 with No Knowledge about the Nakba18 
This group numbered 8 and was evenly divided between 4 males and 4 
females. This group exhibited a strong divergence from the ‘accepted’ 
view of Palestinian identity, but not exclusively so. 
Ghazi, a 21-year-old male who left the education system with no 
qualification, as his father was too sick to work and who is unemployed, 
said: 
‘I know nothing at all about it (al-Nakba). I want to have a 
permanent job. I want better conditions and to live with dignity, 
with full civil rights and without problems. I want to have a 
nationality somewhere else. If I get this I will be happy not to have 
the Palestinian identity. This is more important to me than having 
this one. I would be happy to take tawteen. My parents had a hope 
of going back to Palestine. I don’t believe in this.’ 
                                                 
18 1 was a student at University, 2 had completed the Brevet and 5 had completed various 
stages of the Baccalaureate, but none had finished it except one.  Only 2 of these had 
employment. None owned or had access to a computer, but all had access to Wi-Fi and the 
internet on their phones, and used them for Social Media purposes. 
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Both Ghazi and Kamal, a 28-year-old male, and unemployed saw their 
aspirations as being larger than their parents, and Kamal expressed the 
view that ‘Maybe their time is over. We are living in different time.’ 
Badria, a 27-year-old female, who is unemployed and has passed her 
Baccalaureate, when asked to relate what she knew about the Nakba 
replied: 
‘My mother used to tell me, but I have forgotten about it. I do not 
remember anything about it. I am happy enough if I have enough to 
eat. I don’t think about the future. I have had a lot of unhappy 
incidents in my life. I am losing weight worrying about it.’  
Badria has a family member who is a drug addict and her father has left the 
family home to live with his girlfriend, leaving his family unsupported. 
She and her family face a continual struggle to find the means to eat on a 
daily basis. In that regard, she typifies many of the youth interviewed for 
this research. Kansteiner (2002: 194) suggests that an individual may 
‘subscribe wholeheartedly to certain historical interpretations,’ however 
that individual ‘would not be able to identify their origins even if one 
undertakes the cumbersome task of asking (that individual) directly.’  
Klein (1998: 301) cautions us that ‘in order to remember, something must 
be forgotten’. This is necessarily true because new experiences interfere 
with memory and can crowd it out and cause it to have less significance 
both for the individual and the collective. This research posits the view that 
the existential hardships which the Palestinian youth endure in the camps 
of Lebanon are one source of Klein’s forgetting, and that the Nakba has 
become less important for them. Since the Nakba is at the core of 
Palestinian identity, this ‘forgetting’ has importance for ethnographers 
when attempting to quantify the identity of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb.  
Allan (2014: 239) cites Nietzsche [1873, (1983: 62)] to suggest that this 
forgetting is a process which enables the Palestinian refugees to avoid a 
condition in which ‘an excess of memory precludes action or future 
development.’ 
106 
 
 
 
 
 Despite the variation in levels of knowledge on and understanding of the 
subject, 56% of all those interviewed, were able to ascribe blame on the 
British and 7% on the American governments for their predicament.  
Fateh, a 35-year-old male learnt about the Nakba from his parents:  
‘A gang of Zionists raped our land and had a conspiracy with the 
British to deny us our land. We were forced to leave and promised 
to return within many days and are still struggling today. Al- Nakba 
still goes on. We don’t hate all people, just this gang who did this to 
us.’ 
The Palestinian woman is frequently used in literature and art to represent 
the homeland. (Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 138; Slyomovics, 1998: 200-
201). Fateh’s use of the word ‘rape’ (ightisab) is a powerful metaphor to 
describe the destruction of the entity known as Palestine during the events 
surrounding the Nakba, as well as the actual rape of Palestinian women by 
the Hagannah, Irgun Levi and /or the IDF. In Arab culture, the honour of 
the female members of a family is linked to the honour of the family and 
the wider clan (Warnock, 1990: 23). Any hint of despoliation is the 
harbinger of shame on all the family members. 
 
Figure 3.11.  Copy of poster in a home in Shatila PRC, using a female 
figure to represent Palestine under occupation. Source: O’Connor, 
2016. 
 In his interview Fateh displayed a strong commitment to his Palestinian 
identity and nationalism.  He also spoke of Palestine as a feminine entity. 
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He upheld the Right of Return as ‘sacred’, but said that ‘I don’t believe 
that I will return to Palestine’ and he iterated that his problem was not with 
Jews in general, but with the Zionists. He wanted to live with dignity and 
rights for his children. He said ‘I see no future for myself’ and had 
doubtful prospects for his son, but he was unwilling to surrender his 
Palestinian identity.  Fateh’s declarations epitomise what Bernard (1972: 3) 
states when he says that the collective identity of a group is bounded by the 
sharing of the ‘same beliefs, language, historical background and cultural 
heritage, formed out of common responses to common needs in the 
historical experience of that group.’ The only aberration of that collective 
identity is that Fateh would take tawteen if it were offered to him, due he 
said to the economic pressures imposed on him. He fully realised that in 
doing so, he would be risking losing his Palestinian identity.     
 
Conclusion: reflections and pathways for policy 
This paper has examined Palestinian refugee youth contemporary concepts 
of Palestinianness through the prism of the events surrounding the Nakba.  
The aim of this research was to determine the extent of this generation’s 
attachment to, and knowledge of, the events surrounding the Nakba, as the 
cornerstone of their identity. As previously outlined anthropologists have 
presumed that this attachment was ineluctable and homogenous for all 
Palestinian refugees, across the generations in Lebanon (Peteet: 2005; 
Sayigh: 2001; Bianchi: 2014). This research has validated the incipient 
fractures in attitude and loyalty to that position, as noted by Allan (2014: 5, 
26, 33, 60); and also validates her view that ‘we need to bear in mind the 
radical transformations that have occurred over the more than six decades.’ 
In so doing we acknowledge the ‘primacy of economic subjectivity and the 
decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian’ 
(Allan: 2014: 97-98). This research has found evidence that the present 
generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not a homogenous group 
in their loyalty to the ‘accepted’ idea of Palestinian identity.  
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This study proposes that there now appears to be a weakening of the 
knowledge of the Nakba; a diminution of the transgenerational 
transmission of the facts surrounding it; and a lessening of the significance 
which this generation affords it, which, in turn is resulting in a shift in 
identity patterns amongst the present generation of refugees -Jeel ma baa’d 
El Harb. Chatty and Hundt (2001: 41) have already noted that ‘historical 
consciousness appears to be waning as the younger generation learn less 
about their past.’  Allan (2014: 4, 5, 33) cites Desjarlais (1997: 223), in 
suggesting that ‘felt immediacies’ are producing a new form of 
Palestinianness – ‘distinct from a national identity.’ For a significant 
number of this group the existential diurnal conditions in the Lebanese 
refugee camps appear to have mediated their allegiance to nationalist 
dogma and the traditionally accepted view of what Palestinian identity 
entails.   
Knowledge of the Nakba was found to be high in one group, spread across 
the camps and the gatherings. This group were substantially better 
educationally qualified than those with a lesser degree of knowledge. 
Furthermore, they were mostly employed and/or in pursuit of higher 
education. The responses given to questions were delivered in a more 
confident manner and it was obvious from those responses that they 
considered themselves to be less concerned with earning enough money to 
survive. In the group with a lesser knowledge, there was a diversity of 
educational achievement, mostly caused by the need to fulfil those 
existential needs. In the third group, lack of both education and 
employment impinged greatly on their lives and the need to provide 
sustenance for themselves and their families superseded any other 
concerns. It is possible to assume that this diversity in knowledge of 
history is typical of other societies but the environmental and socio-
economic landscapes in the PRCs in Lebanon have served to intensify the 
phenonomen.  
This research suggests that Palestinian refugee youth identity deserves to 
be reconsidered by academics and by policymakers. Van Meijl (2008: 169) 
stated that anthropologists treated culture as if it were a set of ideas or 
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meanings, which were ‘shared by a whole population of homogenous 
individuals.’ Similarly, Diana Allan (2014: 4, 8) makes the point that 
anthropologists, policymakers and ethnographers have also assumed that 
this generation will continue to view and live the Nakba, as did their 
antecedents.  
This study demonstrates the need for a re-examination of policy at the 
international, regional and national levels to take account of the changes 
noted in ‘Palestinianness’. At the local level, some form of modified 
tawteen could be offered to those of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, who may 
wish to avail of it, as many of the youth were born in the camps and are de 
facto, although not de jure, citizens of Lebanon. At the regional level 
opportunities could be made available to those who wish to travel for 
employment and education. At the international level, there is an urgent 
need to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian dispute with a renewed emphasis 
on the refugee situation.  
Cultural groups are composed of people with individual aspirations, points 
of view and sometimes conflicting allegiances. This examination of 
Palestinian refugee youth identity would seem to suggest that there are 
inter- generational fractures in what importance the Palestinian refugees 
and in particular, the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb attach to the Nakba, their 
willingness to accept/reject tawteen and how they view haq al ‘awda. This 
phenomenon will be further examined in Chapters 4-6 of this thesis. Some 
of those interviewed for this research were willing to reject as unacceptable 
the traditional aspects of Palestinian identity, due to the perceived 
irrelevance of those tenets based on a nationalist ideology. Some were 
willing to retain parts of that ideology and others remain fiercely loyal to 
all aspects of that concept. This research demonstrates that this generation 
is heterogenous and that no one size fits all approach will suffice. Allan 
(2014: 174) suggests that  
‘Younger generations understand the history of the community and 
their place within it but also how they view the future – less an 
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immutable destiny than as determined by individual will and 
choice’. 
In summary, this study has found a disparity between the findings of 
previous research on the importance of the Nakba to Palestinian refugee 
and specifically to the present generation. It is posited that the three levels 
of knowledge found in this study are strongly linked to socio-economic 
and socio-political influences on the identity of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb. 
As Proshansky et al (1983: 58) have found the physical and social 
environment which define and structure daily lives have a profound effect 
on the development of identity at both the collective and individual levels. 
A number of factors can be identified as contributing to the changes noted 
in this study. There is evidence of increased pressure caused by the influx 
of refugees from Syria resulting in competition for scarce resources and 
employment opportunities. The continued repression by GOL of the 
Palestinian refugees is another factor, coupled with the failure of the 
LPDC, the PLO, PA, and the PCs to deliver any amelioration in their lives. 
This coupled with the perceived corruption of the factions by the youth is 
causing them to consider them as increasingly irrelevant.  
Memory and tradition are important constituents to collective and personal 
identity as Taylor (1989) suggested. However, as Massey (1994: 141) 
pointed out, those memories are subject to social negotiation and conflict 
and the importance which individuals ascribe to them, in their search for 
identity. For some of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, these memories have 
become irrelevant as the necessity to find the wherewithal to survive and 
the search for agency has taken primacy.  This has caused intergenerational 
ruptures with the conception of the Palestinian identity of their forbearers, 
which was based on what Bauman (1996) described as nostalgic 
remembrance of a past life and what Smith (1991) suggests is the myth of 
nationalism. Despite the intergenerational differences noted, allegiance to 
place as Palestine was noted to be strong amongst this generation, despite 
the poor levels of knowledge about the Nakba. This would seem to chime 
with what Sack (1980) suggested, when he observed that group 
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belongingness enhances the importance of places of origin, and through 
them the identity of the individual. 
hooks (1991) has suggested that that globalisation has implications for the 
construction of identity, and that place is now a multitude of locations and 
remembrances. Lovell (1998) also makes this point stating that the 
pressures of daily life and the effects of globalisation, sometimes causes 
memories associated with group membership to be altered or forgotten and 
causing consequent alterations in identity patterns. This study has found 
elements of that forgetting in which memories of the Nakba have faded or 
been deliberately forgotten as the quest for daily survival has taken 
primacy. Parekh (2008) has also associated globalisation with a breakdown 
of cultural loyalties and traditions. This study has also found evidence of 
this amongst this generation of Palestinian refugees in the reduced 
importance of the Nakba for them. The factor of globalisation will be 
further explored in Chapters 4-6, in dealing with some other aspects of 
Palestinian refugee youth identity.  
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Chapter 4 
Haq al ‘Awda, the Right of Return and Palestinian Refugee Youth 
Identity in Lebanon. 
Abstract: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 1948 
codifies Haq al ‘awda (right of return), and is pivotal to the Palestinian 
narrative at both the individual and collective levels. It has been framed by 
academics, in the past, as a nationalist ideology based on territoriality. In 
this paper, the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the generation after the war) are 
surveyed in a series of interviews, using qualitative research methods, in 
order to ascertain how they view haq al ’awda and whether they regard it 
as an absolute right. The importance of place, home, homeland, identity 
and belonging are explored, in order to see if there are any 
intergenerational changes in how haq al ‘awda is situated in the 
traditionally accepted Palestinian refugee identity concepts. Factors which 
may be responsible for any changes are analysed. The main finding 
suggests that the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb visualise haq al ‘awda in a much 
more eclectic manner, including concepts of dignity, human rights, justice, 
and a better quality of life, than previous generations. These findings 
should assist policymakers and NGOs at all levels to devise better 
strategies and normative solutions to reconcile the ideational concept of 
haq al ‘awda with a more pragmatic notion of the right of return. 
Keywords: haq al ‘awda; identity; dignity; belonging; place; human rights 
Introduction:  Hart (2014: 384) has demonstrated that not all of those 
classified, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Near 
East (UNRWA), as children or young adults in the families of forced 
migrants have experienced displacement during their own lifetimes. 
However, he suggests that the lives of the youth of those ‘originally 
displaced are shaped in diverse and significant ways by this displacement.’ 
Their daily existence is fraught with the ‘limitations imposed upon them by 
the withholding of citizenship and the absence of economic opportunities’ 
associated with that deficiency. These limitations include a lack of civil 
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rights; the denial of adequate employment; the exclusion from access to 
adequate medical and education services; and most of all to a lack of 
dignity and opportunities to achieve agency for themselves.   
While Hart’s (2014) work was centred on a more general approach to 
issues regarding children, and forced migration, this paper focusses on the 
consideration of refugee youth in the Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in 
Beirut, Lebanon, specifically in terms of identity-based social science 
research. The primary and overarching aim of this research was to 
ascertain the degree to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb subscribe to the 
traditional Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers, 
and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that 
identity. This paper seeks to measure the relevance of, and loyalty to the 
concept of haq al ‘awda for the Jeel ma baa’d El harb in Lebanon today. 
Haq al ‘awda refers to the right of return, to pre-Israeli Palestine, which 
has been a core aspiration of Palestinian refugees through the years. Haq al 
‘awda has been one of the central tenets of Palestinian national identity as 
iterated by academics through the years. 
Methodology 
The semi-structured interviews utilised for this paper, as part of a 
qualitative research methodology allowed the respondents greater latitude 
in expressing their concepts of haq al ‘awda. The case study used in this 
research centred on the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the generation after the 
war), permitted a greater depth of data collection than other techniques 
such as questionnaires. More triangulation of data and opportunities for 
probing questions were possible. This enhanced the reliability of data 
recorded and supplemented the observation conducted in the gatherings in 
Beirut and the PRCs of Ein el Hilweh and the Beirut area.19. 
The Arabic expression haq al ‘awda translates as ‘right to/of return’ and is 
usually understood to refer to the Palestinian diaspora, or those living 
beyond Gaza and the West Bank. Support for this principle throughout the 
                                                 
19 Appendix ‘C’ provides a detailed description of the methodology employed for this 
thesis 
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broader Palestinian diaspora fluctuates and this survey was particularly 
interested in determining whether the younger generation in Lebanon have 
a differing conception of haq al ‘awda from their predecessors and if so, 
how this difference is expressed. This study also seeks to examine the 
factors which Allan (2014) suggests may be causing a shift in 
Palestinianness amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in Lebanon. 
Qualitative research carried out amongst Palestinian refugee youth in 
Lebanon, during 2015/2016, on the subject of identity and belonging, 
explores the changes which the cultural, physical and socio-economic 
landscapes have wrought on the present generation, and forms the grounds 
for this paper. 
 A deeper understanding of identity patterns amongst refugee youth is 
presented, which will be of assistance to policymakers as they seek to 
mitigate this long-standing and seemingly intractable problem associated 
with these groupings in Lebanon.  This study also attempts to give a voice 
to the present generation, who feel helpless and forgotten. Both collective 
and personal identities are ‘not fixed’ (Allan, 2014: 214), always in a 
dynamic process of evolution; subject to internal and external influences 
and it is dangerous to consider them as anything other than heterogenous. 
The Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in Lebanon are no different to other groups, 
whose existential conditions and future prospects lie largely outside their 
own control. This study attempts to show that a number of factors have 
combined to make their situation somewhat anomalous. 
Place and Palestinian identity of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb  
Palestinian identity is complex and highly politicised, representing an 
entanglement of historical and contemporary political and legal processes.  
One key element of this is that access to academic histories, outside of the 
international biblical-period focussed narratives amongst the Palestinian 
communities, is very limited. Histories and memory are then largely passed 
orally through generations and are reproduced in a myriad of ways within 
both the urban and rural landscape. Hull et al (1994:118) have suggested 
that ‘place icons’ provide symbols of people’s memories and that when 
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these are encountered repeatedly they evoke a sense of place. The 
recreation of the place of Palestine in the Lebanese PRCs, by the naming of 
streets and areas after locations in Palestine and the occupation of these 
areas by clans or families, from the same region in Palestine (Schulz and 
Hammer, 2003:115), serve as what Tuan (1977: 152) calls ‘rallying points’ 
which bind the refugees to places lost and to each other. This collective 
belonging reinforces a sense of Palestinian identity, not only at the 
collective level, but also at the personal level, providing an enhanced level 
of self-esteem, which Korpela (1989) and Sarbin (1983) maintain is 
essential to balance or respond to the pressures of daily life. In doing so 
they are, in effect, recreating the landscape of their perceived homeland 
and reimaging their past within the contemporary urban environment of 
Beirut. This identity is reinforced continually by the use of wall paintings, 
photographs of martyrs; maps and flags of Palestine; posters of Arafat; and 
items of jewellery in shops and homes within the PRCs observed by the 
author. The inculcation of Palestinian ideology and nationalism is 
reinforced through the display of posters depicting leaders and the 
homeland, even for the very young. These pictorial landscapes represent an 
ideology of power and control and serve to constantly reinforce the 
messages of solidarity alongside politicised marginalisation and 
subjugation.  
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Figure 4.1. Poster of Arafat. Abbas and the Dome of the Rock on a 
wall enclosing a play area in Burj al Barajneh PRC. Source: 
O’Connor, 2016. (Note: The children playing are guarded by a DFLP 
armed sentry). 
Sack (1997: 131-132) suggests that the ‘formation of personal identity is 
directly connected to the formation of place’ and that each is inter-
dependent and would not survive without the other. It is also true that 
identity is adaptable and constantly subject to change and not static, unlike 
place. Casey (2001: 688) further suggests that this attachment to place 
survives through many years, because these places are ‘in us’ and indeed 
‘are us’. Places are embedded in us and become ‘part of our very self, our 
enduring character’ and we carry them forward and through this process 
they become passed on to subsequent generations. This is certainly true for 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Having been physically displaced 
from Palestine, the refugee communities are now reimaging their historical 
place and sense of belonging through whatever means they can in the 
difficult urban confines of these camps. This paper uses an allegory of 
Aburfaha’s (2008) research to present consideration of haq al ‘awda. He 
proposed that Palestinians shaped their identity using symbols of trees 
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indigenous to the land of Palestine. Amongst them he asserted that al- 
burtuqal (the orange) represented the loss of Palestine; al-zaytuna (the 
olive tree) represented the Palestinian nation, rooted in the land of 
Palestine; and al-saber (the cactus), also representing rootedness in the 
land of Palestine, but also patience and resilience. All are related to the 
culture of fellahin (workers of the land), with which Palestinian identity is 
associated (Aburfaha, 2008: 344) and all are tied to al- ard (the land). 
These symbols also represent loss, and remember a constructed past that 
verges on an idyll of rural Palestinians working peacefully with the land 
prior to their expulsion and displacement. 
This study proposes that we should consider Palestinianness, or Palestinian 
identity at the collective and personal levels as like al -zaytuna. This 
identity has its components firmly anchored in the land of Palestine 
through the roots of al -nakba (the events surrounding the catastrophe, in 
the past). The trunk of the tree is summud (steadfastness, in the present) 
which channels the nourishment up to the branches of tawteen 
(resettlement/assimilation/naturalisation in Lebanon); hijra (emigration) 
and haq al ‘awda (right of return). The fruit of the olive is eventual ‘awda 
(return) to Palestine, which lies in the future. This depiction of al- zaytuna 
then is indicative of what both Parmenter (1994) and Swedenburg (1990) 
noted of the prominence of belonging to place in Palestinian identity 
construction.  Depictions of all three trees were continually observed in the 
camps, during the course of this survey, on murals, on posters and on 
informal or unofficial paintings decorating various houses and shops. 
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Figure 4.2.  Palestinian Identity Represented as al-zaytuna (Olive tree). 
 Creswell (2009: 8) suggests that because refugees are in a homeless 
condition, even though this exile is caused by compulsion, they are 
considered to be deviant to the normal conception of place. This does not 
detract from their attachment to Palestine as their homeland, origin and the 
place where as Tuan (1977: 149) suggests they ‘feel to be the focal point of 
their cosmic structure.’  Stokols (1981: 396) proposes that the ‘non-
material properties’ of places forms the ‘glue that binds people to place’ 
and that ‘place’ contributes to self-identity.  For the present generation of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Palestine and the idea of the right of 
return to that point of origin provides that glue, as it has done for previous 
generations, in what Relph (1976: 141) calls ‘the persistent sameness and 
unity’ which allows Palestine to be differentiated from other places. 
Palestine remains for them as a ‘significant centre’ to counter the 
awfulness of their diurnal existence in the Lebanese Palestinian refugee 
camps (PRCs).  
Historical importance of haq al ‘awda for the Palestinians in exile in 
Lebanon.  
The historical context for the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon has 
been related in Chapter 3. Schulz and Hammer (2003:131) chart three 
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phases in the history of the concept of the right of return. The first of these 
took place in the immediate aftermath of the Nakba, when the individual 
demand for return was expressed and the Palestinians considered 
themselves as ‘refugees’. An organised collective demand had yet to 
emerge; although the UN had passed UNGAR 194 (UN Doc, 1948 a), 
demanding the return of all Palestinian refugees to the lands from which 
they had been exiled. The second phase can be identified after the 
formation of the PLO in 1962 and specifically its consolidation in 
Lebanon, in 1969-1970. This led to the establishment of the ‘Fakhani 
Republic’, what Sayigh (1997:448) called a ‘state-within- a state- in exile.’ 
This period of Palestinian ascendancy was strengthened by the 1969 Cairo 
Agreement and accompanied by Arab Nation and PLO financial support.20   
Palestinians in Lebanon now began to refer to themselves as ‘returners 
(a’idoun)’, in what Schulz and Hammer (2003:131) term ‘an act of 
resistance.’ This terminology represented that their stay in Lebanon was 
temporary. It also was their way of expressing agency by rejecting the 
passivity of being a refugee. The third phase began with the defeat of the 
PLO and its exodus from Lebanon, in 1982 and continues to the present. 
This period saw the removal of financial subventions; the loss of armed 
protection; and a return to the adoption of the mantle of being a refugee. 
With the unilateral abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in 1987 (Peteet, 
2005:132, 175) by the Government of Lebanon (GOL), Palestinian 
refugees were once again subject to the control of the Lebanese 
government. They once more became dependent on UNRWA support. 
With the ending of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, they were once more 
subject to a regime which denied them civil rights, severe restrictions on 
the right to employment, a ban on owning property, and denied them 
access to adequate medical, educational and social services (Al-Natour, 
2007; Chaaban et al, 2016). Schulz and Hammer (2003:140- 167) suggest 
that haq al ‘awda has slipped from being a bedrock of PLO ideology and 
                                                 
20 The Cairo Agreement legitimised the Palestinian armed elements in Lebanon and gave 
the PLO de facto control of parts of the country, most notably the South and West Beirut. 
It also gave employment and residency rights for Palestinians living in Lebanon (Schulz 
and Hammer, 2003:55).  
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strategy, even though it remains as ‘a cornerstone of individual life-
strategies’.  During the course of this survey significant dissatisfaction was 
evident amongst the PRCs in Beirut. Many of those interviewed felt 
betrayed by the Oslo Accords (1993). This was a constant recurring theme 
and is one that remains central to contemporary narratives of displacement. 
A second, and possibly more significant theme that emerged during the 
2016 survey was dissatisfaction with the PLO shift in focus away from 
return towards a two-state solution, in lieu of liberation. This is reflective 
of the continued, and possibly increasing elements of radical positioning 
that exists amongst these communities and levels of dissatisfaction 
amongst the younger groups in particular with the former leaders in the 
1990s. This is also a further factor that demonstrates their continued fear of 
abandonment resulting in the principle of haq al ‘awda becoming 
important to them. 
The issues of legality surrounding Haq al ‘Awda 
While it is a highly politicised concept, deeply ingrained in the psyche of 
certain sections of the diasporic communities there are also significant 
legal elements to this. The Palestinian refugees have consistently 
maintained that they have a right of return to the lands from which they 
were displaced. The right of return has served as the ‘bedrock of 
Palestinian ideology’ and the ‘foremost of rights of Palestinian rights’ 
(Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 141). Comprehensive discussions on this 
subject are well presented elsewhere by authors such as Takkenberg 
(1998); Lawland (1996) and Akram (2001). One of the first mentions of 
the concept of a right of return for Palestinian refugees to their homeland 
was made in the first of two reports by the United Nations Mediator for 
Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte on 01 Aug and 16 Sep 1948, to the 
United Nations Security Council (Takkenberg, 1998: 22). In the latter 
report, he stated that the ‘right of return of refugees should be reaffirmed’. 
The following day he was assassinated by Israeli terrorists, but his 
successor, Ralph Bunche reaffirmed his recommendations (Lawland, 1996: 
545). Following from these reports, United Nations General Assembly 
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Resolution (UNGAR) 194(III) was passed (UN Documents, 1948a). Para 
11 of this resolution  
‘Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at 
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid 
for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or 
damage to property which, under principles of international law or 
in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities 
responsible.’ 
This resolution has been reaffirmed in nearly every UN General Assembly 
vote and supported almost unanimously by all states, except Israel, since 
1948. It should be noted that UNGARs are non- binding and do not in 
themselves constitute International law; however, UNGAR 194(III) forms 
the basis for Palestinian claims of a right of return. Also, in 1948, UNGAR 
217 A (III) (UN Document 1948b) was passed, more commonly known as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR48). This stated in 
Article 13(2) that ‘everyone has the right to leave any country, including 
his own country and the right to return to his own country.’ The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR66) (UN 
Documents, 1966) was ratified in 1966 and its Article 12(4) states that ‘no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.’ 
Israel is a signatory to this treaty without reservation. It is similarly a 
signatory of The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD65) (UN Documents 1965), where Article 
5 (d) (ii) guarantees the ‘right to leave any country, including one’s own 
and to return to one’s own country.’  
Difficulties in interpretation arise in relation to the phrase ‘his own’ and 
‘one’s’ country, which appear in CERD65, UDHR48 and ICCPR66. 
Lawland (1996: 548-558) goes into great detail, on the meaning of these 
terms and concludes that through the reading of the travaux prepétoires for 
ICCPR66, in particular, that the terminology did not restrict the application 
of the relief offered to merely citizens or nationals. She cites the 
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Nottebohm Case (ICJ Reports 1955) as conferring entitlement to the 
Palestinians, due to their genuine links to Palestine, a country which they 
consider to be ‘home and to which they are connected through history, 
race, religion, family or other ties.’  The Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, Article 49 (IRC Doc, 1949) protects the right of return in 
international humanitarian law, stating that ‘Persons thus evacuated shall 
be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in 
question have ceased.’ In respect of subsequent generations of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, Lawland (1996: 547) makes a strong argument that 
they have right to ‘enter their own country for the first time’ as conferred 
on them through the travaux prepétoires of ICCPR66. 
 The fact that the British mandate in Palestine has been succeeded by the 
State of Israel does not disentitle the Palestinian refugees from a right of 
return. Furthermore, Israel has no right to arbitrarily de-nationalise 
nationals abroad [ICCPR66 (12) (4); (2) and (26); CERD65 5 (d)(ii)]. The 
establishment of the State of Israel was the successor to the British 
Mandate, where, as Lawland (1996: 558) reports, all inhabitants were 
Palestine citizens pursuant to the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925-
1941. Brownlie (1990: 661,664) states that on succession, ‘the population 
goes with the territory’ and it would be ‘illegal for the successor to treat the 
population as de facto stateless.’ Lawland (1996: 562-563) suggests that 
the 1952 Israeli Nationality Law was an arbitrary and discriminatory 
instrument to deprive Palestinian refugees of a right to return and their 
nationality. Israel has always defended these claims. 
Historically, at least until 1974, as Khalidi (1992: 34) relates the 
Palestinians pressed their right of return to an antebellum status. In that 
year, the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) declared 
that haq al ‘awda was ‘at the forefront of the Palestinian people’s 
collective rights.’ Both Lawland (1996: 542-543) and Takkenberg (1998: 
244-245) make evident that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
and PNC conflated the right of return with Palestinian self- determination. 
Lawland (ibid: 543) opines that the two are not mutually exclusive and that 
an individual can make a claim and ‘does not prejudice his or her rights as 
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an individual.’ She further states that the right of return under ICCPR66 is 
an individual right, ‘not that to be applied to an entire people.’ Zureik 
(1994: 16), however makes the case that abandoning the collective right in 
favour of pursuing an individual right of return weakens community 
membership, a position endorsed by the PLO in the past. Furthermore, she 
states that Israeli state sovereignty is maintained to the detriment of 
Palestinian self-determination. This is at odds with Lawland’s analysis of 
ICCPR66, CERD65 and UDHR48. Since the breakdown of the talks 
surrounding a resolution of the Israeli- Palestine problem, post- Oslo, the 
PLO have tacitly supported the principle of individuals claiming that right, 
in addition to a collective right.  
Attitudes to haq al ’awda  
Place and belonging is central to the identity of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, but it is but one element of identity constructs among these 
communities. In most societies there tend to be intergenerational 
differences associated with these constructs and this is also evident 
amongst the refugee youth with regards to haq al ’awda.  This trend has 
been previously noted by Allan (2014:26), who identified a number of 
factors which might be causing a shift in Palestinianness amongst this 
generation. The first key finding of this research has established that the 
vast majority of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb see the ‘right of return’ as their 
right, even though some have no hope of its realisation. They also are 
conscious that concepts of this right are different to those of the preceding 
generations, in terms of realism, pragmatism and a willingness to consider 
practical solutions to the problem. Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33,60) has noted 
some of these differences due to ‘the radical transformations that have 
occurred over the more than six decades’ and she has quite correctly 
ascribed them as owing to the ‘primacy of economic subjectivity and the 
decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian’ 
(Allan: 2014:97-98).  
Levels of awareness and consciousness of the principle of haq al ’awda 
was high. This research found that of the 61 interviews carried out amongst 
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the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, only four of the respondents professed to know 
nothing about haq al ‘awda. Of the latter, 2 were female and two were 
male. Of these four, one female and one male were employed on low pay, 
with only basic education. Even within the context of the PRCs these could 
be regarded as marginalised individuals and they professed little interest in 
their political situation. Three of them knew little about the historical 
context of their community and professed to knowing nothing about the 
Nakba. Two of them, following discussion would take tawteen if offered to 
them. Everyone else had varying degrees of knowledge and understanding 
about the historical context, political framework and legal position 
associated with the right of return. Each of the 57 positive respondents 
stated that haq al ‘awda was their right. This was not always a blind 
adherence to the mantra of the political factions (which are not highly 
regarded by many of this generation), and for most, there was an 
acknowledgement of the difficulties in realising it, but it does represent a 
highly symbolic and emotive association with the principle of return and 
illustrates the continuing place-attachment to Palestine, and the pivotal part 
it plays in their identity constructs.  
The survey results would suggest that there now appears to be a greater 
willingness amongst the present generation of refugees (Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb) to consider haq al ‘awda in terms other than an immediate physical 
return, which they unquestionably regard as theirs by right. They 
understand that a realisation of this right is not achievable in the short or 
medium term; and it is not always their priority, especially in the context of 
the often very challenging socio-economic conditions that these individuals 
have to contend with. This research indicates that the worsening conditions 
in the PRCs have caused them to consider the achievement of haq al ‘awda 
in more realistic and more idealistic terms.  Haq al ’awda remains a 
guiding principle but the lived realities of their situation allow them to 
adopt a more grounded approach to its realisation. The responses of 
interviewees were informative on many levels but their responses to the 
principle of the right of return can be grouped under a number of common 
thematic responses. These included internal conflicts and lack of hope; 
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summud and religious perceptions; land; dreams, agency and dignity; 
generational shifts; insurgent nationalism; and a synopsis of the remedies 
offered by the respondents to the problem of haq al ‘awda. 
Internal Conflicts and Lack of Hope:  
There was a realisation amongst some respondents of the conflict between 
the concept of haq al ‘awda and accepting another nationality, or even 
tawteen (naturalisation in Lebanon, Chapter 5 refers). This research found 
that 27 or 44% of all respondents would accept tawteen if offered to them.  
Some of these would take any nationality as a vehicle to gain entry to 
Palestine, even fleetingly. In a typical response one 28-year-old female 
stated that she would take another nationality if it allowed her access to 
better employment opportunities. She recognised that this might run 
counter to the dominant political narrative but she wanted a better life for 
her children as she currently had ‘no hope’. Her response was firmly 
positioned within a rights-based and economic opportunity framework.  
Her testimony chimes with Allan’s (2014: 51) finding that the ‘indignities 
of daily poverty’ sometimes supersede loyalty to places of origin and 
political nationalist dogma, and induces feelings of guilt and despair. The 
guilt is because they feel that they are being disloyal to their sense of 
Palestinian identity and the despair is caused by their realisation that their 
existence has little chance of improvement. Fatima, a 27-year old 
university graduate was also willing to embrace tawteen, or some other 
nationality. In gaining another nationality, even a Lebanese one, it would 
enhance her chances of getting back to Palestine, and avoid the 
‘discrimination’ surrounding ‘being a Palestinian refugee.’ A number of 
male respondents had similar responses. Anis, a 25-year-old unemployed 
man with basic education did not believe in haq al ‘awda and had no hope 
of its realisation. His focus was instead on basic living conditions and 
trying to achieve work. In common with other responses he also positioned 
the PRCs within the context of the Syrian crisis, and suggested that the 
influx of Syrian refugees from that region was making the situation worse.  
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‘It is hopeless here, I have no hope. My only hope is to emigrate. 
We need better living conditions, to live with dignity and not to 
have discrimination against Palestinians; these are the most 
important things.’ 
The hopeless feelings of Anis and Sara are in keeping with the research of 
Evans and Cohen (1987: 590-591; 597-599) and similar to that of 
Michelson (1976), in that both studies found that when the present 
environment of the person does not provide the opportunities to fulfil their 
objectives; when the cultural, social and physical landscapes combine to 
work against them; when control is lacking, stress results and a feeling of 
helplessness ensues. In such situations, attachment to an idealised place 
such as Palestine is enhanced, as in Sara’s case, although not in Anis’s 
case.  
These attitudes were reflected at an official level as well with one 
UNRWA official commenting in 2015 that there were certain groups of 
Palestinians stating that they would rather be sent to Germany than 
returning to Palestine. This was further evidenced by small scale protests 
outside of the UNRWA offices on a number of occasions in the 2000s 
where members of the refugee community were actively protesting against 
the right of return. This should probably be contextualised against the 
broader pattern of Syrian refugee movement into Europe and the associated 
perception of opportunities, but such public displays are significant and 
would unlikely have taken place in the politically charged and controlled 
atmosphere of previous decades. 
Summud (patience/steadfastness) and Religious perception: 
While the significant majority of the respondents supported the right of 
return they were also realistic in terms of its realisation. Most articulated 
this through the concept of summud, or the Middle Eastern notion of 
patience. Twenty-seven respondents did not think that haq al ‘awda would 
happen in their lifetime but sixteen were confident that it would happen in 
their children’s lifetime. In this regard, Nasir, a 35-year-old male, was a 
typical respondent. Although he had a degree in Computer Science, he 
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works illegally as a barman in a Beirut hotel because he cannot get legal 
employment. He was of the opinion that haq al ‘awda is inevitable, and 
suggested that it would lead to a better future for his children and provide 
them with an identity, home and country.  
Nasir’s statement that the concept of haq al ‘awda is inviolably linked to 
being a Palestinian is important in understanding how this generation view 
their identity. His responses reflect the common attitudes of his generation 
but tempered within the context of summud. Leila, a 30-year-old female 
reflected this in stating that haq al ‘awda ‘is our right. It is not achievable 
now, at this time, it is unachievable now. We must have summud.’ 
Schiocchet (2012: 80) suggests that summud is ‘used to survive the 
quotidian’ where the present is ‘a temporary aberration to be abolished 
through haq al ‘awda.’ He suggests that the Quran lists summud as one of 
the divine attributes (ibid: 77) and that the present is a disturbance of the 
normal historical development of the Palestinian nation (ibid: 79). It is also 
reflective of the socio-political realities of the everyday lives of the 
younger generation camp residents who have been witness to the older 
generation’s decadal struggle to return and the political barriers that exist. 
The Syrian crisis, and the access the younger generation have to social 
media and information highways relating to that crisis has also led to more 
realistic positions on their future.  
A further theme that emerged from the responses was the positioning of the 
right to return within a religious context. All, but one, of the respondents 
were Muslim and the intrinsic alignment of political identity with their 
religion is unsurprising. Nine of the respondents directly framed their right 
of return in religious terms.  
Wakeem, a 27-year-old male, employed as a sanitation worker stated that it 
was their right to go to Palestine as it was their own country and that as 
Muslims the refugee community  
‘have the hadith (report of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) 
and the Koran verses, which say that we will return. Jesus Christ 
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will appear in Palestine and play a significant role in our liberation. 
This will not happen in the foreseeable future’. 
 Sarhan, aged 27, a Business Studies graduate from university, awaited 
‘God’s promise’ for haq al ‘awda.   
This religious framing was presented in more radical terms by Yasmeen, a 
28-year old female, unemployed and with basic education who stated that 
‘God will kill all the Jews.’ One feature of many of the responses were 
how differences in levels of educational attainment tended to frame the 
response. Those who had achieved higher or further education 
qualifications tended to present a more liberal perspective while those with 
limited educational exposure tended to be positioned more radically in the 
context of conflict-related struggle.  
Anih (1992: 31) suggests that Man has to depend on the divine for all those 
things he cannot provide for himself.  Oppong (2013: 13) suggests that 
‘religion is more likely to play a significant role in identity formation in a 
culture where youth confront a continually fluctuating social and political 
milieu.’ It is an essential component in the development of youth identity 
and without it, the ‘multiplicity of choices and options accessible to 
modern youth is more likely to breed despair, hopelessness and confusion.’  
Parekh (2008: 25) opines that Muslim youth who do not realise their life 
expectancies, often find little to be proud of in their lives and ‘turn to Islam 
as an identity of refuge, the sole basis of their pride’. This normally occurs 
under unusual circumstances, such as in this case the historical and 
ongoing living conditions in the PRCs in Lebanon. Other identities might 
not be available or available only on unacceptable terms, or offer little of 
value, or might only ‘involve obligations and no rights’. This increased 
religious adherence manifested itself in a number of different ways.  
During the course of the survey there was a noticeable increase in the 
wearing of the hajib amongst female youths in the PRCs and a large 
attendance at religious services during Ramadan in both 2015 and 2016 
from earlier years. Aspects of the increasing influence of religion has been 
noted officially with an UNRWA official stating that:  
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‘The modern young generation’s greater access to the media and 
the internet are leading to more radicalisation21 and to an extent to a 
much more regressive society, on the surface of it. If we project our 
Western experiences on the situation here we should expect that the 
youth should have more openness. It’s had a reverse effect in these 
ghettoised communities- which has had to do in large part with the 
failures of the leadership to bring any result.  If you see that your 
secular, nationalist leadership continually fail to bring anything for 
you and all you see amongst them is corruption and inefficiency 
and so on. This is not just here it is all over. Palestinian society here 
has gone backwards to the Islamic tradition and we have the 
Islamist view-not necessarily Daesh (ISIS).’  
Land and Home:  
The connection between land and Palestinian identity was also a common 
theme running through the respondent’s narratives. Schulz and Hammer 
(2003:93) cite an old Palestinian proverb: ‘He who has no land has no 
honour’. Sayigh (1998:49) suggests that the loss of their land became ‘a 
core element of Palestinian identity.’ Haq al ‘awda offers the reversal of 
the wrong done to Palestinians and the return of their honour.  Being ahl 
al-ard (people of the land) was important, in most respondent’s narratives 
to allow them to have an identity (hawiyya), to have belonging (intima) 
and honour (sharaf), and most importantly, to have dignity (karama). 
While Zaima, a 25-year-old female student in university was of the opinion 
that the right of return was a future prospect, the Palestinian people still 
had a right to their land (ard) and their identity (hawiyya). 
Sami, a 31-year-old male, working in a private company for Palestinians 
connected his Palestinian identity to his ownership of land and iterated his 
search for dignity 
                                                 
21 This paper does not propose to discuss issues of radicalisation which will be dealt with 
elsewhere. 
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‘I have ownership of land in Palestine. I have my identity from that. 
I should have access to all of Palestine, every Palestinian should 
have; it is a right of return every Palestinian should have. We need 
our karama (dignity) and haq al ‘awda is the way for us to reclaim 
our dignity. I should have the right to own my beit (house). The 
Nakba is still there since 68 years. We are suffering, but we have 
summud.’ 
In conversations with Palestinians of all ages, during this research, there 
was an inter -generational difference in the description used to define the 
buildings where they lived. The older generations used the word malja 
(which means shelter, or refuge). They also used chador, which means veil 
in Arabic. Upon enquiring why, the word veil was used, in this fashion, it 
was explained that this word can also be used to mean a tent, or temporary 
shelter. (Shelter is also used by Western workers in UNRWA to define an 
abode) The Jeel ma baa’d El Harb used the word beit (which means house, 
but also a home). This would agree with Sanyal’s (2011:883) findings. 
Perhaps it also points to the maintenance of a provisionality in the mental 
conception of the older generations and that they are still waiting and 
hopeful of a return. In the case of the youth there it would seem to indicate 
an acceptance of their permanence in the Lebanese PRCs, despite their 
allegiance to the idea of haq al ‘awda. Concepts of nationalism and 
homeland are intrinsically linked. Salazar (1998) has described how 
homelands are constructed in the minds of peoples to instil spatial identity 
that ignores geographical and temporal boundaries. Aburfaha (2008: 44) 
has suggested that ‘the most prominent representations of nationhood and 
peoplehood has been their articulation of their rootedness in the land of 
Palestine.’ For the older generations of refugees, this remains the case and 
they regard their home in Palestine as Relph (1976: 20) suggested ‘the 
central reference point of human existence.’ The Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, 
have only a vicarious knowledge of that home and the PRCs in Lebanon 
have become ‘home the focal point of a cosmic structure… at the centre,’ 
Tuan (1977: 197).   
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Hope, Dreams, Agency and Dignity:  
While realism, patience and religion have featured strongly in the survey 
results, there was also a strong element of positivity and hope expressed by 
many of the respondents. Bronk et al. (2009:501) suggest that  
‘hope includes a belief that one knows how to reach one’s goals 
and a belief that one has the motivation to reach one’s goals 
(agency); hope involves both the will (agency) to pursue certain 
ends and the way (means) to do to so effectively.’ 
 Farran et al. (1995) found that adolescents enduring adverse life events 
used hope as a means to counteract their situations. Hope is separate to 
optimism, which has been defined by Franken (1994) as a generalised 
expectancy that good, as opposed to bad, outcomes will generally occur 
when confronted with problems across important life domains. Optimism 
describes a positive attitude or disposition that good things will happen 
independent of one's ability to bring them about.  In contrast, hopelessness 
is a system of negative expectations concerning oneself and one's future 
life. It has been defined as the expectation that highly desirable outcomes 
will not occur and that one is powerless to change that situation (Needles 
and Abramson, 1990; Beck et al, 1974). Misztal (2012: 106) suggests that 
the principle of human dignity, understood as the ‘universal value that 
belongs to every person by virtue of being human, is also frequently 
associated with the call for social justice.’ Smith (2006:38) argues that any 
denial of respect and dignity is humiliating as it ‘forcefully overrides or 
contradicts the claim that particular individuals . . . are making about who 
they are and where and how they fit.’ 
Many interviewees, used differing levels of hope and hopelessness when 
expressing their concepts of haq al ‘awda. Many expressed the realities of 
these concepts in terms of ‘a dream’ or an ‘impossible dream’. One 21-
year-old who was studying dentistry suggested that all Palestinians have a 
dream to return to their land. This was especially true of his generation as 
they had never visited it of seen it. This sense of emotive displacement was 
strongly reiterated in more negative terms by Fares, a male aged 29, who 
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has completed 1st Year nursing degree in Beirut, and is holding down three 
jobs to fund his way through college.  He dismissed haq al ‘awda as a 
dream and that ‘there was no Palestine on the map’. Another solution had 
to be found. These two views reflect the spectrum of opinions when it 
comes to the dream association with Palestine. On the one hand there is the 
politico-romanticised ‘dream’ of returning to the homeland, tempered on 
the other hand by the politico-reality and futile ‘dream’ of returning.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Bronze sculpture evoking haq al ‘awda in Aref’s home in 
Burj al Barajneh PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016. 
This Bronze sculpture is in the shape of pre-1948 Palestine. It contains 
inscriptions such as ‘we will not kneel; ‘we are still upholding the right to 
return’; in addition to ‘God is the greatest’ and other Koranic quotations. It 
was fashioned by a Palestinian ex-prisoner of the Israelis, who was living 
in Burj al Barajneh.  
The desire for haq al ‘awda was similarly expressed in terms of a dream by 
Hanadi, a 20-year-old female university student, working as a part time 
teacher to fund her college fees and Aya, a 35-year-old woman, employed 
and married to a Palestinian, former fighter. Both were of the opinion that 
it might not be realised in their lifetimes. 
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For the Jeel ma baa ‘d El Harb, perhaps Creswell’s (2009: 1) definition of 
attachment to place as ‘the nebulous meanings associated with a place, the 
feelings and emotions a place evokes’ is an apposite encapsulation of their 
attachment to Palestine, a land of which they have no direct experience. 
Their knowledge has been acquired through the transgenerational 
transmission of their antecedents and the resulting imaginaries; their 
education and their own research. In the minds of the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb, the place of Palestine is not one that they have personally 
experienced, having being born in the Lebanese PRCs and deprived of haq 
al ‘awda. Palestine is an imagined land which they have palimpsestically 
constructed both on the material places of their existence, and on what 
Relph (1976: 43) describes as ‘the places where they grew up and lived 
and where they live now,’ and also on the memories of their forbearers. In 
this way, they exemplify Anderson’s (1996: 6) ‘imagined communities’, 
because as he suggests most of them will ‘never know most of their fellow 
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind, each lives the 
image of their communion.’ 
In addition to Sami, above, who spoke of land and dignity, Fares spoke of 
his need for agency and dignity… 
‘What if someone gives you $1 million dollars and you spend it the 
wrong way? It’s not about throwing money at us; it’s about giving 
self-respect. What about if someone gives you knowledge and you 
generate the $1 million? It’s about your chances and your belief in 
yourself.  I want, at least to leave something to be remembered by 
the people. I want to be someone special in life. It’s not just about 
my nationality. I want my rights as a human. I want to live in 
dignity. Let life evaluate me.’  
Fares used the expression bidna n ‘aysh bi-l-karama (I want to live in 
dignity) several times as did other respondents. This has a special 
significance for Palestinians as Karama was the location of a battle where 
the Palestinians first defeated the IDF, in 1968, after the failures of regular 
Arab armies in 1967 (O’Connor, 2013 :13-14). His response tallies with 
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what Allan (2014: 194-196) suggests. She opines that younger generations 
are progressively confronting the dilemma of loyalty to the dream of a 
‘redemptive return to a Palestinian homeland’ and the ‘pragmatic desire for 
a secure and meaningful existence in Lebanon or abroad.’ The ‘return’ 
which they articulate is the means to determine their own destiny, dignity 
and humanity, which ‘has been long denied to them.’ Fares remarks are 
typical of the responses noted during this research. Most of the youth made 
attaining human rights, dignity and the means to achieve a decent living 
their priority. Fares’s testimony is indicative of a new Palestinian dialogue 
in which Palestinian refugees are conceptualising a “political society,” 
composed of new claims, narratives, and political practices, which they 
base on a broader moral and political ground than that of nationalism and 
the nation-state. As Allan (2014: 102) posits there is a need to shift 
analytical attention away from the ‘discursive continuities of nationalism’ 
and instead focus on the ‘issues that concern people’s immediate future,’ 
such as health, security, employment rights and the quest for dignity and 
agency, at the individual level.  
Intergenerational identity shifts 
Bamyeh (2003: 842) suggests that earlier generations of Palestinian 
refugees have linked and constructed concepts of haq al ‘awda in physical 
terms. This concept was linked to a place, known and yearned for 
nostalgically, and a hoped for physical eventuality. The young generation, 
he suggested, view it in more symbolic terms. Rather than focussing on the 
short-term political aspiration of physical return they instead conceptualise 
it as the return of a dignity and humanity long denied to them through 
better lived opportunity. It is also a ‘common heuristic or a candlelight to 
shed light on common suffering.’ This study has supported that hypothesis 
of a generational shift in thinking and has found a movement towards more 
nuanced and realistic perspectives surrounding the right of return.  
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Figure 4.4.  Reported Differences in Aspirations surrounding Return 
amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb from Previous Generations Jun/Jul 
2016. (n = 61). 
Of the respondents in this survey a majority of 54% wanted to return to the 
Palestinian homeland but 38% did not. This is significantly different for 
the older generations where the overwhelming majority want to return 
unconditionally. This generational difference was commented on by a 
number of respondents. One, a 25-year-old man, working illegally in 
Beirut suggested that the older generation want to return as if the 
intervening 68 years had never happened. He instead simply wanted a 
better life, with rights, property and the ability to travel. He further 
suggested that only 50% would return if the opportunity arose. Aya, a 35-
year-old female, working for an NGO in the PRCs also recognised an 
intergenerational difference in the concept of haq al ‘awda. She noted that 
her parents simply wanted to go back to their homeland from which they 
had been forced to leave by the war. She instead wanted ‘to go back to a 
better future’ for her children with proper access to education, health 
services and human rights.  
The responses recorded during this study support the findings of the 
Shikaki Study (Shikaki, 2003: 160-162, Allan 2014, 202). This was the 
single largest survey ever conducted of the refugee opinion on the question 
of return. This study found that if there was an amelioration in the 
conditions of refugees in Lebanon, the majority would prefer to remain. 
3323
5
Reported Differences in Aspirations 
amongst the Jeel ma baa'd El Harb from 
Previous Generations
Yes (54%) No (38%) Didn't Know /No opinion (8%)
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Only 23% would opt to return to their ancestral villages. It was swiftly 
denounced by nearly 100 Palestinian organisations as being part of a plan 
to resettle Palestinians outside of Palestine.  
Schulz and Hammer (2003: 111) suggest that the yearning for a return is 
indicative of a search for identity as much as for a place, and Aya is 
looking for an identity free from the indignities of the PRCs and for a 
better life for her family. This was common to most of the respondents. 
Fares recognised that his generation had a differing concept of haq al 
‘awda which he expressed as follows… 
‘My father and mother only wanted to live as a normal human. For 
me it is not like that. The generations before me were searching for 
a revolution to get back our land. Now, I am going to tell you the 
truth. I have the right to speak of all the lands of my age. All the 
people my age, I know because I live amongst them. They don’t 
care about going back to Palestine. They know nothing about it, 
and they forget about it, you have to know that very well. All they 
are searching about is not to be a mafia, or a faction member 22or 
working with weapons or involved in drugs23. They don’t have the 
chance to live here as a human being. They are waiting for a chance 
to be a human and they don’t care if you give them an Israeli 
identity also. I am telling you the truth; I hear this from all the 
                                                 
22 Many of the youth interviewed referred disparagingly of members of the Popular 
Committees as mafia members. in this way. Sometimes they spoke ‘off-record’, with a 
plea ‘Don’t quote me’. The Popular Committee, also known as al –hakuma al –saghira, or 
the small government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the 
1970’s. It is composed of members of the political factions within the camps. It is not 
elected. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy 
from the time of Jeel al-thawra (days of revolution). 
 
23 It should be noted that questions surrounding this subject were extremely sensitive in 
nature, and are regarded as a taboo subject. The researcher was surprised by the candid 
answers given by most respondents. The political factions in the camps deny that there is a 
drug problem. However, UNRWA officials admitted that there was a drug rehabilitation 
centre in Burj al Barajneh and several respondents related to the author their experiences 
with the drug problem. 
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young guys of my age. They don’t care about the Palestinian 
identity, except to make them feel that they belong, for something.’ 
These attitudinal shifts are reflective of other processes active in the 
camps. While there are increased levels of realism associated with the 
principle of the right of return there is also clear evidence of insurgent 
nationalist sentiment. Druckman (1994: 48-49) suggests that nationalism is 
merely a more complex form of patriotism, which he defines as a’ 
commitment, a readiness to sacrifice for the nation.’ In this definition a 
person's social identity is tied to the importance of the groups to which he 
or she belongs, such as the Palestinian diaspora. There is a link between 
the self -esteem of the person and the esteem of the nation to which he 
belongs. Loyalty and identification with the nation become tied to one's 
own sense of self. That loyalty is constantly in question and the individuals 
have to prove that the group is important to them through their behaviour 
(Druckman, 1994:54-55).  
Some of the youth were anxious to demonstrate their commitment to the 
cause of haq al ‘awda and it has become a strong defining feature of their 
nationalist sentiment. One, 34-year-old member of a Palestinian NGO 
associated it with the dominant political sentiment associated with 
confrontations that took place in 2011 on Nakba Day, when he suggested 
70,000 Palestinians across the Middle East directly confronted Israeli 
security forces at the border, resulting in 11 deaths at Maroun ar Ras by the 
Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). This event was again evoked by Kamal, a 
28-year-old self-employed male who measured his commitment to haq al 
awda with reference to Maroun ar Ras. While he stated that he was there 
and that friends of his were wounded, he was still cautious stating that they 
would have to wait for generations for it to happen and that they had to 
have summud.    
‘I was in Maroun ar Ras in 2011, because I have the right to haq al 
‘awda to my land. Two of my friends were wounded there and 
those who were killed were also my friends. Return is not going to 
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happen soon. We have to wait for generations; we have to have 
summud.’ 
Sanyal (2011: 887-888) maintains that the Palestinian Refugee Camps 
(PRCs) by ‘virtue of their particular marginality’ support the desire for the 
right of return and create an ‘insurgent nationalism.’ Proshansky et al 
(1983: 65-66) relate how environments such as POW camps (which in 
many ways are analogous to the PRCs) can threaten the sense of self in 
occupants and when the physical setting becomes ‘dysfunctional’ the threat 
becomes heightened (ibid: 75). These settings enhance feelings of ‘place –
belongingness’ (ibid: 76) to ‘imagined’ places where positively valanced 
cognitions outweigh the negatively valanced ones of the present, and 
where ‘social expectancies’ will be met. For the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb 
such a place is Palestine.  
 Other attitudes associated with the right of return also surfaced. One 
surprising element, in the context of the more realistic approaches to an 
actual return, was the simplistic perspective amongst a number of the Jeel 
ma Baa’d El Harb that simply sending the Jews back ‘to their own 
countries’ is a solution.  Twenty-one of the respondents wanted the Jews to 
go back to the countries from which they originated. When pressed on 
what they meant by this solution, they invariably replied that they should 
go back to their countries of origin. When it was pointed out to them that 
many Jews had been born in Israel, some of them drew an analogy to their 
own situation. Most of the respondents were born in Lebanon, but saw 
themselves as belonging in Palestine. They suggested that the native- born 
Israelis should return to the countries from which their antecedents 
originated.  
Solutions as to how a return for the respondents, would be implemented 
varied. Thirty-nine offered pragmatic solutions. Both Ennas (a 21-year-old, 
working for a Palestinian NGO) and Nasir (a 35-year-old male) suggested 
that all could live in Palestine (as one State) under a Palestinian 
government. Hosni a 31-year-old male working in a private company 
suggested a two-State solution as being workable. He saw the partition of 
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the old Palestine into two countries, one for the Jews and one for the 
Palestinians as a just and workable solution. Of the 18 others, they offered 
no solution but they were adamant in their commitment to the principle of 
the right of return. 
A Legal solution? 
This paper has also examined in brief the legal background to haq al 
‘awda. The legal basis for this concept has been outlined. The remit of this 
study does not permit a debate about how this right is to be achieved, or 
indeed what agency would take on the task. As highlighted, UNRWA has 
no protection role, providing only humanitarian services. UNRWA does 
not provide the same protection as the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), as Takkenberg describes (1998: 304-309; 316-
317). Both Takkenberg (1998) and Lawland (1996) suggest that 
UNRWA’s mandate could or should be changed to take on this role. This 
view is supported by Akram (2001).  Changing UNRWA’s mandate would 
most likely require another UNGAR, which is probably unlikely given the 
difficulties that organisation has in even securing a working budget. The 
absence of a viable Palestinian State means that no country is identifiable 
to champion haq al ‘awda in a realistic sense. The omission of the question 
of refugees from the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accord) of 13 
September 1993 effectively postpones into an indefinite future the 
resolution of haq al ‘awda. 
International/Regional Solutions 
Lebanon was already a host to over 400,000 Palestinian refugees prior to 
the Syrian crisis in 2011. Post – 2011, refugee numbers have swollen to 
approximately 1.5 million. Lebanon is still a fragile state after a bitter civil 
war and years of occupation by neighbouring powers. It is still busy 
asserting its independence and territorial integrity. It suffers an intolerable 
economic burden due to this influx. Politically, it continues to engage in a 
delicate balancing act to maintain consociational equilibrium. The events 
surrounding the resignation of Prime Minister Hariri in November of 2017 
have demonstrated its susceptibility to the effects of Saudi and Iranian 
146 
 
 
 
 
influences in the region. Lebanon was best placed, due to its geographic 
location to provide a safe haven for the refugees of 1948 and also of 2011. 
The refuge and support it provides, however minimal, cannot be sustained 
in the long run, without compromising its economic and political stability.  
Perhaps a viable solution to this problem could be reached if a supra-
national and regional body such as the Arab League were to take on the 
role of finding a resolution to both the long-term refugees and those of 
more recent origin.  This body would be able to investigate all possible 
remedies, including a modified haq al ’awda, as part of a package of 
measures to resolve the situation. At the international level, progress on 
haq al ‘awda has stagnated, although the United Nations continues to 
reaffirm UNGAR 194 (III) annually. There is an urgent need to address the 
Palestinian refugee problem in Lebanon but unless the major powers take 
action to resolve the Israeli- Palestinian debacle, there is little likelihood 
that this will occur.  
Bodies like refugees are not homogenous groups, but are comprised of 
individuals with differing needs, opinions and identities. Whitebrook 
(2001: 137) suggests the heterogeneity of people with ideas and identities, 
which are sometimes at odds with the groups to which they belong.  The 
research for this paper would suggest that there are inter- generational 
differences in what importance the Palestinian refugees and in particular, 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb attach to haq al ‘awda and how they view 
tawteen and the Nakba (Chapters 5 and 3 of this thesis, respectively). This 
research indicates that ethnographers and anthropologists need to be open 
to such diversity when reading and writing about the PRLs, to question 
previously held assumptions about their conceptions of identity and 
belonging, and to re-evaluate the importance of place in their psyche.   
This study has established that the vast majority of the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb continue to embrace the concept of haq al ‘awda as a central tenet of 
their Palestinian identity. This conception is not necessarily or entirely 
framed in a simplistic Palestinian nationalist dialogue. There are infusions 
of agency, dreams, hopes and imagined futures, which are imbricated with 
elements of insurgent nationalism and dissatisfaction at the previous 
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generations loyalty to that dialogue. In their responses during interview, 
they demonstrated pragmatism in the solutions they offered as to how haq 
al ‘awda might be achieved, which differ from those of previous 
generations, who wanted to return to Palestine as it was pre-Nakba. Their 
commitment to haq al ‘awda speaks of their conception of place as 
Palestine and their Palestinian identity, deriving from that place. The 
research has also indicated that factors which may have strengthened that 
commitment to Palestine include their perceived abandonment by the PLO, 
after the Oslo Accords and the PA pursuit of a two-state solution over 
resolving the right of return of refugees to the homeland. A secondary 
factor has been the continued repression by GOL and a stagnation of the 
dialogue between the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) 
and GOL. Finally, the large influx of Syrian refugees since 2011 has put 
pressure on their already weakened economic prospects and on the limited 
assistance provided to them by UNRWA and NGOs in Lebanon and 
strengthened their desire to achieve agency in their homeland.     
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Chapter 5 
 Tawteen: A New Approach to Naturalisation in Palestinian Refugee 
Youth Identity Negotiation in Lebanon. 
Abstract: Ethnographers have reported in the past that tawteen 
(naturalisation) has been rejected by both the Lebanese population and 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Its meaning has been interpreted 
differently by academics, politicians and political activists, depending on 
the context in which it is used, and the agenda of the commentator. An 
absolute rejection of tawteen has been described as a constituent of 
Palestinian refugee identity. An exploration of the importance of tawteen 
amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the generation after the war) forms 
the premise for this paper. The qualitative research methods of interviews 
and observation were utilised to evaluate the degree to which this 
generation reject or are willing to embrace the proposition of tawteen and 
how they situate tawteen in their concepts of Palestinian refugee identity. 
Attachment to place, in Lebanon, Palestine, or elsewhere was examined 
and factors which have altered the loyalty of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb to 
an absolute rejection of tawteen were identified. The findings of this 
research suggest that there are intergenerational differences in how this 
generation, in Lebanon, situate tawteen in their concepts of Palestinian 
identity and that a new approach to this contentious issue has emerged 
amongst them.  
Keywords: Tawteen, identity, ideology, socio-economics, agency, civic 
rights, citizenship. 
Introduction: Chapters 3 and 4 have already highlighted the lack of 
substantive identity- based social science research, which has its sole focus 
on the present generation24.  This paper is the result of qualitative research 
carried out amongst Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon, during 
                                                 
24 Several academics have written about Palestinian refugees (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1977, 
1979, 1994, 2001; Suleiman, 1999; Ramadan, 2009,2013; al-Natour, 2007), but none have 
written solely about the Palestinian refugee youth in the Lebanese camps. 
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2015/2016, on the subject of identity and belonging. The aim of the 
research was to examine whether this generation had the same commitment 
as its predecessors to the traditional representation of Palestinian refugee 
identity.25 Within the context of Palestinian refugee identity, the specific 
research aim of this paper is to evaluate whether or not this generation are 
willing to accept or reject tawteen (naturalisation). Incorporating this aim, 
the following research objectives were formulated:  
• To evaluate the extent to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb reject or 
accept tawteen and the level of awareness of what this might entail 
to their concepts of Palestinian identity and belonging. 
• To assess attachment to place, either in Palestine, Lebanon or 
elsewhere. 
• To investigate what factors are altering the traditionally accepted 
view of attitudes to tawteen, amongst this generation. 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 25) suggest that a phenomenon of some sort 
occurring in a bounded context becomes ‘in effect, the unit of analysis’. 
The identity of the Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon and the issue of 
tawteen, then, is the unit of analysis for this paper. The method of research 
selected for this study was a qualitative case study, involving multiple 
individual case studies. In such multiple case studies, the researcher 
examines several cases, in order to understand the similarities and 
differences between the cases. Yin (2003 :47) suggests that such use of 
multiple case studies embedded within a single case study will elicit 
similar or contrasting results but for predictable reasons. A combination of 
semi-structured interviews and observation were utilised for this research. 
A total of sixty-one respondents, aged between 18 and 35 years, were 
interviewed amongst the Palestinian refugee youth. The interviews were 
conducted in the three PRCs located in the Beirut area and in a fourth, Ein 
                                                 
25 A traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity casts them as a group memorialising 
the 1948 expulsion from their lands (al-Nakba –the ‘catastrophe’); being steadfastly 
opposed to naturalisation (tawteen); and being rooted in a refusal to contemplate anything 
other than a right of return (haq al ‘awda) to Palestine (Peteet: 2005; Sayigh: 2001; 
Bianchi: 2014). 
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el Hilweh, located in South Lebanon. A detailed methodology for this 
thesis is outlined in Appendix ‘C’26. 
This paper examines the background to the issue of tawteen from both the 
Palestinian and Lebanese perspectives. Tawteen is an Arabic word usually 
understood to connote assimilation into the local population of a country, 
through a political process of naturalisation, and whose various meanings 
are subject to contestation as outlined hereunder.  Research conducted in 
the Lebanese Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in 2015/2016 suggests 
that this aspect of Palestinian identity deserves to be reconsidered by 
academics and by policymakers. This paper proposes that there now 
appears to be a greater willingness amongst the present generation of 
refugees (Jeel ma baa’d El harb: the generation after the war) to put aside 
the allegiance to the dogma of rejection of tawteen, as the existential 
quotidian conditions have worsened in the Lebanese refugee camps. 
Evidence of a possible paradigm shift in the old concepts of identity and 
belonging amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El harb has been uncovered calling 
into question whether those accepted modalities still remain relevant.  
Background:  Chapter 3, has recounted in some detail the historical 
background of the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon. Previous 
researchers have documented the historical resistance to tawteen 
(naturalisation) by the refugees (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 2001; Schulz and 
Hammer, 2003). These researchers have reported this resistance as being 
unanimous. This has been accepted as being the historical and universal 
position of all Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. However, as this paper 
shows there have been instances of naturalisation in the past. This has most 
often been for political purposes and not carried out for humanitarian 
reasons. As iterated in Chapter 4, the respondents for this research use the 
term ‘refugees’ as a self-reference. Local integration/ naturalisation is one 
of the three solutions (repatriation, local integration and resettlement) 
advocated by the UNHCR (UNHCR Documents 2008) for refugees in 
                                                 
26 This format is in accordance with University of Ulster guidelines on the presentation of 
methodologies. 
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protracted situations.  For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, using the 
designation of ‘refugee’ allows them access to the limited assistance 
provided to them by UNRWA. Furthermore, it also serves to remind the 
international community that it has an obligation to them, stretching back 
over many years. Adopting the mantle of refugee denotes their resistance 
to their perception that the PA and the PLO were willing to ditch their 
cause, in lieu of an increasingly unlikely two-state solution, in the 
agreements after the Oslo Accords.27  
Situating Tawteen in Palestinian Identity: 
 Knudsen (2007: 6) suggests that ‘the three pillars of Palestinian political 
activism in Lebanon are the provision of civic rights for the refugees; 
resisting naturalisation; and upholding the right of return to their 
homeland/ natal villages.’ It is possible to conceive of the essence of 
‘Palestinianness’ and by extension, Palestinian identity at the national and 
personal level as resting on three pillars. These can be considered firstly, as 
an awareness of the facts surrounding the Nakba, and the preservation of 
that knowledge through commemoration and the education of successive 
generations, using storytelling and memorialisation. The second pillar is 
the utter rejection of tawteen and the third is the maintenance of haq al 
‘awda (right of return).  
                                                 
27Interviews carried out by the author in Beirut in 2015/2016. 
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Figure 5.1. Representation of Palestinian Identity as Resting on Three 
Pillars. 
If one considers these three pillars in a linear temporal, historical 
progression, the Nakba represents the catastrophic events of the past which 
deprived the refugees of their civic rights in a previous existence and led to 
their exile (al ghurba). The repression and resistance embedded in the 
concept of tawteen represents the existential present and haq al ‘awda 
represents futurity and hope. Summud (steadfastness) is the thread that runs 
through all three elements. It bears witness to the traumatic events of the 
past; defending the right to retain their unique identity in the abysmal 
conditions of the present. Having summud provides hope that the future 
will bring a restoration of rights, an improvement in their marginal 
conditionality and a recognition of the wrong done to the refugees at both 
the individual and collective level.  Ethnographers and anthropologists 
have written how each of these elements or combinations of them is a 
component of the Palestinian identity (Allan, 2014; Sayigh, 1977, 1979; 
Schulz &Hammer, 2003). 
The translation of the Arabic word ‘tawteen’ can be problematic, emotive 
and in some cases subject to hijacking for political reasons. Ethnographers 
and anthropologists assign different terms to explain it. Social 
 
Palestinian Identity 
Rejection of Tawteen 
Al-Nakba 
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commentators and political leaders in Lebanon also use it in varying ways 
to convey political messages, depending on audiences and expediencies. 
Sunni politicians may sometimes agree with Haddad (2000: 30) and Schulz 
and Hammer (2003:116) when they describe it as ‘integration’. Palestinian 
factions and Christian politicians use it in a way in which it connotes 
‘permanent resettlement’ as Ramadan (2009: 72; 2013:69); Bianchi (2014: 
118); and Suleiman (1999: 71) explain it. Talhami (2003: 34) uses the 
word to mean ‘settlement’, which is politically more neutral and 
acceptable, while Hanafi et.al (2012: 34) styles it as ‘naturalisation’. 
However, Knudsen’s (2007:12) and al- Natour’s (2007 :3) use of it as 
‘implantation’ has definite provocative connotations and has been widely 
used by Lebanese politicians to arouse opposition to its adoption, in what 
Chaaban et.al (2010: 7) calls the ‘scarecrow’ effect. Shehadi (2010: 10) 
makes the point that terming tawteen as ‘permanent settlement’ of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is ‘an ideal subject to be exploited in 
political manipulation.’ 
Traditionally academics have been all too ready, in the past to make the 
assertion that both the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon 
reject tawteen, as evidenced in Hanafi et.al (2012: 42); Sayigh (1994: 
27,45); Fischer (2009: 61); Schulz and Hammer (2003:116); Weighill 
(1997: 308); and al- Natour (2007). Chaaban et.al (2016: 24) seem to 
acknowledge that not all Palestinian refugees reject it at the personal level 
when they make the comment: ‘On a political level, Palestine refugees 
have also opposed it’. Some academics in the past (Peteet 2005, Sayigh 
2001), have assumed that the rejection of tawteen was a paramount and 
unchanging conviction of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Conversi 
(2004: 271) terms this as a form of essentialist thinking, where ‘entire 
groups are hypostasised as cohesive entities obeying self-perpetuating 
mandates and enduring injunctions.’ The results of this research indicate 
that there are shifts in how the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb view tawteen.  
Indeed, Allan (2014: 60-61) has noted that fractures have appeared in the 
‘accepted view’ of this aspect of Palestinian identity, in the younger 
generation. She has identified flickers of ‘quiet personal resistance’ 
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amongst them because they are finding difficulty in absorbing the dogma 
of a ‘national belonging’ into their identity framework. This is hardly 
surprising given that Palestinian youth now have access to the internet and 
are more aware of the world around them. Elbedour, Bastien and Center 
(1997: 222) found that the extreme rapid social change that communities 
have experienced over the past decades has been caused by the trauma of 
displacement and has resulted in a ‘deterioration of family structures’ and 
changed the ‘socio-cultural structure of the Palestinian community’. This 
in turn has caused inter-generational differences and alienation from their 
elders and their cultural roots, with the youth ‘pursuing modern lifestyles’ 
and having divergent concepts of their identities. 
Lebanese Attitude to Tawteen: 
Historically, the Government of Lebanon (GOL) has opposed tawteen 
because it has argued that the influx of mainly Sunni refugees would upset 
the delicate consociational balance in the country (Takkenberg, 1998: 162). 
Additionally, it has insisted that the international community owes both 
Lebanon and the refugees a huge debt for agreeing to the foundation of the 
state of Israel and causing the displacement of such huge numbers 
(Takkenberg, 1998: 133). It has suited GOL to follow the general Arab 
position of ostensibly not wanting to put any obstacles in place to the 
refugees’ right of return to Palestine (Takkenberg, 1998: 132; Allan, 2014: 
245). As O’Connor (2013: 17-20) has suggested, GOL and many Lebanese 
hold the Palestinians responsible for causing the Lebanese Civil war (1975-
1990).  Naturalisation did occur in the 1960’s, 1994 and 199528.  In total, it 
is estimated that 80,000 Palestinians were granted Lebanese citizenship, 
being in the main Christian and Shia, although a small number of Sunni 
were included. Most were naturalised for political reasons, to boost falling 
Christian numbers, when it was feared that the Muslim population numbers 
would overtake them.  Nishikida (2009: 229-230) outlines an instance of 
where a number of Shia village inhabitants were naturalised for political 
                                                 
28 See both: Haddad, S. (2003: 4); and Hourani, G. and Sensing –Dabbous, E. (2012: 
188).  
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reasons. It was also afforded to a smaller number of wealthy Sunnis, who 
were able to pay for the privilege.  
The population of Lebanon is estimated at 6.5 million29 (CIA: July 2016), 
which includes all refugees. Since the Syrian Civil war, which erupted in 
2011, an estimated 1.5 million Syrian and 58,000 Syrian Palestinian 
registered refugees have entered Lebanon. There are some estimated 
additional 40-50,000 Iraqi refugees residing in Lebanon.  It is conceivable 
that the true numbers far exceed these figures, due to the fact as already 
pointed out that registration is largely voluntary. GOL does not want to 
destabilise the country’s delicate consociational balance, by naturalising 
any of them. Furthermore, it argues that the economy of Lebanon would 
collapse if tawteen were to be offered to the refugees. Allan (2014: 3) has 
asserted however that GOL has ‘exploited this situation as a pretext for 
withholding everything from healthcare, education and social security to 
the basic right to work and own property.’ 
As Allan (2104: 13) relates, the Ta’if Accords (1989) modified the 
Lebanese constitution to include the rejection of permanent resettlement of 
Palestinians in Lebanon. The accords perpetuated the sclerotic nature of 
the Lebanese political system, further accentuating the possibility of 
stagnation typified during the last four years30.  Political stagnation has led 
to the perpetuation of the anti-tawteen policies of successive Lebanese 
governments, and has stymied the advances made by the Lebanese 
Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), in improving the plight of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The problems associated with housing the 
                                                 
29Lebanon has not had a Census of population since 1932. See CIA Country statistics, 
2016: Lebanon. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/le.html.  Accessed: 08 November 2016. See also Chaaban et al (2016: 8) 
for numbers of refugees caused by the Syrian civil war since 2011. 
 
30 Lebanon was without a President from May 2014 to October 2016, when Michel Aoun 
was elected, with the support of Hezbollah and Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, with the 
apparent blessing of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hariri was elected Prime Minister in 
November 2016, prior to which the Parliament had extended its mandate on two 
occasions. The abrupt resignation of Hariri on 04 Nov 2017 and his subsequent 
suspension of that resignation at the end of November opens the possibility of a return to 
the previous uncertainty. 
 
162 
 
 
 
 
estimated additional 58,000 Palestinians from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, 
coupled with the influx of 1.5 million of (non-Palestinian) Syrian refugees, 
(Chaaban et al, 2016: 8) has put the economy under severe pressure, as 
well as deflecting the work in improving the conditions of the PRLs, 
through the LPDC.  Palestinians are still blamed for causing the Civil war 
(Ibrahim, 2008: 38) and this blame in conjunction with ‘opposition to 
tawteen is a glue that helps hold the political system together.’ (Sayigh, 
2001: 100). Brynen (2009: 4) states that the ‘potent mix of sectarian – 
political – demographic tensions and bitter experience’ has led to strong 
opposition to tawteen amongst Lebanese society. Bianchi (2014:135) 
reports that the Lebanese perceive: ‘that any improvement of Palestinians’ 
living- conditions facilitates assimilation and their permanent resettlement 
in Lebanon’.    
Ahmed (1997: 163), even though in this case he is not writing about the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, correctly recognises that ‘for a democratic 
state, the existence of a large segregated and discriminated population of 
foreign citizens is not conducive to stability in the long run’. Shiblak 
(1996: 39) outlines the difficulty across all Arab states, and not just in 
Lebanon, for the Palestinian refugees, in establishing their civil rights as 
being ‘the absence of clear and well-defined legislation regulating their 
status.’ Additionally, (ibid: 39) he comments  
‘Palestinian affairs are governed by ministerial decrees or 
administrative orders, which allow differing interpretations and 
abuses of power and can easily be reversed in response to changing 
political conditions.’  
 
Discussion: 
This paper has situated the concept of tawteen within Palestinian refugee 
identity and outlined the Lebanese attitude to it. It has also reported that 
previous researchers have ascribed opposition to tawteen as a unanimous 
position amongst Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A pivotal finding of this 
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study indicates that this no longer the case. The research suggests that 
Palestinian refugee identity can no longer be considered as homogenous, 
and that there are intergenerational differences between the Jeel ma baa’d 
El Harb and their predecessors in the degree to which they will accept 
tawteen. Allan (2014 :3) suggests that ‘any form of assimilation is taboo, 
because it is seen as forsaking nationalist aspirations and legitimising 
historical dispossession.’ The main and surprising finding of this research 
has established that despite Allan’s statement, Palestinian refugee youth, in 
Lebanon are so desperate because of the deprivation caused by the 
physical, economic and cultural landscapes imposed upon them, that many 
of them are willing to contemplate the acceptance of tawteen, which, as 
Chaaban et al (2016: 24) state, has been opposed by the Palestinians ‘on a 
political level’.   This study found that 27 persons or 44% said that they 
would take this option if it was offered to them. This number was almost 
equally matched by those against it at 26 or 43%. A further 5 (8%) were 
unsure and 3 (5%) said that they did not care about the issue. Acceptance 
rates across the genders reflected the overall acceptance rates, with 41% 
amongst females and 47% for males. This would seem to lend weight to 
Allans’ own finding (2014: 7), that ‘during informal conversations 
nationalist imperatives would often give way to aspirations conceived in 
terms far more personal.’  
Cultural Landscapes: Identity and Ideology Issues. 
Allan (2014: 214) states: ‘Refugee experience can no longer be adequately 
understood through the ideological lens of national attachment’, when such 
attachment does not offer any relief to the existential suffering which the 
youth are suffering in 2016. Informal interviews conducted for this 
research in 2015/2016 reflect Allan’s (2014: 102) assertion that there is a 
rising rejection of the factions and the Popular Committees (PCs)31 in the 
camps by the youth, as they regard them as corrupt and self-serving. 
                                                 
31 The Popular Committee, also known as al –hakuma al –saghira, or the small 
government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the 1970’s. It is 
not elected. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy 
from the time of Jeel al-thawra (generation of revolution).  
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Allan’s (2014: 100-136) account of the deficiencies of the PCs in 
managing the provision of electricity in Shatila was echoed in this research 
conducted by the author in 2015/2016; although it was always 
accompanied by the comment ‘don’t quote me.’  A similar situation applies 
to the provision of potable drinking water in the camps. Another weakness 
spoken of was their inability to formulate a unified stance on advancing 
refugee rights, thereby further weakening their credibility. In that light, 
these bodies are regarded as increasingly irrelevant by the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb. 
  Sami, aged 31 rejected the idea of tawteen on ideological grounds: 
‘It is personally unacceptable to me. I want the right to return to 
Palestine. As a Palestinian refugee living in this country, I want you 
to know that I have pain and summud on a daily basis. Palestinian 
youth nowadays are a bit diverted, because they are busy in getting 
their daily needs. This is one of the issues facing the new 
generation of Palestinians their daily bread and they don’t have 
time to think about their future.’  
Sami’s rejection of tawteen on a point of principle was echoed by several 
other respondents, both male and female and across the employed and 
unemployed groups, who had varying levels of education. Bar-Tal (1998: 
94-95) proposes that group beliefs are defined as ‘convictions that group 
members are aware that they share and consider as defining their 
‘groupness’ and that acceptance of these group beliefs is one of the 
important indicators of group membership.’ A person joining a group must, 
at least ‘externally express acceptance of group beliefs’ Group beliefs 
unify group members, giving them their identity and differentiate them 
from outgroups. For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, in the past, one of 
those group cultural beliefs was the almost universal refusal to accept 
tawteen. However, Van Meijl (2008: 172-173) offers a divergent position 
and he contrasts the old tradition of cultural beliefs (associated with a 
group of people, delineated with a boundary and static), with a new 
definition [such as that of Wright, (1998)]. This definition states that a 
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culture is ‘multi-vocal, polyphonous and dynamic’. It is a ‘political process 
of contestation among individual members or groupings over the power to 
define social situations’. The diversity of these research findings bears out 
his assertion and also echo Clemens’ (2007: 110) caution that the 
Palestinian people are ‘not a single homogenous group, but comprise a 
people with multiple identities’. This is despite what Clemens (ibid: 110) 
terms the tendency of Western media to depict the ‘typified Palestinian – 
nationalistic, radical and militant- without understanding the diversity of 
the peoples who call themselves Palestinian.’ Maalouf (2000: 4) iterates 
the difficulties in maintaining a singular identity when he talks of every 
individual being a ‘meeting ground for many different allegiances’ where 
these ‘loyalties conflict with one another and confront the person who 
harbours them with difficult choices.’ Any ‘incident, a fortunate or 
unfortunate accident, even a chance encounter, influences our sense of 
identity more strongly than any ancient affiliation.’ 
 Yousra aged 21 would take tawteen, if it were available to her, but she 
didn’t want to lose her Palestinian identity. Aref aged 21, echoed this 
desire to maintain his hawiyya (identity): 
‘I have an opposite view to a lot of Palestinians. I have no problem 
with (accepting) it (tawteen); you can still have the Palestinian 
nationality and identity. With the Palestinian identity (hawiyya), I 
can do nothing. I hope that I get another nationality and balance the 
two identities’ 
This statement appears to bear out Van Mejil’s (2008: 180) observations 
on the likelihood of adolescents in the modern world developing a ‘hybrid 
identity’ in which they ‘successfully combine aspects of both local and 
global circumstances’. However, these ‘components of a different origin’ 
require being re-combined continuously. This phenonomen requires a 
‘never-ending struggle to work out in which situation they ideally belong. 
Many people, adolescents, in particular, now develop multicultural 
identities’.  
John aged 31 and the only Christian to be interviewed agreed: 
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‘Whatever nationality, I will get, I will stay Palestinian. An 
example of this is the Armenians32 in Lebanon. They got Lebanese 
citizenship, but today they are still Armenians.’ 
 Schiocchet (2012: 81) counters this assertion when he writes: 
‘Taking up local citizenship equates to giving up one’s 
Palestinianness. Tawteen allows for the erasure of a Palestinian’s 
refugeeness, thereby undermining the consequences of al-Nakba 
and rejection of haq al ‘awda.’  
This research found that 57% of the Palestinian youth wanted to retain a 
Palestinian identity; 10% were prepared to abandon it and 62% were happy 
to have a double identity (not necessarily including a Palestinian identity).  
31% were either ambivalent or not sure about retaining it. In contrast, 
many of the youth framed their acceptance of tawteen in terms of 
achieving an identity of their own, even if it meant forswearing their 
Palestinian identity. They also recognised the distinction between identity 
and nationality. These saw tawteen as a means to achieve agency, 
employment and the right to own property, which they saw as being denied 
to them. Sara aged 28 was one such respondent open to accepting it:   
‘Yes, I would take it, as it would allow me a better chance to get 
work; even though I know that it is against haq al ‘awda (the right 
of return). I want a better education for my children, even if they 
don’t have the right to work as Palestinians. I want human rights 
and a better life, and better opportunities for work, outside the 
                                                 
32 Nishikida, (2009: 229-230) writing about the Seven Villages and the process of their 
naturalisation makes a distinction between the concepts of tajannis (nationalisation) and 
tawteen (naturalisation). In the case of the former, he states that it means ‘getting 
nationality as a Lebanese citizen and does not mean to quit being a Palestinian.’ In the 
case of the latter Nishikida imputes the term with the meaning ‘to quit being a 
Palestinian.’ All persons interviewed for this research understood precisely what was 
meant by tawteen and at no stage referred to the term tajannis and yet some of the 
answers given to the researcher are in congruence with Nishikida’s definition of tajannis. 
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camp. We are left with no hope and we have to fight for our 
chances.33’  
This is an example of the personal struggle between the nationalist 
ideology of the group and a desire for personal agency, common amongst 
Palestinian youth and concurs with Worchel’s (1998: 56) observation that 
in the Middle East, culture places ‘greater emphasis on the collective- the 
group’ and there is a stress on the individual’s social identity; however, he 
also postulated that ‘personal identity was emphasised during early 
childhood and adolescence’ in tandem with this emphasis.  Worchel (1998: 
55-56) also writes of our life-long journey to find our identity, at the heart 
of which is ‘determining our relationships with the groups to which we 
belong’. Group membership inevitably means the surrender of some of our 
personal identity. While we desire to be members of the group, we have a 
parallel desire to be recognised as an independent, unique individual. ‘A 
constant struggle ensues’, in deciding how much of our personal identity 
we will sacrifice for the substitute group identity, or indeed if we are 
prepared to abandon the group identity altogether as Salman, aged 23 put 
it: 
‘I am 50% for it because we can get civil rights and feel human; 
and 50% against it because it means that we will forget our identity, 
people and land.’ 
Physical Landscape: Socio-Economic Issues 
This study found that 71% of all respondents earned less than $1,000 a 
month (includes 0 earnings). The dire socio-economic conditions for the 
PRLs have worsened and led to a concomitant despair amongst some 
elements of the youth, so much that any solution is acceptable. Chaaban et 
al (2016: 82) found that the unemployment rate for PRLs, males of all ages 
is 21% (an increase from 8% from a similar survey carried out by Chaaban 
                                                 
33 The unwillingness to compromise haq al ‘awda was a common factor in the high 
refusal rates of the refugee youth’s willingness to accept tawteen; however, despite an 
awareness amongst all respondents of that possibility, those who were conducive to 
acquiring civic/civil rights in Lebanon were prepared to take that risk. 
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et al, 2010) and 32% for females, of all ages, in 2015. This study found 
general youth unemployment at 33%, with moderately lower 
unemployment for males at 31% but similar figures to Chaaban et al 
(2016:82): (35%) for females at 34%. Much of the employment was 
menial, temporary and illegal. The vast bulk of those working (86%) found 
occasional employment within the camps, some with UNRWA (7%); the 
majority not.  
 Chaaban et al (2016: 9) also found that extreme and overall poverty rates 
are higher in the camps than without and have increased since 2010 in the 
Beirut area (by 9%). Furthermore, nearly all professions show poverty 
rates higher than 50%, ‘reflecting the low pay and precarious work 
conditions PRL still experience’. Chaaban et al (2016: 84) outline the 
prohibitions on gaining employment for PRLs, which are quite onerous, in 
particular in the professions, and despite some concessions after 2010, 
‘Low income is still the primary cause of high poverty rates amongst the 
PRLs’. (ibid: 54). Under Lebanese law, Palestinians are prohibited from 
owning property, and must make convoluted circumventions of the law to 
do so (Author’s interviews Beirut: 2015, 201634). The security situation in 
neighbouring Syria and within Lebanon, coupled with the refugee influx 
has delayed negotiations between GOL and the Palestinian refugees 
through the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC). This 
forum has been dismissed by numbers of Palestinian youth as haki fadi 
(empty talk), during data collection in 2016. The influx of refugees from 
Syria since 2011 has further eroded the prospect of employment, however 
menial, for the PRLs. There is anecdotal evidence that competition 
between PRL and PRS youth for these jobs has intensified, contributing to 
‘an increase in unemployment rates among PRL in the already limited pool 
of low-skill jobs’ [conversations with UNRWA officials 2015 and 
Palestinian NGOs 2016; Chaaban et al, 2016: 84)].  
 
                                                 
34 See also: Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 126-127). 
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Figure 5.2.  Reported Acceptance Rates amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb of Tawteen Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
A common view across the respondents who would accept tawteen, if 
offered to them was that it afforded them the opportunity to get better 
living conditions, employment, freedom to travel, the right to own property 
and civil rights. The response of John aged 31, is typical when he states 
that in taking tawteen, he saw a chance to have: 
‘A decent life, civil rights, to work for our daily bread, without 
needing anyone, and the right to own property, which is part of the 
discrimination against only us. We want to be free from fear of the 
future.’ 
Allan (2014: 161) suggests that ‘poverty, chronic unemployment and 
political disenchantment conspire to diminish the expectations of 
refugees.’  Mahdi aged 23, summarised the views, commonly held, of 
those who would accept tawteen and the intergenerational differences with 
their parents as follows:  
‘I think that they should give Palestinians the tawteen because we 
are a long time here, and we have no option, if we cannot get 
human rights and a decent education and earn a living, we cannot 
fight back. It is causing internal conflicts within yourself, in what 
you think about yourself, or at least in what your parents made you 
think about yourself. They always try to make you not forget that 
27
26
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the Jeel ma baa'd El Harb of Tawteen.
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you are Palestinian, then when you go outside you are rejecting that 
idea. Eventually young people want their own life and 
improvement and to be a bit selfish; they want to live, they don’t 
care about their country (Palestine) anymore. Palestinians are 
capable of providing the country with their help and also their 
families. I want to become a doctor and help my family; to own a 
house. Here in Lebanon, I can’t work as a doctor; I don’t have any 
right to work; I don’t have residency, and they are afraid of me 
because I am a Palestinian’ 
The acceptance rates (44%) are important because they show a change 
amongst this generation in their attitudes to assimilation in Lebanon and 
fly in the face of previous research carried out amongst the PRLs. The 
results seem to indicate that this generation do not see acceptance of 
tawteen as a diminution of their Palestinian identity.    
This research in 2016 found that 100% of the youth had a Mobile phone. 
77% of all respondents had access to Wi-Fi and 39% possessed a 
laptop/computer. This implies that younger refugees are more exposed to 
the wider world and the internet, as a by-product of globalisation, than 
their predecessors. Tölölyan (2012: 11) makes the observation that as a by-
product of globalisation, the diasporic possesses a hybridity of culture and 
identity, ‘or at the very least has developed a comfortable bicultural 
competence.’ Massey (1994: 156) contends, in the Marxist tradition, that 
‘Globalisation does not simply entail homogenisation.’ Furthermore, as 
Allan (2104: 96) observes Lebanon has a ‘voracious consumer culture, 
where social status increasingly appears to be determined by one’s capacity 
to purchase commodities and brand-name goods’. The lack of a 
wherewithal to engage, in these ‘market- based identities, can result in a 
sense of ‘personal failing and an existential crisis,’ being felt by the 
Palestinian youth. Access to the consumer culture is seen by many as being 
achievable only by getting civil rights, the right to work and earn money 
and the desirable route for some youth to attain these rights is to embrace 
tawteen, if it were to be offered to them.   
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Figure 5.3.  Reported Opposition to Tawteen by Gender amongst the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
Opposition to tawteen (43%) was higher amongst females at 52% than 
males at 35%.  Several reasons were given for their opposition. Loyalty to 
the idea of a return to Palestine was one reason given as Ennas aged 21 
stated: 
‘No, I don’t want it; I know that I will never have the right to work 
here, and that I will never own anything here. I have never seen 
Palestine, but I feel it to be home.’ 
Aya aged 35 felt that there would always be discrimination against 
Palestinians, even if they got Lebanese nationality:  
‘I don’t think that it’s good, as I do not think that it will give better 
conditions and there will always be discrimination against the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. I want a secure living with 
dignity, in peace and to be motivated by better work opportunities 
and I want better living conditions. I want full human rights.  
Kamal, aged 28 was also emphatic in his opposition to tawteen and gave 
the reason as the poor state of the Lebanese economy:  
‘We don’t need their nationality. Fuck it! The Lebanese themselves 
are leaving. We all want better for or families. We have a very poor 
future here. It cannot be done in Lebanon; but we hope that it can 
be better. We are not living, we are surviving!’  
11
15
Reported Opposition to Tawteen by Gender 
amongst the Jeel ma baa'd El Harb
Males (35%) Females (52%)
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Conclusion 
This paper has examined Palestinian refugee youth contemporary concepts 
of Palestinianness through the lens of the cultural landscape, dealing with 
aspects of identity and ideology. It has explored the physical landscape, 
dealing with the socio-economic factors which impinge on their 
consciousness. The aim of this research was to determine the measure of 
this generation’s attachment to the traditional view of tawteen, as an 
immutable taboo, held by previous generations. The findings of this 
research tally with the incipient fractures in attitude and loyalty to that 
position, as noted by Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33, 60); and also adds weight to 
her suggestion that ‘we need to bear in mind the radical transformations 
that have occurred over the more than six decades.’ In so doing we 
acknowledge the ‘primacy of economic subjectivity and the decisive 
shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian’ (Allan: 2014: 
97-98). This concluding passage highlights the imperatives for 
improvement in the way in which assistance is delivered to the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb by the UN and NGOs.  Anthropologists and ethnographers 
are urged to adopt new research methods. Lastly, new policy initiatives are 
proposed for international, regional and national bodies, in order to 
improve the situation.  
Imperative to improve UN and NGO assistance 
UNRWA which began operations in 1950 does not provide the same 
protection as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), as Takkenberg (1998: 304-309; 316-317) describes. It has no 
mandate to pursue naturalisation for Palestinian refugees under its care. 
This research indicates that an amendment to its mandate should be 
considered to take account of the ‘protection gap,’ in order to acquire legal 
rights and uphold them for the Palestinian refugees.  It is apposite that this 
mandate be reviewed to take account of this gap. An alternative 
proposition would be to extend the remit of the UNHCR, or co -ordinate 
the operations of the two UN bodies. Greater co-ordination with NGOs 
working with PRLs would lead to greater efficiency of service provision to 
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the benefit of the Palestinian refugees.  UNRWA is dependent on donor 
funding for its operations and has had its budgets curtailed in recent times, 
leading to a reduction in service provision. This situation needs to be 
reversed and a more secure long term budgetary framework needs to be 
established.  
 Imperative for a re-appraisal by Anthropologists and Ethnographers 
This research has highlighted a disparity with the findings of previous 
anthropologists and ethnographers (Sayigh: 1977, 1998; Peteet: 2005; 
Masalha: 2009; Ramadan: 2009), who reported that there was a universal 
rejection of tawteen amongst Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The 
rejection of tawteen, as has been pointed out is one of the pillars of 
Palestinian refugee identity, and has been an important aspect of the 
‘accepted view’ of that identity. The findings in this paper amongst this 
generation- the Jeel ma baa’d El harb indicates that a change has taken 
place in the degree to which they subscribe to this rejection. These findings 
also indicate that a reappraisal is needed in how researchers construct 
hypotheses about what constitutes Palestinianness. Failure to do so risks 
the portrayal of Palestinian refugees in what Malkki (1996: 378-396), 
speaking about the depiction of refugees generally, describes as a 
homogenous ‘miserable sea of humanity’, when in fact that ‘sea’ contains 
many diverse and contrasting elements. Failure to recognise the 
heterogeneity of all groups as Whitebrook (2001: 137) suggests does a 
disservice to social science research. This paper has demonstrated that 
there are inter- generational differences in the acceptance or rejection 
which the Jeel ma baa’d El harb afford to tawteen, which have not been 
previously recognised in anthropological research, on the subject of 
Palestinian refugee identity.  
Imperative to reappraise policy initiatives 
Given that the PRLs have been in Lebanon since 1948, with little change to 
their situation, a new approach to the resolution of the problem is 
necessary. The influx of 1.5 million refugees as a result of the war in Syria, 
in addition to the registered 400,000 PRLs, has caused a significant 
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deterioration in the economy of Lebanon.  The danger of upsetting the 
delicate consociational balance of Lebanon’s political and social balance is 
also very real. There is little likelihood of an imminent resolution to either 
the war in Syria or the situation of the PRLs. Three levels of actions to 
resolve the position of the PRLs could be explored. At the international 
level, a re-invigoration of the dialogue between the Israelis and the 
Palestinian Authority is necessary. The recent deterioration of relations 
between the two, since the election of Donald Trump as president of 
America, makes this increasingly unlikely. However, it is necessary to get 
negotiations between the two parties re-started. The United Nations could 
play a greater role in achieving a solution.  
At the regional level, a body such as the Arab League could be mandated 
to investigate ways in which opportunities could be provided for those 
PRLs, who wish to do so, to immigrate and seek employment and possible 
residence in member countries belonging to that body. The Arab League 
has defended the interests of the Palestinians in the past, as and when it has 
suited their interests, and not very effectively. 
 At the local level, GOL could investigate ways in which PRLs could be 
granted limited civic rights, within Lebanon, without upsetting the 
consociational symmetry. Most of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb were born in 
Lebanon and some of them consider it as home and are willing to 
contribute to Lebanon’s economy. Given the part that Palestinians have 
played in Lebanon’s history, this would be difficult politically, but not 
insurmountable.    
Perhaps a normative solution for those Palestinian refugees who wish to 
avail of agency, if not full tawteen in Lebanon is as Ahmed (1997: 163) 
suggests, (speaking about refugees generally), that as a host nation it 
should afford an ‘opportunity to such a body of people to be incorporated 
into the nation through naturalisation’. He proposes that alternatively, if 
they do not want citizenship they may be granted ‘substantial political 
rights and representation.’ Gabiam (2006: 726) citing Iris Young, although 
writing about Native American Indians offers another solution which could 
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be applied in Lebanon. She suggests that ‘group specific rights should be 
instated in conjunction with ‘a general system of rights which are the same 
for all’. Young points to Native Americans who have ‘what almost 
amounts to dual citizenship’. Having resisted numerous attempts by the 
United States' government to assimilate them into the dominant culture, 
Native Americans are now entitled to ‘specific political, legal, and 
collective rights as members of tribes as well as to all the civil and political 
rights of other American citizens’. For Young, this dual system of rights 
enforces ‘the group's autonomy and protects its interests as an oppressed 
minority’. In a somewhat similar vein, Brynen (2009: 14) suggests that  
‘GOL should adopt a legislative definition of tawteen as citizenship 
and voting rights, thereby facilitating reforms that don’t involve 
naturalisation and emphasise that improving the social and 
economic conditions of refugees are in the social, economic and 
security interests of Lebanon’. 
In conclusion, as Massey (1994) and Maalouf (2008) have suggested, 
identity is not static, but responsive to influences from the environment. 
The socio-economic realities of deprivation and denial of agency have 
impinged on the traditional Palestinian identity of the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb, causing an intergenerational divergence from the accepted position 
of a rejection of tawteen. This has caused 44% of them to consider an 
alternative to that facet of the traditional Palestinianness. In so doing, they 
are conscious of the risk of losing all aspects of that identity. They are also 
conscious of developing what Van Meijl (2008) terms a ‘hybrid identity’ 
and the need to balance the two. 57% of them wished to retain a 
Palestinian identity, yet 62% were willing to have a double identity.   
The importance for some of them of rejecting tawteen the hope of 
returning to Palestine indicates that they position place as Palestine, which 
as Siddiq (1995: 89) has suggested is a place where Palestinian identity can 
be realised. It also demonstrates their loyalty to a collective identity, what 
Bernard (1972) termed their cultural heritage. For those willing to accept 
tawteen it is not necessarily a rejection of that cultural heritage, but a 
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pragmatism and realisation that return to Palestine is not feasible. For 
others, within this group, it is a means of acquiring agency, because they 
see the PRCs as their home, in what Relph (1976:20) has termed ‘the 
central reference point.’  For others, willing to accept tawteen, there was a 
hope that acquiring any identity would eventually facilitate their return to 
Palestine. These divergent views are evidence of the heterogeneity of the 
present generation of Palestinian refugees and points to Whitebrook’s 
(2001) assertion that groups contain sometimes conflicting allegiances. 
The findings of this study point to a new evolving Palestinian identity, 
which is more reflexive in nature and not necessarily tied to the old 
rigidities of an identity framed by nationalistic dogma.  
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Chapter 6 
 Is Hijra (emigration) causing a paradigm shift in Palestinian Refugee 
Youth Identity in Lebanon? 
Abstract Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are a discrete class of refugees 
in a protracted refugee situation, owing to the transgenerational legacy of 
their lengthy exilic status. Due to the legal restrictions imposed upon them 
by the Lebanese government, in terms of employment, lack of civil rights, 
ownership of land, and access to medical, educational and social services, 
there are few outlets for them to achieve agency. Hijra (Emigration) has 
long been a facet of Palestinian refugee life in Lebanon and has served as 
such an outlet in the past. Achievement of emigration has become 
increasingly more difficult for the Jeel ma baa’d El harb, due to the 
increasing reluctance of countries abroad to accept refugees. Despite the 
difficulties, many of them are willing to attempt the expensive and often 
dangerous travel abroad, in search of a better life. An assessment of this 
generation is undertaken in this paper, using qualitative research methods 
of semi-structured interviews and observation to gauge their visualisation 
of how hijra will impact on their Palestinian refugee identity.  Attachment 
to place, and belonging are two of the themes explored. Findings which 
point to a realisation amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El harb of the alteration of 
Palestinian refugee identity are proffered and differences with the previous 
generations’ loyalty to that identity are noted. The findings in this research 
seek to add to the corpus of knowledge amongst academics, NGOs, and 
governments, so that more appropriate programmes may be instituted to 
ameliorate the situation.   
Keywords: hijra; haq al ‘awda; identity; dignity; belonging; human 
rights; al ghurba (exile). 
Introduction: Peterson (1958: 261) identifies two types of migration, 
which he labels impelled (when migrants retain some agency over the 
decision to leave or stay) and forced (when migrants do not have agency). 
Stein (1981) also seems to suggest that forced migrants are a distinct 
category of victims, when in reality they are individuals, with individual 
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needs and therein he risks dehumanising these migrants by denying them 
the role of purposeful actors and thus ordinary people. Van Hear (1998: 
42), in contrast to Peterson (1958), suggests that almost all migration 
involves some form of compulsion. He adds ‘almost all migration involves 
choices.’ This is without question true, but perhaps rather than try to fit 
Palestinian refugee youth from Lebanon into a category, and thereby risk 
dehumanising them, it is more appropriate to consider Richmond’s (1994: 
55) assertion that the distinction between involuntary mobility and 
voluntary mobility is misleading. In the same vein, UNHCR (2013: 13) 
contends that there are ‘deeper and often interrelated patterns of political, 
human rights and economic pressures …there are as many reasons for 
moving as there are migrants.’ The problem therefore is that all migrants 
make the decision to move based on a number of factors which pertain to 
them, including but not solely, on economic grounds, persecution, or 
access to dignity, amongst others. This paper examines issues associated 
with Palestinian Refugee youth identity through the lens of hijra 
(emigration). The Arabic expression hijra has its roots in the flight of the 
prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina in 622 and it resonates with 
the modern-day flight of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who are also 
fleeing from persecution and denial of human rights and dignity. 
Research Aim  
The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the 
degree to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb subscribe to the traditional 
Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers 
(Sayigh:1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha:2009; Khalidi: 
1997; Peteet:2005), and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the 
expression of that identity. It would be remiss if ethnographers, 
policymakers and anthropologists were to ignore the potential for change 
in concepts of identity in this generation, and to discount the possibility of 
heterogeneity amongst them, which Calhoun (1995: 293) and Whitebrook 
(2001: 137) suggest is the accepted norm for members of their peers in the 
West. This has consequences for the future development of Palestinian 
aspirations for return, for a nation state, for Middle East politics in general 
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and a resolution of the Palestinian- Israeli dispute. The specific aim of this 
paper was to establish how hijra, usually translated as emigration, 
impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this generation. It 
has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% of Palestinian 
refugee households in Lebanon reported having immediate family abroad. 
The importance of hijra as an outlet for the Palestinian refugees, given 
their precarious existence in the PRCs and how their attempts at achieving 
a measure of that agency, is deserving of investigation. 
 Research Objectives  
• To determine, by qualitative research, the degree to which the Jeel 
ma baa’d El harb desire to avail of hijra.  
• To assess the extent to which this generation visualise how 
achievement of hijra will impact on their sense of identity and 
belonging. 
• To identify what factors are causing this generation to seek hijra 
• To assess the degree to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb are 
willing to forgo their traditional Palestinian identity in pursuit of 
hijra. 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this research was constructed around issues 
of identity, attachment to place and refugee migration. The work of Relph 
(1976); Proshansky (1978); Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996); and Korpela 
(1989) are examined in relation to place as a component of identity, and 
attachment to place. Imagined futures elsewhere are explored through the 
research of McDonald, et al (2011); Thompson and Holland (2002); and 
Vigh (2009).  This paper seeks to explore the factors which are causing the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb to contemplate taking hijra and questions whether 
what Allan (2014: 26) terms the ‘contingencies of prolonged exile’ are 
producing ‘new forms of subjectivity and belonging’ which are 
‘dynamically evolving attachments that cut across the grain of officially 
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sanctioned nationalism.’ These factors include the effects of deprivation 
and disenfranchisement of the camps; the influx of 1.5 million Syrian 
refugees on an already overburdened camp population; and the 
increasingly diminished support services provided by UNRWA and NGOs. 
Allan (2014: 33) proposes that ‘the very anomalousness of camp life and 
refugee experience’ may be producing a separate form of 
“Palestinianness”, ‘distinct from a national identity tied to ancestral land.’ 
In this context, it is important to consider that identity is always in a 
dynamic process of evolution; subject to internal and external influences 
(Massey, 1994; and Maalouf, 2000) It is therefore methodically unsound to 
consider identities as anything other than malleable and heterogenous.  
 
Historical Background 
The historical background to the present- day situation of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon has been narrated in Chapter 3. Dorai (2008: 24) 
suggests that the history of migration of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon 
can be broken down into three distinct periods. 
 The first period commencing in the 1960s and extending into the late 
1970s he calls Labour Migration. Hovdenak (1997: 35) terms this period as 
one of emigration for economic reasons. As Chapter 3 relates, this period 
coincided with the ascendancy of the PLO in Lebanon and its provision of 
financial support for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. However, the 
influx of refugees following the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970 
was coupled with the arrival of Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the 
Six-Day War (1967).  This event is known amongst them as the Naksa 
(setback). This brought an unknown number of refugees to Lebanon, most 
of whom would not be entitled to UNRWA support (Chaaban et al 2016: 
23). Many of these Palestinian refugees were eventually obliged to seek 
livelihoods outside of Lebanon. This timeframe also covers the outbreak of 
the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), when the fighting caused disruption 
of monetary assistance to the refugees and the start of the expulsion of 
Palestinians from South Lebanon.  
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 The second period, that of the asylum seekers (Dorai, 2008: 24) ranges 
between 1982 and 1987. Hovdenak (1997: 31) terms this period as one of 
emigration for security reasons. During this period, the Lebanese Civil War 
had intensified. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had invaded up to and 
including Beirut. The IDF had assisted in the massacres in Sabra and 
Shatila in 1982 (Fisk, 1992) and there was widespread fear of further 
massacres. The departure of the PLO from Lebanon occurred during this 
timeframe also and this resulted in further loss of financial subvention. The 
War of the Camps (1985-1987), where the Amal militia attacked the PRCs 
and killed many of the occupants resulted in further flight from Lebanon. 
The third period identified by Dorai (2008: 25) covers the period from the 
early 1990’s up to the present day, a period which he terms as one of 
illegal refugee migration.  This period saw the end of the Lebanese Civil 
War (1990) with the Ta’if Agreement. The Ta’if Agreement ushered in a 
period of increased repression on the Palestinian refugees by GOL as 
Roberts (2010: 77- 80) relates.  Any hope of naturalisation was removed 
by that agreement which expressly forbids tawteen (naturalisation), which 
would have been one means for the Palestinian refugees to get civil and 
economic rights. The influx of refugees from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria 
has swollen the numbers in the PRCs and put an unbearable burden on the 
Lebanese economy. When these factors are taken into account, emigration, 
by whatever means becomes a necessity for the Palestinian refugees. 
  
Palestinian Emigration/ Migration from Lebanon: 
UNHCR (2016: 22) estimated that ‘11.6 million refugees were in a 
protracted refugee situation’ 35 by December 2015, in addition to 5.7 
million Palestinian refugees registered to UNRWA worldwide (UNRWA: 
2016), some of whom are arguably in the same predicament.  Durieux 
                                                 
35 UNHCR defined a protracted situation for refugees as one in which refugees have been 
in exile ‘for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate 
prospects for implementation of durable solutions.’ (Preamble to UNHCR, 2009, UNHCR 
Ex Comm. 2009). 
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(2009: 60) suggests that protracted refugee situations inevitably lead to a 
deterioration in the quality of life as time progresses, in addition to the loss 
suffered in the original displacement; in the case of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon, this is a valid argument. Schulz and Hammer (2003: 2) attribute 
the cause of Palestinian migration to ‘attempts to securing improved living 
conditions,’ as a consequence of their ‘existential destitution and 
impossible living conditions.’ Faist (2000: 15) notes that the lack of social 
capital36 is initially the driving force for migration, and this deficiency 
enforces immobility and it then becomes the impetus for emigration. He 
suggests that migratory networks quickly become established and 
transnational as the initial migrants acquire social capital, facilitating 
subsequent migrants to follow suit. This has been the case of Palestinian 
emigration from Lebanon through the years and Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) 
estimate that 53.5% of Palestinian refugee households reported having 
immediate family abroad. The importance of those Palestinians who have 
already emigrated should not be underestimated. They have provided 
remittances and local knowledge of their new host countries and have 
influenced the choice of destination of subsequent emigrants. They have 
provided valuable knowledge of methods to circumvent legal barriers to 
entry into the new host countries. (Conversations with UNRWA officials 
Beirut, July 2016.)   
The application of labels to Palestinian youth seeking to emigrate from 
Lebanon is a contentious issue, as highlighted in the introduction to this 
paper. Since the opportunities of legal migration are largely denied to 
them, the only option open to them is ‘illegal’ migration. However, this 
risks the criminalisation of a group who have no other choice, as Schuster 
(2011: 1404, 1412) implies in his study of Afghan refugees in Europe. 
Perhaps it is more fitting, methodologically, for this research, to include 
them under the classification of forced migrants, since they suffer 
inequitable access to basic human rights; poor living conditions and 
                                                 
36 By loss of social capital, Faist means the degradation and loss of the normal informal 
social supports and community networks, which underpin economic life, especially where 
the vulnerable are struggling.  
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political persecution and restrictions on their agency as Richmond (1994: 
59) suggests. This risks the very process of dehumanisation which is 
highlighted above.  However, by giving voice to them as individuals, and 
demonstrating their ‘ordinariness,’ this process is nullified and we can 
identify with their lives and get a better understanding of their situation. In 
so doing, this research seeks to add to the corpus of study on migrants, 
which Crisp (1999: 4-5) criticised for its ‘fragmentary nature’ 
This research seeks to highlight the heterogeneity of the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb, thereby moving away from considering them as passive victims, 
whose only needs are humanitarian and aid assistance. This research 
demonstrates that they are individuals and not a homogenous group- 
members of what Malkki (1996: 378) terms a ‘miserable sea of humanity.’ 
It seeks to ‘unmute’ this generation, confront policies of depoliticisation 
and present them as active agents in their own futures, despite the lack of 
agency afforded to them as Richmond (1994: 59) opines. The Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb are stateless and as Arendt (1996: 296) suggests are 
therefore deprived of the ‘right to have rights.’ Emigration is seen by many 
Palestinians as the only option open to them to achieve those rights. Allan 
(2014: 167) proposes that the youth in the PRCs view hijra as ‘a metaphor 
for the social mobility and citizenship denied’ to them in Lebanon, and 
enables ‘broadening horizons of possibility’ in diurnal living, ‘allowing 
imaginative access to an “elsewhere”, creating room for speculation and 
hope.’  
Methodology 
The methodology for this paper incorporated a qualitative research 
approach, examining issues surrounding hijra. A primary research 
methodology was utilised as secondary sources of data were scant. The 
group targeted for data collection was the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb (the 
generation after the war), in Lebanon, ranging in ages from 18 to 35 years. 
A total of 61 of these were interviewed. Additional background interviews 
were conducted with 17 NGOs working with the Palestinian youth, in 
Lebanon. The four PRCs of Shatila, Mar Elias, Burj al Barajneh provided 
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the sites for the research as well as the urban areas in Beirut. The research 
hypothesis for this paper asked the question: Is Hijra causing a paradigm 
shift in Palestinian refugee youth identity in Lebanon? The research 
techniques involved semi-structured interviews and observation. Data 
analysis was conducted with reference to the available literature published 
on identity and belonging. A more detailed description of the methodology 
for this thesis is attached as Appendix ‘C’ to this thesis37. 
Discussion: 
The contemporary concepts of Palestinianness in the minds of Palestinian 
refugee youth are examined through the prism of attitudes to hijra in this 
section of the paper. It explores the significance which they attach to it. 
This research has established that a sizeable majority (59%) of the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb interviewed for this research, see emigration as a means of 
improving their future elsewhere, even though it may entail extending the 
exilic condition of al ghurba and even though some have no hope of its 
realisation. They also are conscious that concepts of identity associated 
with hijra are different to those of the preceding generations, realising that 
they may not be able to, or not want to hold on to their Palestinianness. In 
their estimation of what hijra entails they demonstrate a more realistic and 
pragmatic approach, than their predecessors. Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33,60) has 
noted some of these differences due to ‘the radical transformations that 
have occurred over the more than six decades’ and she has, at least in the 
view of this researcher, accurately identified them as owing to the ‘primacy 
of economic subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what 
it means to be Palestinian’ (Allan: 2014: 97-98).  
Emigration is seen as an outlet for frustrated ambitions and a reaction to 
the ‘everyday histories of grinding poverty’ and the ‘felt immediacies of 
people’s lives, which Allan (2014: 8, 27) has noted. It has become harder 
for the PRLs to secure even the limited and sometimes illegal employment 
opportunities, which had traditionally been offered to them for low pay, 
                                                 
37 This format complies with University of Ulster guidelines for the presentation of 
methodologies. 
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due in part to competition from the PRS (Chaaban et al., 2016: 57). An 
UNRWA official gave his views on the reasons why the Palestinian youth 
put so much effort in trying to emigrate: 
‘Life is not very easy for these people. They are very poor, very 
marginalised and they live in bad areas-they have bad neighbours. 
Lebanon is not known for its stability-especially for its poor. It 
makes perfect sense therefore, that if you have any talent; if you 
manage to educate yourself and you live in a society that 
institutionally discriminates against you on top of all other 
discriminations, simply because you are a Palestinian, and you have 
no way of changing that, unless you are a woman and you can 
marry a Lebanese, and hope for a better future for your children; 
that you seek to emigrate. What can you expect from life in 
general? If you become a doctor, having an American certified 
education, ten years of university and you are still not allowed to 
practice medicine. Unless you are lucky enough to get a job with 
UNRWA-where you can get maybe $500 a month. So, if you have 
any relations abroad, you will be doing everything to get out of this 
place and, why shouldn’t you? It doesn’t mean that you don’t feel 
proud of your heritage or that you didn’t grow up with your grand 
or great grand- parent’s legacy of living in tents and then sheds. All 
this history of deep misery is your identity. If you manage to lift 
yourself out of this hole, you have accomplished something, raising 
your children in relative prosperity in Europe or somewhere, how 
can you be more successful than that?’ (Interview with Hermann 03 
Jul 2105, Beirut). 
The research for this paper found that 36 of the 61 respondents wished to 
emigrate from the PRCs in Lebanon. 19 were ambivalent or did not 
express a wish to emigrate, while 6 were definite in not wanting to 
emigrate. The advent of 1.5 million Syrian refugees, including 58,00038 
                                                 
38 Conversation with ‘Mary’ a UNDP Director, Beirut, Jun 2015. 
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registered Palestinian Syrian Refugees (PRS) to Lebanon since 2011 has 
dramatically altered the physical, social and economic landscapes for the 
PRLs. Evidence of the financial pressures for the PRLs is presented by 
Chaaban et al. (2016: 52 -65), who reports an increase in poverty rates in 
the Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in the Beirut area. Anecdotal 
evidence from this authors interviews and observations in 2015 and 2016 
indicates that there is overcrowding in the PRCs; an increase in ‘enforced 
idleness’ due to lack of employment opportunities; and an increase in 
pessimism amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb. Many of the PRS have 
moved into the PRCs, which were already overcrowded, as Chaaban et al. 
(2010) reported. Camp Service Officers (CSOs) in Burj al Barajneh and 
Shatila reported increases in their PRC populations between 2015 and 
2016.39 There has been a concomitant pressure on waste collection, 
sanitation, water provision; and access to education and health facilities, 
which have been affected by reduced UNRWA budgets40.  There is 
anecdotal evidence of a rise in the price of food and basic commodities, in 
interviews given by both UNRWA officials and the subjects of this 
research. Additionally, this author was struck by the increase in the amount 
of begging on the streets of Beirut between 2015 and 2016, which would 
seem to indicate that the poverty increase noted by Chaaban et al. (2016) 
above is not confined to the PRCs. The impact of hijra on the identity on 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb is examined through the following themes 
which emerged during data collection and analysis in Lebanon, during 
2015/2016. 
 
                                                 
39 CSO Burj al Barajneh, in conversations with the author, reported the population of the 
PRC, as being 40,000 on 06 Jul 2015; and in excess of 45,000, possibly as many as 56,000 
on 24 Jun 2016. CSO Shatila, similarly reported 25,000 residents on 23 Jun 2016, an 
increase of 2,500 from 2015, and a huge increase from 6,000 in 2000. Shatila PRC 
encompasses an area of 0.4 km. It should be noted that numbers in the PRCs are boosted 
by non-Palestinian immigrants, who cannot afford the high cost of housing in Beirut, and 
who may not have work permits for Lebanon. All figures are estimates only. UNRWA 
intends to conduct a census of all the PRCs to establish how many residents are 
Palestinian, in 2017. 
  
40 Conversations with UNRWA policy co-ordinators Beirut, Jun 2015 and 2016.  
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Hybridity and Balance: 
Aref, a 21-year-old male, studying at the American University of Beirut 
(AUB) wanted to emigrate because 
‘I hate my nationality. It’s so much exhausting to be a Palestinian. 
With Palestinian identity (hawiyya), I can do nothing. I hope to get 
another and balance the two. I have the opposite opinion to a lot of 
Palestinians; I have no problem with tawteen; you can still have a 
Palestinian nationality, even with Lebanese citizenship.’ 
In contrast to Aref, Yosura, a 21-year-old female, unemployed with 2nd 
level education was fearful that she might lose her right to be a Palestinian 
and she had a strong desire to hold onto her Palestinian identity: 
‘I hope to go to the UK and Canada and I may lose my Palestinian 
identity there. It’s an important one. I hope to manage the two. In 
my mind, I won’t lose it. I am thinking always of Palestine. Many 
of my friends in Palestine are thinking of leaving there, and I want 
to go there.’  
Yosura’s hope of managing the new identity in tandem with her Palestinian 
one is an example of the hybridity of the exilic condition as cited by 
Ashcroft and Ahluwailia (1999: 139), where ‘one never abandons the old, 
nor completely accepts the new.’ This would seem to suggest as Van Meijl 
(2008: 180) has observed that many transnational adolescents in the 
modern world develop a ‘hybrid identity’ in which they ‘successfully 
combine aspects of both local and global circumstances’. These 
‘components of a different origin’ require being re-combined continuously. 
This condition requires a ‘never-ending struggle to work out in which 
situation they ideally belong.’ Many people, adolescents, in particular, Van 
Meijl suggests, now develop multicultural identities. Appadurai (2001) has 
called the modern inter-connected and globalised world as a ‘contact 
zone,’ in which the stability of identities is challenged by their encounters 
with other cultures. A corollary of this leads to the assumption that people 
are developing multicultural and hybrid identities as a result. This 
193 
 
 
 
 
assumption has been echoed by Ewing (1990: 453); Massey (1994: 170-
172); and Bhabba (1992: 57). 
Agency and Dignity: 
Aya, a 35-year-old female with five children, working for an NGO in the 
camps gave typical reasons for emigration, which can be extended to the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in general: 
‘I want a secure living with dignity, in peace and to be motivated 
by better work opportunities and I want better living conditions. I 
want full human rights. I would take this in another country. They 
should offer us full legal immigration, with career development 
chances and full human rights, the same as the original citizens 
with a recognised state and identity.  If I could I would immigrate 
to another country if I could have a better life for myself and my 
family. Even though my husband and I are working for earning 
good money, the high standards are not achieved as we have five 
children between us in school. We are paying lots of bills and we 
hardly make both ends meet, for the very high financial costs with 
low standards. In addition, there is the fear of the security situation 
and the high drugs dealing41 and addiction inside the camps, that 
make us worry about our children.’ 
Aya’s comments on an imagined future in another country with full civil 
rights and better opportunities is consistent with the published work of Mc 
Donald, Pini, Bailey and Price (2011); Thompson and Holland (2002); and 
Vigh (2009) on the imagined futures of youth, when the existential 
conditions of the respondents are so poor.  
                                                 
41 Officially, according to the political factions, there is no drug problem in the PRCs. 
Drug addiction is viewed by them as a Western malaise, an example of degeneracy 
contrary to the ideals of Palestinian identity. However, a substantial number of 
respondents to this research project cautiously mentioned the problem, usually with the 
caveat: ‘please don’t quote me.’ A Special Advisor to the Director of UNRWA in 
Lebanon spoke of a Drugs Rehabilitation Unit in Burj al Barajneh Camp, established and 
run by the camp residents themselves. The author requested access to this unit, but it was 
not facilitated. 
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Some youth were determined to hold on to their Palestinian identity, even 
though taking advantage of emigration as Maysoon, a 28-year-old female, 
working as a Support Teacher in the camps related:  
‘I would emigrate to have the better conditions, but I will still be a 
Palestinian. I am proud to be a Palestinian. I want a better home, a 
better camp for the people, so that our new babies don’t have the 
same experience. I want to go back to Palestine. I want them (the 
world) to see our reality of living here in the camps and for them to 
know our suffering and for them to help us.’ 
Maysoon is an example of what Van Meijl (2008: 166) alluded to when he 
posited that increased transnational migration, a phenomenon of 
globalisation is ‘complicating culture and culture relationships’ and 
causing problematical dilemmas for the identity of the individual and the 
relations left at home, specifically the previous generation. He urges a 
‘dialogical perspective’ to take into account the ‘increasing number of 
voices and counter-voices’ that are represented in the multi-cultured and 
hybrid nature of identity in the global transnationals. As already outlined in 
Chapter 2, several writers such as Korpela (1989: 245); Proshansky (1978); 
and Proshansky et al (1983:61) suggested that place identity was not 
restricted to the home environment only, but extends far beyond 
considering it as essential and wholly comprising a person’s place identity 
relationship. Maysoon is an example of that phenomenon, in that she sees 
her future in more than one place, and not just in Palestine. 
Fatima, a 27-year-old female, university graduate, working for a private 
company expressed her wish to emigrate in terms of: 
‘I would take another nationality in order to help my situation and 
to improve finances and civil rights. It is the only way to live in a 
more stable situation. The world does not like Palestinians. Even 
the Arab countries, like the Emirates, won’t give us our rights I 
would like to go to Canada, the USA, or Ireland, not an Arab 
country. I want to buy a home. I want to be safe, it is the most 
important. I want to live in peace and have a normal life, outside a 
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camp. I love Ein el Hilweh, but it is really very dangerous. Nobody 
outside the factions has authority. It is sad. I would take another 
nationality to get back to Palestine. If I go as a Palestinian, I will be 
taking discrimination; if I go with another nationality, they will 
deal with me in a different way. I do not want to go against haq al 
‘awda- it is our right.’  
Bandura (1999: 35) commenting on the capacity for forethought in order 
for people to achieve agency in their lives, suggests that ‘it enables people 
to transcend the dictates of their immediate environment and to shape and 
regulate the present to fit a desired future.’ Furthermore, it provides 
‘direction, coherence and meaning to one’s life.’ Harrell – Bond (1986) 
argues that refugees are not necessarily passive and are not always 
dependent on humanitarian assistance in conceiving and developing their 
own agency, which may include onward migration. Turton (2003: 12) 
terms these agency architects as ‘purposive actors’, even though they may 
be refugees and thus ordinary people. 
Generational Differences: 
Both Maysoon, a 28- year old female and Fatima, a 27-year old female 
were similarly conscious of the generational differences in respect to hijra, 
as expressed by Fatima: 
‘My grandparents only saw the old Palestine and to return; my 
parents only want to live in peace and only have enough to live. 
They don’t have a wide view of the future or wish to emigrate; only 
to have children and provide for them.’ 
Omar, a 35-year old male also recognised these differences: 
‘I am sometimes totally different to my family. Most of them are 
members of the Palestinian factions, even the Popular 
Committees,42 but I am not a member of a political faction. Two of 
                                                 
42 Many of the youth interviewed referred disparagingly of members of the Popular 
Committees as mafia members, in this way. Sometimes they spoke ‘off-record’, with a 
plea ‘Don’t quote me’. The Popular Committee, also known as al –hakuma al –saghira, or 
the small government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the 
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them, one in France; one in Germany, and now one of them in jail; 
drugs problem and the security in the camps.’ 
Fateh, a 35-year-old married man who started but did not complete 
University education spoke in a similar vein: 
‘Even if I take another nationality, it will not make me forget 
Palestine and my Palestinian identity, until I can return to Palestine. 
Haq al ‘awda is sacred. My parents said that we will return and 
were worried just about my education. I am fighting harder than 
them, to get better conditions for my children.’ 
Fateh’s comments about return and his desire to get another nationality 
through hijra coincide with Allan’s (2014 :172) finding that it is not 
uncommon therefore to ‘encounter individuals who invoke return 
rhetorically, while simultaneously planning emigration materially. 
However, his comments also validate the observation of Twigger-Ross and 
Uzzell (1996: 218) that place (in this case- Palestine) is central to our 
identity in their assertion that ‘all identifications have location 
implications; place is part of the content of an identification’ 
Abandonment:  
Both Ghazi, a 21- year old unemployed man with basic education, and 
Bashar, a 24-year-old male, unemployed with basic education would also 
take emigration. Bashar was especially anxious to escape from the negative 
connotations which his Palestinian identity held for him in Lebanon: 
‘I would emigrate if I had the chance and lose my Palestinianness 
and all that goes with that. The Syrians are taking our jobs, working 
for less money. The youth of this generation are going in a bad 
                                                 
1970’s. It is composed of members of the political factions within the camps. It is not 
elected. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy 
from the time of Jeel al-thawra (generation of revolution). 
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direction because of pressure, unemployment, plenty of time to do 
nothing, etc. There is drug addiction at 12 years of age in the 
Camps. Something bad will happen after a year if something isn’t 
done. There is a lot of peer pressure. I have a 16-year-old brother 
and I am afraid for him. The dealers give out drugs like candy to 
get the kids hooked. It’s mostly Capticon and Benzies. I want my 
human rights and dignity.’ 
Bashar’s comments epitomise what Lassailly – Jacob (2000: 123) suggests 
in that the exilic condition of refugees means ‘surviving in camps where 
the living conditions are so poor that few wish to stay on.’ Fares, a 29-
year-old male, holding down three jobs to put himself through university 
was also willing to contemplate losing his Palestinian identity: 
‘We are suffering a lot of racism here; in Lebanon. We are 
scapegoats for the war. I am classified as a foreigner; it’s not based 
on your talents. I have lost a lot of chances of work, because I am a 
Palestinian.  I deserve those chances in life. The only solution is 
that I get another identity/nationality I don’t care where I can get it, 
from Sweden, Ireland or wherever. It makes you belong to a land. 
As a Palestinian you don’t belong to any land. Without land, there 
is no honour. I want my own identity.’ 
The statements of Ghazi, Bashar and Fares illustrate the desperation of 
those refugees who are willing to contemplate the abandonment of their 
Palestinian inheritance. Cernea (1997: 1572-1573) posits that the lack of 
land, access to wages and employment, housing, cultural space and agency 
combine to produce a ‘psychological downward slide of… confidence in 
one’s society and self.’ It causes the individual to question his very 
identity.  
Refusal: 
Omar, a 35-year-old male, who is a university graduate and working for a 
private company was one of the few to adamantly refuse the opportunity to 
emigrate if offered to him: 
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‘I have opportunity to take nationality in many countries, but I 
refuse to take emigration. There is a movement in the camps 
against this type of emigration. I want to visit countries, but not to 
stay. It’s a decision, actually. Tell the world to invest in Palestinian 
youth and people. It is important now, more than any other thing. 
We have no other thing in the camps but people.’ 
Relph (1976: 20) suggested that home is ‘the central reference point of 
human existence,’ and for Omar the camps are as Relph (1976: 43) 
describes ‘the places where they grew up and lived and where they live 
now.’ Omar was unwilling to consider an alternative outside of the only 
certainty which he knew. He was also unwilling to go against the 
nationalist dictates of the PCs in the camps. Allan (2014: 172) notes that 
‘the decision to go is politically charged, as it can be regarded as 
tantamount to the abandonment of community and homeland.’ Chaaban et 
al. (2016: 44) noted that some opposition to emigration was promoted by 
some of the factions within the PRCs in 2014. They saw it as betrayal of 
haq al ‘awda and Palestinian identity. Alarmed at the actions of 
Mohammed Dahalan and his wife Jalila, urging emigration, in 2014; Fatah 
and a loose coalition of factions organised demonstrations to counter their 
influence. (Conversation with Abdullah, a high ranking DFLP official, 
Beirut, Jul 2016). However, given that, as this research indicates, respect 
for the political factions is limited amongst this generation, the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb have largely chosen to ignore their admonishments and 
continue to pursue their quest for emigration. 
Failure: 
Sometimes attempts to gain asylum or even opportunities to work abroad 
are not successful. Mohammed, a 35-year-old male, unemployed with 
basic education and five children explained 
‘I am just back from Germany, where I was trying to get 
emigration. I came back because I was treated badly and didn’t 
succeed. I want to get a non-Arab nationality for my children, but I 
don’t want them to forget that that we are originally from Palestine. 
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I wish my children to have a good education, to work in a secure 
good job and for the Lebanese government to allow us to work.’ 
Mohammed had been shot, in the head and stomach, as a young child by 
the armed wing of Amal (a Shia Political Party) during the War of the 
Camps and has an artificial intestine. His case for asylum was turned down 
and he was held in a German detention centre for six months while his case 
was being adjudicated. He had previously tried to get into the UK, but 
failed. He stated that due to his inability to work legally in Lebanon, that 
he has no other option but to try to emigrate again, by whatever means 
possible, as soon as he can generate enough money to pay for it. 
Mohammed’s search for a better life and his constant movement is akin to 
what Bauman (1996: 28) relates ‘wherever the vagabond goes, he is the 
stranger; he can never be the ‘native’, the ‘settled one’, one with ‘roots in 
the soil’. Each place is for the vagabond, a stop-over, but he never knows 
how long he will stay in any one of them; ‘this will depend on the 
generosity and patience of the residents.’ 
One of those who did not wish to have her interview recorded on tape, was 
‘Nahla’, a 23-year-old female, university graduate, in Computer Studies. 
She recently returned to one of the PRCs after a failed attempt to emigrate 
from Lebanon by illegal means. She was the eldest of four children, whose 
father was dead.  Her immediate family and relatives had clubbed together 
to raise $7,000 to finance her trip and were now destitute. She had been on 
a boat which set out from Tripoli in the North to go to Turkey, but the boat 
sank and some passengers were detained by the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF). She managed to avoid detection and eventually returned, but she 
still lives in fear of discovery and was desperate not to be identified. It is 
unusual for women to be selected for this type of trip, but her prospects 
due to her education were seen to be good. Allan (2014: 170) notes that 
most would -be migrants are men, partly because of the expectation that 
they will earn more than their female counterparts and the money gifted for 
the trip is seen as ‘an investment in the earning power of a family member 
who will eventually send remittances home.’ Emigrants also act as 
sponsors and guarantors for others. The family are now under 
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consideration as a Special Hardship Case (SHC) by UNRWA. While 
$7,000 might seem somewhat insignificant by Western observers, it is an 
exorbitant amount for Palestinians in the camps of Lebanon. 
Globalisation and Manifestations of Western influences in the PRCs 
Maalouf (2000: 93) sees the acceleration of globalisation as intensifying 
‘peoples need for identity.’ Parekh (2008:192) has suggested that 
globalisation, by which he means the spread of Western values, has caused 
a disruption of cultures and collective identities. Schulz and Hammer 
(2003: 229-230) posit that this in turn has caused a dissolution of 
attachment to the old rigidities of the traditional Palestinian identity. Van 
Meijl (2008:180) comments on the contest between a pre-existing 
traditional identity and an evolving global identity and suggests that a new 
hybrid identity results.  It can be posited that in a similar manner that the 
process of globalisation has sharpened the need of the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb for dignity, human rights, the right to work and own property and 
access to better education. Their attachment to place is altered by 
globalisation, in what Beck (2002: 24) terms ‘place-polygamy’. The desire 
to return to Palestine is strong, but amongst this generation, there is a 
realisation that this may not be possible, in the near future and the need for 
agency becomes paramount.   
 
Figure 6.1. Reported Access to Wi-Fi and Internet amongst the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb Jun/Jul 2016. (n= 61). 
24
21
Reported Access to Wi-Fi and Internet 
amongst the Jeel ma baa'd El Harb 
(77%)
Males (75%) Females (72.4%)
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The use of the internet has become widespread in the PRCs and the youth 
are like their Western peers spending more time using it and they are 
questioning why they cannot have the same rights and material things as 
their counterparts elsewhere. Allan (2014: 187) suggests that as the future 
elsewhere has come to seem like something available only to other people, 
they have ‘increasingly turned to emigration as a means of regaining 
agency and control in their lives’, and to ‘carve out better and more secure 
lives for themselves and their families.’  Emigration from the PRCs is as 
Allan (2014: 189) notes ‘spawning their own diaspora, creating cross-
currents of attachment that unsettle our understanding of how Palestinian 
identity and affiliation should now be conceived.’ 
Dress 
While female dress was in the main conservative, there were some 
examples of western styles observed. Almost all women wore Arabic 
headdress, either the hajib or niqab. Two examples of the burqa were seen 
during this research in Shatila PRC; although these were worn by older 
women. Where trousers or jeans were worn they were covered to the knee 
by a cloak. Brand names were popular with both genders and followed 
Western fashions. Where nail varnish was worn, several young women of 
the Jeel ma baa’d El harb used designs and colouring commensurate with 
their western peers. Males bought jeans under western brand names, or 
cheap copies. They also followed western fashions in their choice of 
footwear. Males seemed to have more freedom to wear what they wanted.  
Hairstyles 
As nearly all young girls wore headdress, it was not possible to ascertain if 
they were following western styles. Most of the male youth styled their 
hair in Western fashion. One of the respondents owned a salon which 
catered for both men and women. She told this researcher that young men, 
in particular, followed western fashion and asked for hair styles to match 
rock and pop stars and sporting heroes. It was evident that young males 
took great care in matters of grooming. 
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Speech 
It was noticeable amongst both male and females that modern western 
styles of speech were used, when English was spoken. The word ‘like’ was 
inserted into conversations, in the same manner as it is now prevalent in 
the West. Males used a curious admixture of phrases such as ‘He’s my bro’ 
and ‘It was my bad’, in the same manner as their western peers, but 
interspersed with sentence constructions typical in the Middle East. When 
questioned about these phrases, respondents said that they had picked these 
up by watching movies and popular TV shows on the internet, and also in 
conversations with their emigrated relations and friends living abroad.  
Food Preferences 
It was reported by both the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb and adults that 
consumption of traditional food has declined. There are pizzerias in both 
Shatila and Burj al Barajneh. These produce traditional Arabic flatbreads 
as well as pizzas. Food from these outlets is relatively cheap and has 
become the staple diet of many of the youths. These food outlets also 
provide meeting places for the youth to ‘hang out’. 
 
Figure 6.2 Pizzeria in Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016. 
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Recreational activities 
There are very few spaces for recreation in the PRCs due to the density of 
population. Teachers and parents who spoke to this researcher bemoaned 
the fact that the Jeel ma baa’d El harb spent too much time on their 
phones, lap tops playing games, or on the internet. Many of the 
respondents spoke of their use of Google, Facebook, Snapchat and 
Instagram. They used these social media to maintain contact with actual 
and virtual friends in the camps and abroad, and to access western media 
sites. Young males tended to group together in the streets, alleyways, and 
cafes of the camps and talk and smoke, as their western counterparts do. A 
type of ‘café culture’ is common across the Middle East. The difference in 
the camps is that it is an all- day occurrence due to the ‘enforced idleness’ 
caused by high levels of unemployment. Young women do not follow the 
same custom and are rarely seen unless they are accompanied. They do not 
loiter in the streets.  
 
Figure 6.3. ‘Enforced Idleness’ in a Shatila PRC café. Source: 
O’Connor, 2016. 
Posters and Photographs 
In the public areas of homes, there was little evidence of western 
influences, except for the presence of the ubiquitous television sets. Access 
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to private rooms in residences for the conduct of this research was limited. 
In the few instances where access was permitted, the researcher found that 
photos and posters of western footballers and rock stars were placed side 
by side with traditional Palestinian art and photos.    
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to determine the measure of this generation’s 
attachment to the traditional view of Palestinian identity and to determine 
if there were inter -generational differences in the loyalty to and 
visualisation of it. It also sought to identify any factors which may be 
causing these differences. This paper proposes that there now appears to be 
a greater willingness amongst the present generation of refugees (Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb) to consider hijra as one of the few avenues open to them in 
pursuit of a better future in which they may achieve the full range of 
human rights which are denied to them in Lebanon. This research indicates 
that the worsening conditions in the PRCs, coupled with exposure to other 
cultures through the internet, a by-product of globalisation, have caused 
many of them to consider hijra as an imperative. It has also shown that 
they are aware of the of dangers that availing of hijra poses to commitment 
to the maintenance of the traditionally ascribed Palestinian identity and 
belonging. This is especially valid given the fear of being disloyal to the 
precepts of haq al ‘awda, as was iterated by a number of respondents. This 
would seem to suggest a heightened sense of self-awareness amongst this 
generation, or a lack of substantive research on this aspect by previous 
researchers. 
Responsibility of Anthropologists and Ethnographers 
This research indicates that ethnographers and anthropologists must take 
cognisance of this development. It is no longer sufficient to present 
Palestinian refugee identity as homogenous. Palestinian refugees are 
composed of many diverse and often contrasting elements, holding what 
Whitebrook (2001:137) describes as ‘multiple allegiances.’ Researchers 
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need to be open to the possibility of change, because as has been pointed 
out previously identity is not moribund, but evolves in response to 
alterations in socio-economic and political landscapes.    
This examination of Palestinian identity would seem to suggest that there 
are inter- generational differences in what importance the Palestinian 
refugees and in particular, the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, in Lebanon, attach 
to other facets of Palestinianness, such as haq al ‘awda (Chapter 4). 
Difference has also been found in how they view tawteen (Chapter 5) and 
the Nakba (Chapter 3). This suggests that the paradigm of this identity has 
been imbricated with elements of history, the struggle of daily survival in 
the PRCs and increasingly the influences of the West. In the light of these 
facts researchers need to be aware of the changing nature of Palestinian 
refugee youth identity in Lebanon.   
Responsibility of Policymakers and NGOs 
This research indicates that the influx to Lebanon of 1.5 million refugees 
including 58,000 PRS, since 2011, has had a detrimental effect on the lives 
of the PRLs. There has been an increase in pressure on the economic and 
physical landscapes in Lebanon, with increased unemployment, 
overcrowding and higher levels of hopelessness amongst this generation. 
The lack of the basic right to meaningful employment, and the continued 
denial of civic rights by GOL has heightened the desperation which many 
of this generation of respondents has reported. The reduction in UNRWA 
services due to budget constraints has been another factor in the daily 
struggle to survive. The failure of leadership at the Palestinian Authority 
level and the perceived corruption of the PCs by the youth has served to 
heighten the desire for hijra as a solution to what Allan (2014:8) calls ‘the 
everyday histories of grinding poverty.’  
This paper suggests that policymakers and NGOs need to re-examine 
strategies at the international, regional and national levels to take account 
of the changes noted in ‘Palestinianness’. A re-invigoration of dialogue 
between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is overdue. 
In the present political climate this seems unlikely, however, it should be 
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pursued, by the United Nations and the United States. At the regional level, 
the Arab States could initiate policies to provide employment opportunities 
for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb and relax restrictions on border restrictions. 
If hijra cannot be realised in the near/medium term, then possibly some 
form of naturalisation should be afforded to the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb by 
GOL. As the research for Chapter 5 has shown, numbers willing to avail of 
it would most likely be small. That group of PRLs who wish to remain in 
Lebanon, could be afforded a limited form of assimilation, not necessarily 
a complete form of tawteen.  
Carens (2009: 7- 10), writing about the efforts of the United States to debar 
entry to migrants, offers an opinion that could be applied to the situation of 
the Palestinians in Lebanon. He suggests that a person acquires a moral 
right to membership in the state, after an unspecified period of residence. 
His argument is that such a person will have established personal, social 
and economic connectivity with the state and its citizens over time; a 
failure to include these persons is tantamount to an abrogation of the 
principles of a democratic and liberal state. 
Maalouf (2000: 160), although not writing about the Palestinians in 
Lebanon. is perhaps giving the citizens of Lebanon a message when he 
says:  
‘In the same way, societies themselves need to accept the many 
affiliations that have forged each of their collective identities in the 
course of history, and that are shaping them still ….so that every 
individual may recognise himself in the image of the country in 
which he lives, and may feel encouraged to involve himself in it 
rather than, remaining an uneasy and sometimes hostile spectator.’  
The provision of assistance needs to be transparent and co-ordinated. 
Where there is reduced clarity, ulterior motives for aid provision may be 
surmised, even when there may be none. Perhaps given the focus of past 
UN policies of resettlement as solutions to the worldwide refugee problem, 
it is understandable that there is a certain amount of suspicion that any 
offer of assistance, no matter how altruistic in nature, may be seen to 
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threaten the haq al ‘awda or Palestinian identity. Bassima, the director of a 
Palestinian NGO which provides loans to Palestinian youth for educational 
purposes was apprehensive about the motives of some foreign 
governments: 
‘I was talking to a woman from to the British Embassy and she was 
getting me to encourage them to study for two years here and go to 
England to get a Masters to get a scholarship for the Palestinians 
and never to come back. Yesterday we had information about a 
Resettlement Scholarship from the Canadians-you go there for 1 
year- covers University, food, all expenses, but only for 1 year 
because they become Canadian. They become part of the system 
there and they can manage to go to the university as Canadians. 
This is important. This is another kind of resettlement of young 
people in the camps. All the young productive people will be taken 
from the camps to other societies and after twenty years the old 
people will die off in the camps. There is something that is going 
on in this.’  (Interview with Bassima 17 Jun 2016, Beirut).  
A paradigm shift in Palestinian refugee youth identity in Lebanon? 
The danger of forming a conclusion of an absolute shift in Palestinian 
youth identity based on an extrapolation of the results of the small sample 
of this research is recognised by the author. Williams (2000: 215) opines 
however, that it is possible to produce ‘moderatum generalisations’ in 
which qualitative research findings ‘can be seen to be instances of a 
broader set of recognisable features.’ Taking into consideration the fact 
that the research was conducted across four PRCs; the ‘gatherings’; and the 
urban districts of Beirut and Sidon, utilising gatekeepers and facilitators 
from diverse origins, there are definite indicators of such shifts from the 
previous generation. The ‘accepted’ view of Palestinian refugees as a 
homogenous group, as taken by ethnographers and anthropologists in the 
past, is no longer valid, as has been demonstrated by this research. 
Clemens (2007: 110) reminds us that the images that are portrayed in the 
West of Palestinians fail to understand their diversity and that ‘they are not 
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a homogenous group, but comprise a people with multiple identities.’ 
Calhoun (1995: 293) cautions that the assumption of homogeneity amongst 
a group is pernicious and makes no allowance of ‘differences which are 
basic to human life’.  
This research indicates a strong desire for hijra amongst the Jeel ma baa’d 
El Harb in Lebanon. Taken in isolation this is not a marker for a shift in 
their concepts of personal and group identity. Cross – correlation with 
other research undertaken by this author on tawteen (Chapter 5); al-Nakba 
(Chapter 3); and haq al ‘awda (Chapter 4); indicates a shift in attitudes to 
Palestinian identity at both the personal and collective levels, which is at 
odds with those of the previous generations. Elbedour, Bastien and Center 
(1997: 222) posit the view that younger generations are pursuing modern 
lifestyles, seeking better living conditions and find themselves speaking a 
different language from their elders, thereby distancing themselves from 
their cultural roots. Allan (2014: 33) writes that the desire for hijra is about 
reclaiming agency, even amongst those who lack the resources to realise 
that goal. 
Only 4 of the respondents did not know of the haq al ‘awda. As indicated 
previously, hijra is seen a threat to haq al ‘awda and Palestinian identity 
by the PCs and factions within the PRCs, because as Allan (2014: 172) 
notes it is seen as ‘a betrayal of national interests…. privileging of 
individual aspiration over long -term political goals.’ Despite the 
proscription by the PCs and factions, a substantial number of youth were 
willing to risk a lessening of their Palestinianness by taking hijra and as 
Allan (2014: 32) noted spoke of haq al ‘awda and hijra in a way that was 
‘contrapuntal, speaking both languages fluently’ when thinking about their 
future. Some were prepared to lose their Palestinian identity as typified by 
Ghazi and Bashar, underlining as Robins (1996: 72) has noted that the 
increasing ‘transnationalisation of cultures and mobility of populations has 
worked towards the dissolution of the old rigidities in the nationalist 
cultures.’   Others such as Maysoon wanted to keep that identity. Yosura 
was one of many who hoped to be able to balance two identities. There 
was an awareness that transnational migration would lead to some 
209 
 
 
 
 
alteration in, and accommodation with, their Palestinian identity as Van 
Mejl (2008: 180) suggests.   
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb are 
engaged in a constant quest for agency and a better life for themselves. 
This may necessitate them disavowing the accepted collective strictures, 
imposed upon them by a less relevant nationalist ideology. Stern (1985) 
highlighted the importance of ‘agency’; the person’s comprehension that 
they have control over their ability to influence their environments and 
which is integral to their ideas of whom they are and who they can be.  
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Chapter 7 
 Conclusions and Recommendations: 
Mercer suggests ‘identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when 
something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the 
experience of doubt and uncertainty’ (Mercer, 1990: 43). This research 
centred around questions of Palestinian refugee identity amongst the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb in Lebanon. It explored the nuances of memory, 
belonging and place amongst this generation. It set out to validate or 
repudiate the traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity as reported by 
previous ethnographers and anthropologists. This traditional view 
portrayed the Palestinian refugees as memorialising the events surrounding 
the Nakba (the events surrounding the expulsion from Palestine); refusing 
to accept tawteen (naturalisation) and engaged in a campaign for haq al 
‘awda (right of return). This view also considered this identity to be static 
and homogenous in nature.  The research aims for this thesis were guided 
by a critical appraisal of the available literature, and by the extensive field-
based research undertaken in the PRCs in Lebanon. 
 Primary Research Aim 
The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the 
degree to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb subscribe to the traditional 
Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers 
(Sayigh:1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha:2009; Khalidi: 
1997; Peteet:2005), and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the 
expression of that identity. This is important because it will add to the body 
of academic work around issues of identity, memory, belonging and place. 
It will, as outlined above, assist in providing more focussed and 
appropriate strategies for NGOs and inform policymakers at the 
international, regional and national levels in the formulation of solutions to 
the refugee problem. 
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Findings 
Intergenerational Differences: 
This research found that there are intergenerational differences in the 
loyalty which this generation ascribe to the traditional view of Palestinian 
refugee identity as reported previously by academics (Sayigh: 1977,1994, 
1998, 2001; Hanafi: 2003,2010; Masalha: 2009; Ramadan: 2013; Bianchi: 
2014). Although 35 (57%) reported a wish to retain their Palestinian 
identity, 6 (10%) were prepared to relinquish it and 1 (1.6%) didn’t care. 
Interestingly, 38 (62%) reported satisfaction with having a hybrid or dual 
identity, with 19 (31%) being ambivalent or unsure about what this would 
entail. These findings would seem to indicate that the intergenerational 
transmission of identity has attenuated and that other influences are 
accentuating the fractures with previous generations. These range across 
the spectrum from a deterioration of the socio-economic, physical and 
political landscapes to the increasing impact of access to the internet. 
Mannheim (1928) suggested that under normal circumstances cultural 
transmission across the generations is effective; but that in time of social 
change, young people will consciously set themselves apart from the 
culture, tradition, values and ideas of the older generations. Davis (1940) 
added to Mannheim’s suggestion by positing that a generation gap in 
cultural transmission was not merely an aberration caused by social 
change, but was an inherently normal characteristic of modern society. He 
admitted however, that this gap could be exacerbated by a detrimental 
deterioration in socio-economic landscapes; youth find their own meanings 
from the world around them and make their own decisions on what is 
relevant to them. Grolnick, Deci and Ryan (1997) suggest that as youths 
grow older, their autonomy increases within the structures of family and 
community and the process of intergenerational transmission of culture is 
stultified. This suggestion is in congruence with Berry (2007), who 
identified three forms of cultural transmission: vertical (from parents and 
grandparents); horizontal (from peers and educators); and oblique (from 
social institutions, media and the internet). Berry (2007) opined that as 
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youths grow older the horizontal and oblique transmission forms become 
more relevant. Trommsodorff (2009: 147) also suggests that there is a 
general preference for individualistic values and less ascription to a 
collectivist identity, more intergenerational differences and more 
intergenerational inconsistencies in cultural value orientations, amongst 
populations exposed to Western culture.  
Previously published research (Lee et al 2005, Ying et al 1999, and Sluzki 
1979) on the subject of intergenerational differences amongst refugees and 
migrants indicate that older generations adhere to their cultural beliefs and 
traditional values. The conflict between the tempting attractions of the 
forces of modernity for the youth and the demands of their conservative 
parents creates confusion for the younger generation. They commonly 
subscribe to Western values, because they do not see the relevance of those 
of their parents. Often a hybrid mixture of the two sets of values and 
identities ensue. Mary Bucholtz (2002: 532) cautions however, that it is all 
too easy to exaggerate the phenomenon of intergenerational difference. 
‘Researchers in a variety of cultural settings have found that the divisions 
between youth and elders, modern and traditional, conflictual and 
consensual are blurry and ambiguous rather than clearly differentiated 
(Gable 2000, Rasmussen 2000, Rea 1998, Sharp 1995)’. The research for 
this thesis has found a somewhat similar situation. However, there are 
undoubtedly intergenerational differences in how the Palestinian refugee 
youth view their identity; in the importance, they attach to memory and 
belonging; and their loyalty to the tenets of traditional Palestinian 
nationalist dogma. As Peteet (2005) reported, previous generations saw 
memories of the events of the Nakba as central to their identity. This 
generation, as reported in Chapter 3, have not assigned the same priority to 
this tenet. The levels of knowledge about it were surprisingly poor amongst 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb. 8 (13%) had no knowledge; 17 (28%) had poor 
knowledge; 23 (38%) had a fair knowledge; and 13 (21%) had a good or 
very good knowledge (Figure 7.1 refers). This would seem to indicate that 
the level of transgenerational transmission of knowledge about the Nakba 
has weakened. Additionally, the lack of interest in seeking information 
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about it was unexpected, given the availability of the internet, and devices 
to access it, in the PRCs.  This would seem to indicate that there are 
differences with previous generations and the loyalty which they hold for 
the traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity. 
 Pattaro (2015: 321) argues that the ‘presence of the new media in 
everyday life assumes an important role in the construction of youths’ and 
adolescents’ identity and becomes a significant instrument for young 
people’s agency.’ Buonfino and Thompson (2007: 5) agree and suggest 
that the new media enable people to be ‘immersed in cultures located 
elsewhere, and to cultivate multiple identities’. As a result, concepts of 
belonging become more complex. Memories are attenuated as the 
attractiveness of other cultures (such as Western culture) become more 
relevant to the youth. Bourn (2008) suggests that young people everywhere 
are affected by globalisation, a phenomenon, which must be taken into 
account when discussing identity. The Jeel ma baa’d el Harb are not 
immune to its effects.  The use of social media amongst them is 
widespread, as discovered in the research for this thesis. 45 (77%) of 
respondents had access to Wi-Fi, either on their phones or on laptops at 
home (See Figure 6.1). Additionally, there are a number of internet cafes in 
the PRCs which were used by them, sometimes on a daily basis. As Dolby 
and Rizvi (2008) indicate the proliferation of often non-traditional cultures 
and cultural symbols on the internet is causing a cultural dissonance for 
youth everywhere as the more conservative identities of their predecessors 
are called into question and in some cases abandoned. The global 
consumer cultures are causing the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb to search for 
agency and a better life, wherever they can find it as evidenced in Chapters 
5 and 6. 36 (59%) professed to hold an aspiration for hijra (Figure 7.8 
refers). 27(44%) stated an aspiration for tawteen (Figure 7.4 refers).  
Chapter 4 discovered that awareness of the principle of haq al ‘awda 
remains strong in this generation with 57 (93.4%) showing an awareness of 
it during interviews. There is a more pragmatic acceptance of the 
likelihood of its implementation, with 27 (44%) accepting that it is unlikely 
to happen during their lifetime.  
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Subsidiary Research Aim 1 
This subsidiary research aim was to establish the relevance which the Jeel 
ma baa’d El Harb ascribe to events surrounding the Nakba (catastrophe). 
Al-Nakba occurred in 1948 with the formation of the state of Israel and the 
flight of the Palestinian people, either through fear or force, from the 
British Mandated territory of Palestine. Al-Nakba forms the basis for exilic 
Palestinian history and has been described as the lynchpin of Palestinian 
identity Allan (2014: 41-45) and a ‘watershed in the development of 
Palestinian identity’ (Peteet, 2005: 3; Khalidi, 1997: 22).  
Findings  
 
Figure 7.1. Reported Knowledge of al-Nakba amongst the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb Jun/Jul2016. (n = 61). 
 
Chapter 3 of this research indicates that there is a diminution in the level of 
knowledge about the Nakba amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El harb in 
Lebanon. Al-Nakba is regarded as a seminal event in the formation and 
maintenance of Palestinian refugee identity. Levels of knowledge about it 
and the importance it holds amongst this generation would be expected to 
be high. Surprisingly low levels of knowledge were found across all 
interview sites. When the data were examined in terms of education and 
8
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Reported Knowledge of Al -Nakba
None (13%) Poor (28% Fair (38%) Good / V. Good (21%)
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employment, the results show marked differences, suggesting that these 
factors are important constituents in the maintenance of Palestinian refugee 
identity. A correlation between higher levels of education and higher 
earnings; with knowledge of about the Nakba and the importance which 
the respondents ascribed to it was found in the reported answers to the 
interview questions. 
 
 
Figure 7.2.  Reported Education levels amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
 
 
16
20
25
Reported Education Levels (includes those 
not yet completed)
Brevet 26% Baccalaureate 33% University 41%
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Figure 7.3.  Reported Monthly Earnings amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 41). 
 8 (20%) of the 41 (67%) respondents in employment were classified as 
‘higher earners’. All had completed, were undergoing or had quit 
university education. 12 (20%) of those in employment had middle 
incomes. These respondents had a mix of lower and higher educational 
attainment. 21 (51%) had lower earnings and most had only basic 
education. 23 (38%) of respondents had a fair knowledge and 13 (21%) 
had a good knowledge about the Nakba and considered it as important. 
This latter group were in secure employment in the higher or middle- 
income brackets. They were not as concerned about finding the means to 
live. This thesis suggests that the level of loyalty to traditional Palestinian 
refugee identity is moderated, in part, by socio-economic factors, such as 
lack of education and the increasing level of unemployment for the PRLs 
in Lebanon. The ingress of 1.5 million Syrian refugees to Lebanon since 
2011 has led to ever diminishing opportunities for employment. The 
dropout rate in education, as reported by Chaaban et al (2016: 73-75) at 
7.1% has increased, with 12.4% reported as needing to find employment, 
to sustain their families.  Employment opportunities are limited with 
Chaaban et al (2016: 86) reporting youth unemployment at 36.4%, a 
finding broadly supported by the results of this research, with 20 
respondents (33%) unemployed. 
21
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5
3
Reported Earnings per month ($)
0-400 (51%) 400-1,100 (20%) 1,100-1,500 (12 %) > 1,500 (8%)
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Figure 7.4. Reported Employment Status amongst the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
The findings in Chapter 3 indicate that where the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb 
are focussed on securing employment, the Nakba becomes less important 
for them, as Allan (2014: 9 7-98) suggests the ‘primacy of economic 
subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to 
be Palestinian,’ changes. This finding in Chapter 3 would seem to support 
Allan’s (2014: 5,26,33,60) suggestion that a radical change has occurred in 
the knowledge of and loyalty to one of the accepted tenets of Palestinian 
refugee identity. This research suggests that there is a heterogeneity in the 
identity of this generation and that the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb cannot be 
considered as a homogenous group, where their identity is concerned. It is 
acknowledged that there is no guarantee that the snapshot obtained in this 
research will not alter, in responses to changes in the socio- economic, 
physical and political circumstances, in the future. Rousseau and van der 
Veen (2005: 688-689) and Oyserman, Elmore and Smith (2012: 70) and 
Maalouf (2000: 23,25) have all suggested that identity, a social construct, 
is malleable and not static, but responds from interactions with the 
environment. 
Subsidiary Research Aim 2 
This research aim was to measure the relevance of the concept of haq al 
‘awda for the Jeel ma baa’d El harb in Lebanon today. Haq al ‘awda 
refers to the right of return, to pre-Israeli Palestine, which has been a core 
41
20
Reported Employment Status
Employed (67%) Unemployed (33%)
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aspiration of Palestinian refugees through the years. Haq al ‘awda has been 
one of the central tenets of Palestinian national identity as iterated by 
academics through the years (Knudsen,2007; Khalidi, 1992; Sayigh, 2001; 
Abu-Sitta, 1999). 
Findings 
Chapter 4 explored the degree of attachment to place amongst the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb using the concept of haq al ‘awda as a basis for determining 
one of the tenets of Palestinian refugee identity. As Nasir said ‘If there is 
no haq al ‘awda, then there are no Palestinians.’  56 respondents (91.8%), 
for this research, reported an awareness of haq al ‘awda, which indicates a 
high level of awareness. Only 1 person didn’t want it. 30 (49%) of 
respondents were convinced that it would happen in their lifetime. 27 
(44%) saw it as happening at some indeterminate period in the future. The 
levels of loyalty to the principle of haq al ‘awda can be described as high, 
indicating a significant degree of attachment to place as exemplified in 
Palestine. There were some significant differences in the responses of the 
respondents and a smaller degree of similarities; these were most evident 
in the areas of education and employment. When cross-correlation was 
carried out with the results found in Chapter 3, on the Nakba, it became 
apparent that those who were in secure employment and those whose 
standard of education was at the lower end of the scale were more 
supportive of the idea of haq al ‘awda than those in the middle ranges. 
These results are also found in Chapters 5 and 6. This may indicate that 
those in good employment are secure enough to consider haq al ‘awda in 
terms of a nationalist and political right. It may also indicate that those who 
are unemployed and lacking the educational qualifications necessary to 
secure employment are desperate for a better life elsewhere. The loyalty to 
the concept of haq al ‘awda is a means to achieve that aim.       
This research has indicated that despite the realisation and affirmation of 
haq al ‘awda as an absolute right for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, a 
significant number 27 (44%) have no hope that it will happen for them. 
Many of these expressed it in terms of a dream, or an ambition which may 
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never be realised. However, (30 or 49%) suggested that it would happen in 
their lifetime. 
 
Figure 7.5. Respondents Solutions to the Problem of Haq al ‘Awda 
Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
 Amongst all respondents, differences were noted in their interpretation of 
the concept of what that might entail. Some of those echoed the concepts 
traditionally reported by researchers in the past. These most often 
envisaged a return to Palestine as it was pre-1948, suggesting in a 
simplistic way that the Jews should be returned to their countries of origin. 
This group were in a minority (21 or 35%). The vast majority of 
respondents (39 or 65%) offered solutions ranging from a two-state 
solution to a one state-solution (with Israeli Jews living under Palestinian 
rule). 33 (54%) of respondents admitted intergenerational differences in the 
concept of haq al ‘awda with their predecessors, in willingness to consider 
alternative and pragmatic solutions to the resolution of haq al ‘awda. There 
was an awareness that those who were willing to accept tawteen or to 
attempt hijra were in danger of betraying haq al ‘awda, but such was their 
desperation to achieve agency and dignity for themselves, they were 
willing to risk losing their Palestinian identity. Many of those interviewed 
saw haq al ‘awda in terms of a search for identity as Schulz and Hammer 
(2003:111) proposed, either because their present Palestinian identity was 
21
39
Respondent's solutions to the problem of 
Haq al 'Awda
Return Jews to countries of origin (35%) One State/Two State Solution ( 65%)
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insufficient to their needs or because they hoped for a better life in 
Palestine, to escape the confines of a suffocating environment which 
increasingly offered little hope for improvement.    
Subsidiary Research Aim 3 
This research Aim was to evaluate whether or not this generation were 
willing to accept or reject tawteen. Tawteen is a problematic term variously 
translated as assimilation, settlement, naturalisation, and implantation. It is 
a highly emotive term, in a country where the divisions of the recent civil 
war remain unhealed. It is subject to political hijacking by politicians who 
want to use it to convey alarm for the Lebanese population. This thesis 
adopts the meaning of naturalisation, which is the most neutral and 
probably the least contentious definition. Tawteen is regarded as one of the 
pillars of Palestinian national identity (Knudsen: 2007), and has been 
regarded by some researchers as abhorrent to all Palestinians (Sayigh,1977; 
Masalha,2009; Bianchi,2014). Within the concept, dimensions of 
attachment to place, personal and collective identity, homeland and 
belonging are intertwined.   
Findings 
Chapter 5 examined Palestinian refugee identity amongst the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb through the lens of tawteen. Tawteen as iterated above is a 
highly disputed word, for both the Lebanese population and Palestinians 
refugees. It was anticipated that this facet of the research would be 
difficult, due to the narratives of previous researchers, as highlighted 
above, who reported that it was a taboo subject. It turned out to be the 
easiest subject to investigate in the research for this thesis, because the 
respondents all had an opinion on it. It would appear that this generation 
are more willing to at least debate the subject rather than dismiss it 
outright. Two main groups can be identified, those who wished to accept 
tawteen and those who rejected the proposition. 27 (44%) of all 
respondents indicated that they were in favour of it, 26 (43%) against it, 5 
(8%) indicated that they were unsure, and 3 (5%) didn’t care. 
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Figure 7.6. Reported Acceptance/ Rejection of Tawteen amongst the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
 All respondents expressed an opinion on it. The rates of rejection of 
tawteen were again most prevalent amongst those who were in steady 
employment, with enough money to sustain themselves and with a good 
education. Many of these adopted a nationalist stance, in accordance with 
Palestinian nationalist ideology. However, the ‘rejectionists’ also included 
a cohort who were unemployed, or lacked second or third level education. 
Many of this latter group expressed the view that tawteen was of no use to 
them, since many Lebanese citizens were in a similar dire economic 
situation. Those among the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb who professed 
themselves as willing to accept tawteen were drawn to do so, most often in 
the hope of achieving agency for themselves. They saw it an improvement 
to their long- term situation. Members of this cohort included some of 
those with good education, but no employment, due to Lebanon’s 
restrictive policies on hiring Palestinians and also those who had little 
education, beyond basic levels.  
Cognisant of the dangers of diminishing or losing their Palestinian identity, 
35 (57%) of respondents expressed a desire to retain it and these were 
spread across both groups. The 6 (10%) who wished to lose their 
Palestinian identity were confined to the group who were unemployed.  
27
26
5
3
Reported Acceptance/Rejection of 
Tawteen
In Favour (44%) Against (43%) Unsure (8%) Didn't Care (5%)
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Figure 7.7.  Respondents acceptance rates for a double or hybrid 
identity Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
 
The finding that 38 (62%) of all respondents were happy to have a double 
or hybrid identity is an indication of a more pragmatic conception of their 
identity. There was a realisation that this new identity would impinge on 
their Palestinian identity and might eventually cause its eradication. These 
respondents were spread across the two groups and would seem to indicate 
a shift from the refusal of previous generations to accept any identity other 
than a Palestinian identity. 19 (31%) were ambivalent or unsure about the 
prospect of a double identity, indicating a reluctance to abandon whatever 
tangible benefits having a Palestinian identity entails. 4 respondents or 7% 
did not express an opinion on a hybrid identity, and this question was not 
pursued with them. The findings in this research are strikingly different 
from those reported by previous academics. Previous studies reported a 
refusal to even countenance the acceptance of tawteen, amongst all 
Palestinian refugees. Several factors seem to be at play here. One factor is 
undoubtedly the declining socio-economic landscape, with diminishing 
prospects for the youth. A secondary factor is a growing lack of 
satisfaction in the Palestinian political leadership’s ability to provide 
improvements. In that regard, the dictates of nationalist rhetoric on refusal 
of tawteen become increasingly irrelevant for this generation. Furthermore, 
38
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the stagnation of the Lebanese- Palestinian political dialogue is another 
possible factor, because without progress in this area, no amelioration in 
their situation is possible and a sense of hopelessness pervades.  There is 
also a recognition of the diminishing capability of UNRWA to provide 
adequate resources to the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, in terms of health 
services, education and employment, due to its own diminishing resources. 
On the international scene, there is a recognition that the Israeli- 
Palestinian dispute shows little hope of being resolved. The tightening of 
borders in the USA and in Europe reduce the opportunities for a better life 
abroad and so tawteen becomes an attractive proposition, even if that 
means surrendering Palestinian identity. This does not mean that their 
attachment to place as Palestine is diminished. Amongst those who 
accepted tawteen, 93% indicated that even if they took tawteen, they would 
still like to return to Palestine, either to visit or to live, if some solution 
could be found to the question of haq al’ awda.  
 
Subsidiary Research Aim 4 
This research aim was to establish how hijra, usually translated as 
emigration, impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this 
generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% 
of Palestinian refugee households in Lebanon reported having immediate 
family abroad. The importance of hijra as a means of achieving agency for 
the Palestinian refugee youth, given their precarious existence in the PRCs, 
and how achieving that agency is deserving of further investigation. 
Findings 
Chapter 6 investigated the willingness of the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb to 
embark on hijra (emigration) and explored their concepts of how hijra 
would impact on their Palestinian refugee identity. It also analysed some of 
the factors which might be causing this generation to aspire for hijra. As 
reported, hijra has long been a facet of Palestinian refugee life in Lebanon. 
Traditionally, Palestinians have travelled to the Gulf, Europe, the USA, 
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South America, and elsewhere in the Middle East in search of 
employment, some of whom have never returned. Access to those 
traditional destinations has dried up, as nations enforce immigrant quotas 
and border restrictions.  
 
Figure 7.8. Reported willingness to avail of Hijra amongst the Jeel ma 
baa’d El Harb Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61). 
36 (59%) of all respondents indicated a willingness to emigrate, with 6 
(10%) refusing to contemplate it and 19 (31%) unsure or did not express an 
opinion on it.  Many of those who opted to take the emigration route were 
cognisant of the dangers of losing their Palestinian identity. Some were 
confident of being able to maintain that identity, despite being citizens 
elsewhere, recognising that a new identity would intrude and a balance was 
required between the old and the new. Some saw the danger of hijra 
impinging on haq al ‘awda as a threat to their Palestinian identity, but were 
willing to pursue it nonetheless.; some of whom were determined to hold 
on to their Palestinian identity. Some saw it as a means to achieve haq al 
‘awda (with another nationality). The willingness to aspire to hijra was 
consistent across the divides in education and employment. The refusal to 
consider it was mainly confined to those in better jobs, with a better 
standard of education. Those who most consistently wanted to lose their 
Palestinian identity were to be found amongst those willing to attempt 
hijra.  
36
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There was also a recognition of intergenerational differences in how the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb saw hijra in terms of their identity and their 
aspirations. Most of them expressed their desire for hijra in terms of 
achieving agency and a better life. Most also affirmed that their 
expectations of the end result were more ambitious and realistic than those 
of their parents and grandparents, who they said were more simplistic in 
their outlooks. Overall, the responses of the interviewees displayed a 
pragmatism and realism, largely devoid of the traditional view of 
Palestinian nationalist ideology.  
The factors which are considered to be causing a desire for hijra amongst 
this generation include, a lack of agency in Lebanon for the youth; 
increasing demand on diminishing NGO resources due to a high influx of 
refugees from Syria; the failure of political and civic leadership on both the 
Lebanese and Palestinian sides to resolve the refugee situation; the 
continuation of the Israeli- Palestinian dispute; and the attractiveness of 
cultures and life elsewhere afforded by access to the televisual media and 
the internet. When taken together with a weakening of intergenerational 
transmission of Palestinian culture, history and tradition, an increased 
demand for hijra is one of the few means to achieve agency available for 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in Lebanon.  
Note on generalisability of findings: 
A qualitative research project such as this one is normally specific to a 
small number of participants and locations. It is methodologically 
dangerous to assume that the findings in one research project can be 
applied automatically to other populations and environments. As 
Erlandson, Harris, Skipper and Allen (1993) point out, all data collection 
and data analysis procedures are defined by the contexts in which they 
occur. However, both Stake (1995) and Denscombe (1998), while 
accepting the uniqueness of every case, suggest that it may also be an 
example of a phenomenon within a broader group, and the possibility of 
generalisability should not be dismissed out of hand. Williams (2000: 15) 
argues for the possibility of making what he terms a moderatum 
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generalisation, in which qualitative research findings ‘can be seen to be 
instances of a broader set of recognisable features.’ In cases where 
researchers are engaged in similar studies, Bassey (1981), while agreeing 
with this stance, also makes the point that it is up to the new researcher to 
make that extrapolation, a position also made by Lincoln and Guba (1985), 
and Firestone (1993), providing that a modicum of contextual information 
regarding the original case is presented. The findings in this thesis 
therefore, have the possibility of being generalised to a broader population 
of Palestinian refugee youth. However, this research was bounded 
contextually by the environment in Lebanon and the socio-political and 
socio-economic landscapes in that country. There is no guarantee that the 
same findings are applicable elsewhere. Further research is needed to 
validate that supposition.  
  
Recommendations: 
The Israeli -Palestinian dispute has been largely stagnant for some years 
now. The resolution of that dispute lies at the centre of the Palestinian 
refugee problem. Without the agreement of all parties, this situation will 
continue interminably. The responsibility for finding a solution lies with 
both parties but also with countries at the international and regional level. 
The imponderables are not merely legal, but there is also a moral 
imperative to solve the refugee crisis.  The research for this thesis indicates 
that the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb are willing to consider novel and realistic 
solutions to enable a resolution to this long -standing dispute. As the 
inheritors of the future, they deserve to be heard and at least have their 
opinions in the public domain and considered. There appears to be no 
forum for this to take place. The UN should establish a Commission of 
Enquiry to establish if the views expressed by respondents in this thesis are 
indicative of those of the Palestinian refugee population throughout the 
diaspora. 
A re-examination of the role and mandate of UNRWA is proposed in order 
to address the ‘protection gap’ highlighted in Chapter 4, especially as no 
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solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is in sight. It is encouraging that 
UNHCR has now commenced to account for numbers of Palestinian 
refugees in its statistics and also have issued a report on the situation of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (UNHCR: 2016). A more enhanced co-
operation regime between the two organisations is recommended, in order 
to develop improved strategies to resolve the situation. UNRWA depends 
on annual contributions from donor countries for its budget, which is 
formed annually. There has been a reduction in contributions over the 
years which in turn has resulted in a reduction in the level of service 
provision afforded to refugees. Effective long-term planning is not possible 
in this type of environment. UNRWA should seek three or five- year 
budget strategies, which will enable a measure of stability for the 
organisation to deliver improved outcomes in the areas of housing, 
education, education, medical, relief and social support services. Greater 
co-ordination with the multiplicity of NGOs operating in the PRCs and 
urban areas will ensure less duplication of services leading to greater 
efficiency, less waste and more confidence in the organisation from the 
refugees. UNRWA should further develop a bottom up approach to 
policymaking, involving and empowering the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb to 
achieve agency for themselves.  
 The question of giving the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb some form of civic 
rights in Lebanon needs to be addressed. This thesis has established that 
they are de facto and not necessarily de jure citizens of Lebanon. It is 
understandable that the scarecrow of tawteen is raised when any question 
of giving increased rights to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A limited 
form of citizenship was proposed in Chapter 5. It would not be acceptable 
to all Palestinian refugees, as indicated in this research. However, for those 
willing to accept it, it would alleviate their dire situation. The Lebanese 
Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) should be re-invigorated as 
presently it is seen by many Palestinian refugees as little more than a 
talking shop. This body has the support of the government and most of the 
political parties in Lebanon. The provision of improved civic rights can be 
progressed through this body, if the political will on both sides is available. 
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Presently there is a legislative backlog in the Lebanese parliament, which 
means that some of the legislation proposed to alleviate restrictions on the 
Palestinians has not been promulgated. This needs to be addressed as a 
matter of urgency. 
A system of emigration to other countries should be investigated, by 
UNRWA, as the body representing Palestinian refugees, but also in 
conjunction and co-operation with the UNHCR. It is understandable that 
given the pressure on countries in Europe with the implosion of migration 
from North Africa, and other areas of the Middle East, that there would be 
little enthusiasm for such a scheme. However, this research indicates that 
not everyone wants to take hijra as an option to achieve agency for 
themselves. This scheme could operate in tandem with the provision of 
limited civic rights in Lebanon. These two schemes would provide 
opportunities for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb, which are denied them at 
present and would not only improve their circumstances but those of their 
families still in Lebanon, due to the practice of sending remittances home.   
It is recommended that ethnographers and anthropologists re-examine the 
concepts of Palestinian identity and Palestinian refugee identity. The 
research for this thesis has established intergenerational differences in the 
concepts of personal and collective identity between the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb and the previous generations, as previously reported by academics. 
This research has also established that the concept of identity amongst 
Palestinian refugees cannot be described as homogenous, nor is it static. 
Both Clemens (2007) and Calhoun (1995) suggest that heterogeneity is a 
natural feature of any group of people. If we accept this fact as a basic 
premise, then a better understanding of groups such as the Jeel ma baa’d 
El Harb will inform policymakers, who rely on academics for their 
knowledge, to construct better solutions to the refugee problem. 
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Appendix ‘A’ 
Profile of Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRLs) in Lebanon 
The 12 Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in Lebanon hold 63.4% of the 
PRL population. The other 36.6% reside in unofficial ‘gatherings’ mainly 
located in urban centres; in addition to some privately-owned residences 
scattered throughout the country. The camps are administered by UNRWA 
and dwellings which lie outside the boundaries of the camps are not. 
Sanitation services and some dwelling rehabilitation are available to 
occupants of the PRCs but not to those in the gatherings. The municipal 
authorities do not supply services to the gatherings and consequently, some 
housing in these areas is very poor. Health services are available to both 
resident types, depending on registration status. The standard of housing in 
the camps is described as dire by Chaaban et al (2016 :126) mainly due to 
insufficient funding for rehabilitation of residences and also the 
overcrowding caused by the influx of Syrian and Palestinian Refugees 
from Syria (PRS). Houses suffer from a lack of maintenance, power 
supply, proper sewage systems and waste disposal is inadequate. Water 
ingress and dampness problems are present in 78% of homes. Due to the 
high density of buildings in the camps, 52% suffer from poor ventilation 
and 55% are affected by darkness, leading to physical health and 
psychological problems amongst the occupants (Chaaban et al, 2016: 11). 
Population density varies in the PRCs with Ein el Hilweh being the most 
populous at 45,000 inhabitants and Mar Elias at 1,600 inhabitants 
(UNRWA estimates 2016) being the least populous. The camps are small 
in area, with a high density of occupation. No allowance has been made by 
the Government of Lebanon (GOL) for normal increases in population 
since 1949 and horizontal development is forbidden and there are 
restrictions on the access of building materials into the camps (Chaaban et 
al, 2016: 127).  As a result, every available space has been used and 
residences are crowded together with sometimes poorly constructed 
buildings, often six or seven storeys high, intersected by narrow alleyways. 
Very often no daylight enters these residences, as a consequence. 
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Infrastructure is poor and water and sanitation insufficient to meet the 
needs of the inhabitants. Electricity supply is inadequate and electricity 
cables and water pipes run often at head height along with internet cables. 
Electrocution is common as people try to acquire power themselves by 
jury-rigging connections. Appendix ‘B’ provides a synopsis of conditions 
in Shatila PRC, which is typical of the other camps. Chaaban et al (2016) 
outlines the restrictions on camp improvements, living conditions and the 
restrictions imposed by GOL on Palestinians in Lebanon. 
Classification of Palestine Refugees.  
UNRWA defines Palestine refugees as “persons whose normal place of 
residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and 
who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 
conflict.” UNRWA services are available to all those living in its area of 
operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency 
and who need assistance. The descendants of Palestine refugee males, 
including adopted children, are also eligible for registration (UNRWA, 
2016). There are three classifications of PRLs, in Lebanon. 
 Firstly, there are 495, 985 PRLs registered with UNRWA. These are 
usually registered also with the Lebanese government’s Directorate of 
Political and Refugees Affairs (DPRA), and hold an ‘Identification card for 
Palestine Refugee’, issued by that directorate (Chaaban et al, 2016: 23). 
However, it is estimated that between 260,000 and 280,000 of these are 
actually still living in Lebanon (Chaaban et al, 2016: 44).  Many PRLs 
have emigrated to other countries, but retain their registration status. Fear 
of failure in their new host countries, and the maintenance of a fall-back 
strategy is one factor in this practice. Another factor is the desire to retain 
their right of return, under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
(UNGAR) 194, in the event should such right be recognised by Israel and 
implemented.  
The second classification concerns the ‘Non-Registered’ PRLs who are 
estimated to number 35,000. These are not registered with UNRWA, but 
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are registered with DPRA. These are PRLs who came to Lebanon after 
1948, including some fleeing Palestine after the 1967 war.  
The third classification are known as ‘Non -Ids’. These refugees are not 
registered with DRPA or UNRWA, in Lebanon. Some of these refugees 
may have been previously registered with UNRWA, in other fields of 
operation, but whose documentation has expired. Estimates of this 
classification ranges between 3,000 and 10,000. Chaaban et al (2016: 23) 
relates that this category has limited access to UNRWA services and due to 
their lack of valid documentation, they endure challenging socioeconomic 
conditions as they are unable to gain legal employment. In considering 
population numbers, it should be borne in mind that it is not possible to 
definitively quantify the true figures, since registration is voluntary and not 
mandatory. UNRWA officials and NGO members told this author, in 2015 
and 2016, that some registration figures are unreliable.  
Unemployment and Poverty. 
GOL has continued to consider the Palestinians in Lebanon as ‘stateless 
foreigners’, depriving them of the basic rights enjoyed by Lebanese 
citizens (Halabi, 2004: 42; Chaaban et al, 2016: 24). Due to GOL 
restrictions, a large number of the professions are debarred to PRLs, due 
either to the precondition of holding Lebanese nationality, or having to 
meet the reciprocity   of treatment condition, in order to access a profession 
(Chaaban et al, 2016: 84). The Human Rights Watch Report (2012) stated 
that  
‘Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live in appalling social and 
economic conditions. 2011 saw no improvement in their access to 
the labour market, despite a labour law amendment in 2010 that 
was supposed to ease such access. The main reason was the 
government's failure to implement the amendment. Lebanese laws 
and decrees still bar Palestinians from working in at least 25 
professions requiring syndicate membership, including law, 
medicine, and engineering. Palestinian refugees are still subject to a 
discriminatory law introduced in 2001.’ 
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Conditions have not changed since 2012.  PRLs wishing to work in any of 
the permitted professions must go through a convoluted process to obtain a 
work permit, putting a bureaucratic workload on both the prospective 
employee and employer. Consequently, the majority of PRLs work 
informally, in menial occupations, 50% of whom are paid on a daily basis.  
The unemployment rate for the PRLs was measured at 21% for males and 
32% for females in 2016, and across the gender profile at 23.2%, compared 
to 8% for the Lebanese population. The highest rate of unemployment was 
amongst the youth at 36.4% (Chaaban et al, 2016: 86). Poverty rates were 
found by Chaaban et al (2016: 52) to have increased by 9% since 2010, in 
the Central Lebanon Area (CLA), which holds three of the camps visited 
for the research for this thesis. There was a slight decline of extreme 
poverty levels in the same area, but it still stands at 25%. The same survey 
found that there are 74% of adolescents living in poverty and 5% in 
extreme poverty. Poverty rates are higher inside the camps than without.  It 
is estimated by Chaaban et al (2016) that conditions for PRLs are as bad if 
not worse than those found in Gaza. The main factors identified were low 
education, lack of decent work, and pressures from Syrian refugees and 
PRS in the job market. 
Education and Health Care: 
UNRWA is the main provider of education at primary, secondary and 
vocational levels, since access to the Lebanese education system is largely 
denied to the PRLs. Additionally, NGOs and non-profit organisations 
provide funds for access to third level education on a limited basis. 
UNRWA runs 67 schools and vocational education centres in Lebanon 
(Chaaban et al, 2016: 70). It is obligatory for the pupils at these schools to 
follow the Lebanese curriculum. UNRWA provides 27 healthcare centres 
in Lebanon (Chaaban et al, 2016: 96). Due to underfunding, UNRWA is 
not able to provide a comprehensive service and tertiary care in particular 
is only partially funded. The Palestinian Red Crescent provides additional 
support, on a limited basis. 
 
244 
 
 
 
 
Property Rights: 
Jaber Suleiman (2010: 10) relates that until 2001, when GOL amended a 
1969 decree, foreigners, including Palestinians were eligible to own 
property in Lebanon. The 2001 amendment prohibited ‘any person who is 
not a national of a recognized state or any one whose ownership of 
property is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution relating to 
tawteen (naturalisation/settlement) to acquire real estate of any kind.’ The 
result of this amendment is that Palestinians can no longer buy land or 
property; can no longer bequeath such land or property; and puts into 
question the legal legitimacy of acquisition of property or land prior to this 
amendment.  
 Freedom of Movement, Right to Travel. 
PRLS are eligible for an identity card and travel documents, which are 
renewable, with some restrictions, depending on their classification as 
outlined above. Those registered with UNRWA and DPRA can renew their 
travel documents every three years and are allowed to return to Lebanon. 
However, those who are ‘Non-Ids’ have a ‘No return’ stamped on their exit 
visas. These regulations are subject to arbitrary and sudden changes as was 
the case in 1995 when the Lebanese Minister of the Interior issued Decree 
no.478 ‘regulating Entry and Exit of Palestinians into and out of Lebanon.’ 
Palestinians outside of Lebanon had to obtain an entry visa to re-enter 
Lebanon, trapping thousands of PRLs outside Lebanon (Suleiman, 2010: 
8). Restrictions on travel within Lebanon are also imposed. Prior 
authorisation from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Ministry of 
the Interior must be acquired to travel to PRCs in the South. In practice, 
this is often not complied with and there is relative freedom to travel to 
other camps. 
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Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon where Research for this Thesis 
was carried out: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1. Location of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon where 
this research was carried out. Map Source: Google Earth 2017.  
 
 
 
Shatila PRC 
Mar Elias PRC 
Burj al Barajneh PRC 
 
Ein el Hilweh PRC 
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Appendix ‘B’ 
Case Study: Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp 
Note: All information in this appendix was provided by UNRWA. 
Statistics:  
Area: 0.4 Sq. Km. 
Population: 25,000 (estimated on 30 Jun 2016). This is an increase from 
6,000 in 2000. 
Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA (on 30 Jun 2016):  
PRLs: 11,647 
PRS: 1,643 
(Note: Not all Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA) 
 
Figure B.1. Estimated Age Profile of Palestinian Refugees in Shatila. 
Source: UNRWA.  
Places of Origin: Upper Galilee Region; Majd el Krum; Barwa; Haifa; 
Jaffa and Acre. 
Population Density (estimated): 60,000 per sq. km. 
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General: 
Shatila was established in 1949, in the mayoral municipality of Ghoberi in 
Beirut. Originally it encompassed 500 residential units and it now holds 
over 5,000 units. (See Figures B. 14 to B. 17) for camp expansion since 
2002). The camp was almost completely destroyed during the Israeli 
invasion of 1982 and again during attacks by Amal (a Shia militia) 
between 1985 and 1987. In 1982, Phalangist forces carried out a massacre 
of the inhabitants, resulting in an estimated 3,000 deaths (Fisk, 1992: 3-4, 
51). The areas surrounding Shatila such as Sabra also contain PRLs, but 
UNRWA is responsible for the area delineated by the camp’s boundaries. 
As the GOL will not permit any further expansion to the camp area, 
horizontal development has stymied. Consequently, vertical development 
has ensued, with six or even seven storeys of poorly constructed buildings 
which are often unsafe. Space is at a premium and the camp is permeated 
with narrow alleyways, sometimes so narrow that only one person can 
walk through. There is one main street in the camp. The preferred method 
of transport within the camp is on foot or on mopeds, some of which have 
been modified to carry goods into shops and homes (see Figure B. 12). In 
addition to residential units, there are 187 businesses in the camp, ranging 
from one- roomed family run shops to larger enterprises. 
 
Figure B.2. A family owned small shop in Shatila PRC. Source: 
O’Connor, 2015. 
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Family solidarity is much in evidence in Shatila. The extended family will 
often pool resources in areas such as food provision and preparation to 
ensure that all members are fed. 
 
Figures B.3. and B.4. Householders preparing food for a Family meal, 
Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016.  
There are three mosques in the camp, one is affiliated to Hamas; one to 
Islamic Jihad and a third to al-Ahbash. Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
do not have offices in the camp, both enjoy widespread support, possibly 
due to the level of welfare services which they provide. During the War of 
the Camps, the basement of the main mosque served as a burial ground. 
This has been preserved as a memorial site and is visited by the occupants 
of Shatila and visitors to the camp. 
250 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.5. Entrance to Burial Place beneath Mosque in Shatila PRC. 
Source: O’Connor, 2016. 
 As noted above, the population of the camp was estimated at 25,000 
persons. Of these some 13,200 are registered as Palestinian refugees with 
UNRWA. In Lebanon, registration is voluntary and somewhat haphazard, 
and not all Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA. Additionally, 
as Lebanon’s economic situation has deteriorated many poor Lebanese 
have taken up occupation in the Shatila due to the high price of 
accommodation in Beirut. Palestinian families will often rent out rooms to 
non- Palestinians, increasing the problems of overcrowding. Many 
immigrants have also taken up accommodation in the camp, hoping to 
build up savings and move up the economic ladder. The influx of non-
Palestinian refugees has increased as they are no longer able to afford high 
rents in the cities and have no other option due to the protracted troubles in 
Syria. UNRWA officials told this author in 2015 that many of these 
refugees are appalled at the conditions in the PRCs. UNRWA is to conduct 
a census in all camps in 2017, in an effort to quantify populations levels 
and to establish definitively who the occupants are. 
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Figures B.6 and B.7. View into Shatila PRC and standard of 
construction of residences, inside the PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016. 
Note the seven storey buildings, which are typical of others within the 
camp. Note also the unfinished construction of the side view in Figure B.7. 
 
UNRWA:  
UNRWA is responsible for the running of the camp. It employs a staff of 
76. 
Staffing levels; 
Administration (Camp Services Officer: CSO): 1. 
Education: 41. 
Health: 15. 
Relief and Social Services: 3 
Sanitation Services: 16. 
Education:  
UNRWA has one school in Shatila with 850 pupils. Due to space 
limitations and these large numbers the school operates a double shift 
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system with different teachers and students in morning and afternoon 
sessions. Additional education is provided by several NGOs for 
undetermined numbers, in private schools. These schools do not charge for 
the education provided and in the main use unqualified staff, who are 
students at university. Some of these NGOs are affiliated and funded by 
political factions, within the camp. 
 
Health: 
UNRWA operates one health centre in Shatila. Its provision of medical 
services, are comparable with those in a general practice in the West. 
Additionally, pre-conception care, antenatal care and postnatal care is 
provided, as well as vaccination campaigns for children. UNRWA employs 
one general medical doctor; a gynaecologist twice a month, and access to 
essential and cancer medication through a pharmacist. In 2015, the health 
centre saw over 43,000 patient visits. In addition to UNRWA health 
services, the Palestinian Red Cross provide some support for medical 
services, as do some of the NGOs.  
 
Figure B.8.  Health Centre Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor 2016. 
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Relief and Social Services: 
UNRWA employs three social workers to process Special Hardship Cases, 
where refugees are in severe poverty and have no means of supporting 
themselves. By 30 Jun 2016, they had processed 690 such cases. 
Assistance given is minimal, amounting to $10 a month and some small 
amounts of staple food. Psychosocial support is provided by one of the 
social workers. NGOs working in the camp also provide services including 
education in gender -based violence, legal assistance, school and 
community projects and youth programmes. The American University of 
Beirut assist the social workers and NGO partners with provision of 
nutrition for pupils at the UNRWA school, for students in grades 1 to 6. 
The daily meals are provided to hundreds of children for a monthly 
subscription of $ 3-5. 
Sanitation Services: 
UNRWA employs 12 sanitation workers to collect waste, clean sewage 
and control rodents and insects. The collected waste and garbage is usually 
transported to an adjacent dumpsite, using handcarts negotiating the 
narrow alleyways in Shatila. During visits by the author to the camp in 
2015 and 2016 it was patently obvious that these collections are not always 
effective and a view was expressed that the number of labourers was 
insufficient for the task.  A recycling yard adjacent to the camp is 
frequently under a pall of smoke, due to the practice of burning electrical 
wiring in order to get copper for sale. Many residences have open drains 
and dampness problems, and this author witnessed areas with open sewers 
and drains, with some flooding, beside residences in 2016.  
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Figure B.9. Refuse dump in Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor 2016. 
  
Environmental Situation: 
The overcrowding situation has worsened in the past five years due to a 
large influx of Syrian refugees, poor Lebanese and migrant workers from 
Egypt and Sudan, many of whom are in Lebanon illegally. This has caused 
immense pressure on the infrastructure within Shatila. There has been a 
reported increase in health issues, including asthma, allergies, skin diseases 
and psychological problems.  
Water: 
Shatila was formerly supplied with water for six artesian wells, but as these 
were outside the camp boundary, they were appropriated by the 
municipality during the Civil war. There are now three additional wells 
which are commercially owned and operated and four smaller wells 
operated by the Popular Committee, but they are insufficient for the needs 
of the population and they are regarded as unfit for drinking, due to 
contamination and high saline levels. Residents have to buy water from 
shops and this water is suspect as it is not subject to health checks. A 
project funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
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implemented a scheme to provide potable water for the residents but as of 
2016, this was not in operation.  
Electricity: 
There are two electricity sub-stations for Shatila, which is inadequate for 
the population. The electricity company, EDL, provides a minimal supply, 
which like the rest of Beirut operates on a reduced basis. There are many 
illegal and jerry-rigged connections within the camp and electrocutions are 
common, partly due to this practice and also due to the proximity of water 
pipes and electricity cables which are often at head height, running from 
building to building. In June of 2016, two persons were electrocuted during 
the visit of this author to the camp. A small number of residents have small 
generators for electricity provision, but this is inadequate for the camp as a 
whole. 
 
  
Figures B.10 and B.11.  Proliferation of Electric cables and Water 
pipes in Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor 2016. 
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Figure B.12. Main Street Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor 2016. 
(Note the proliferation of electricity and internet cables and water pipes 
above the street and the adaptation of the scooter to carry supplies). 
Security Matters: 
GOL, does not normally enter Shatila compared with other camps and 
maintains minimal security on the perimeters of the camp, compared with 
Ein el Hilweh and Burj al Barajneh. Factions allied to members of the 
Popular Committee police the camp. These internal ‘police’ are armed with 
small arms and inter-factional area boundaries are delineated. However, 
compared with other PRCs such as Ein el Hilweh, armed confrontations 
are rare. Crime levels are low, but concerns about the prevalence of drugs 
were expressed to this author in 2015 and 2016. There is a high level of 
unemployment and no recreational facilities for the youth, leading to fears 
of involvement in the drugs trade and even some levels of radicalisation. 
As both of these topics are sensitive matters, interviewees were cautious 
about giving more than anecdotal information.   
  
 
257 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.13. Palestinian Self Defence Forces Burj al Barajneh PRC. 
O’Connor: 2016. 
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Figure B.14. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion 
of the Sabra area around Shatila. 2002. Source: Google Earth, 2017. 
 
 
Figure B.15. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion 
of the Sabra area around Shatila 2004. Source: Google Earth, 2017. 
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Figure B.16. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion 
of the Sabra area around Shatila 2008. Source: Google Earth, 2017. 
 
 
Figure B. 17. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the 
expansion of the Sabra area around Shatila. 2017. Source: Google 
Earth, 2017. 
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Appendix ‘C’ 
Methodology 
Research Aims 
The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the 
degree to which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb subscribe to the traditional 
Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers (Sayigh: 
1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha: 2009; Khalidi: 1997; 
Peteet: 2005), and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the 
expression of that identity.  
Subsidiary Research aims 
• The first subsidiary research aim was to establish the relevance 
which the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb ascribe to events surrounding the 
Nakba (catastrophe). Al-Nakba forms the basis for exilic 
Palestinian history and has been described as the lynchpin of 
Palestinian identity Allan (2014: 41-45) and a ‘watershed in the 
development of Palestinian identity’ (Peteet, 2005: 3; Khalidi, 
1997: 22).  
• The second subsidiary research aim was to measure the relevance 
of the concept of haq al ‘awda for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in 
Lebanon today. Haq al ‘awda has been one of the central tenets of 
Palestinian national identity as iterated by academics through the 
years (Knudsen,2007; Khalidi, 1992; Sayigh, 2001; Abu-Sitta, 
1999). 
• The third subsidiary research aim was to evaluate whether or not 
this generation were willing to accept or reject tawteen. Tawteen 
(assimilation, settlement, naturalisation) is regarded as one of the 
pillars of Palestinian national identity (Knudsen: 2007), and has 
been regarded by some academics as abhorrent to all Palestinians 
(Sayigh,1977; Masalha, 2009; Bianchi, 2014). Within the concept, 
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dimensions of attachment to place, collective identity, homeland 
and belonging are intertwined.   
• The fourth subsidiary research aim was to establish how hijra 
impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this 
generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 
53.5% of Palestinian refugee households, in Lebanon reported 
having immediate family abroad. The importance of hijra as an 
outlet for the Palestinian refugees given their precarious existence 
in the PRCs and how achieving that agency is deserving of 
investigation. 
The author believed that a better understanding of the concepts which the 
Jeel ma baa’d El Harb hold about their identity may serve to give 
ethnographers and anthropologists a more realistic and grounded 
understanding of this generation. It may also assist policymakers and 
NGOs at the international, regional, national and local levels to design 
more appropriate strategies for the development of aid, assistance, and 
permit this generation to achieve some agency for themselves. 
This appendix outlines the methodology for this research and is set out to 
include  
• Research aims outline 
• Rationale for qualitative research design 
• Rationale for case study methodology 
• Research design 
• Selection of sample groups for data collection 
• Data collection methods 
• Data analysis methods 
• Ethical considerations 
• Reliability and Validation 
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Rationale for Qualitative Research Design 
Qualitative research allows the researcher to interact with the lifeworld of 
the subjects of research and to understand the intricacy of how they 
experience that world. The aim of qualitative research is to provide a 
wholeness of understanding how the inhabitants encounter, understand and 
derive meaning from their social surroundings. Gubrium and Holstein 
(1997) identify four strands of qualitative research. The first is naturalism 
which provides thick descriptions of people in natural settings, in social 
reality. The second is emotionalism, where the inner reality of people is 
explored. The third is ethnomethodology, the exploration of the creation of 
social order through dialogue and social interaction. The fourth is 
postmodernism, in which the social world is open to interpretations, and 
not just that of the researcher, who may wish to give his/her definitive 
narrative. In the research for this thesis, elements of those four strands 
were utilised, in order to achieve what Geertz (1973) termed ‘thick 
descriptions’, providing a richer accumulation of data.  Qualitative 
research allows for a spectrum of methods rather than one single method; 
allows for the perspectives of the participants; maintains a principle of 
openness; and has its goal discovery of information and deduction of 
theory and conclusions from that information.  
In designing the research methods for this research, the author was of the 
opinion that purely quantitative methods were insufficient to achieve an 
abundant level of data, necessary to successfully progress the study. This 
was mainly due to the paucity of data available for the Jeel ma baa’d El 
Harb, in Lebanon, and also based on his experiences in interacting with 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon over thirty years. Qualitative research is 
exploratory and therefore apposite because the research subject is new, and 
has never been addressed, and existing theories may not apply with this 
particular group under study.  
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Rationale for Case Study Methodology 
Creswell (2013: 97) describes case study as a qualitative research tool 
which ‘explores a real-life contemporary bounded system…through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information… and reports a case description and case themes’. Merriam 
(1998: 19), although speaking about its use in education, suggests that ‘a 
case study design is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
situation and meaning for all those involved.’ She goes on to state that 
‘insights gained from case studies can directly influence policy, practice 
and future research.’ In the context of this research, the case study 
approach offered a level of flexibility, which enhanced the collection and 
analysis of data. The research for this thesis adopted the case study 
methodology in order to advance an understanding of concepts 
surrounding the debate on identity for the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb in 
Lebanon. Denzin and Lincoln (2011: 1-6) relate that the diverse nature of 
qualitative research allows frequent bending of parameters in 
methodological practices, which still remain true to the tenets of rigour, 
including combinations of case study design. This case study could be 
considered as both idiographic (concerned with unique attributes of a case) 
and nomothetic (producing conclusions which are not time or place 
specific). This hybridity was considered to fit well with Denzin and 
Lincoln’s statement, and was formulated as the best method to provide a 
better understanding of the issues under research.  
 
Research Design 
The research design is laid out in the following steps 
• A detailed literature review was carried out, in order to identify any 
relevant contributions by researchers in the issues surrounding 
identity in general and then specifically refugee identity. This 
sharpened the focus of the research and ensured that when the 
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research proposal was presented to the University Research Board, 
a concrete and directed proposal was established. 
• After the proposal was accepted, a further review of the available 
literature was conducted, which tightened the focus of the research. 
The proposal was submitted to the University Ethics Board for 
approval and was accepted. 
• A short reconnaissance visit was made in 2015, in order to identify 
gatekeepers, gather additional information, and detect any potential 
problems which might arise with the conduct of the research. 
• The proposal was reviewed again and some more tightening was 
made of the focus of research. 
• In 2016, gatekeepers were contacted and the research trip was made 
to Lebanon. 
• Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the sixty- one of 
the Jeel ma baa’d El Harb and also with another seventeen NGOs 
and members of the Lebanese and Palestinian community.  
• Interview data were analysed at the end of each day, in order to 
ascertain if any fine tweaking was required to elicit more pertinent 
responses. 
• On return to Ireland, the data were collated and transcribed and 
analysed. 
Selection of and Access to Sample Groups for Data Collection. 
The selection of the sample group for this research used what Bryman 
(2008: 415) terms purposive sampling- a non-probability form of sampling. 
Sampling was not carried out on a random basis. The goal was to provide a 
body of samples which were relevant to the research aims and objectives 
and yet retain a diversity of opinions and views. This approach was used in 
order to discover correspondence or difference amongst the respondents. 
The criteria for selection of respondents included: 
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• Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon who were resident in the 
Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs). The specific PRCs were: 
Shatila, Burj al Barajneh, Mar Elias and Ein el Hilweh. 
• Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon who were resident in the 
gatherings or Urban areas located in Beirut. 
• Palestinian refugee youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years. 
Swedenburg (2007: 1) notes that ‘forces of modernity’ have greatly 
‘extended the period of youth’ amongst Middle Eastern 
populations. As a consequence, he says ‘young men’ (and young 
women) ‘may belong to this category well into their thirties, due in 
great part to economic difficulties’. This situation is even more 
prevalent amongst Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  
Due to difficulties of access to the PRCs, identified during preparation for 
the research, it became obvious that gatekeepers were required as Bryman 
(2008: 407-409) recommends. Facilitators from within the Irish Diplomatic 
Service; NGOs; and across the Lebanese and Palestinian political and civil 
spectrum were utilised. The use of gatekeepers can be problematic, in that 
they can limit or deny access; or seek to influence the direction and quality 
of the research undertaken (Saunders, 2006: 126). In the case of this 
research, no obstacle was encountered and no attempt was made to 
influence the direction of the research or to put constraints on access or 
publication of outcomes. Gatekeepers were, as Crawhurst and Kennedy-
Macfoy (2013: 457) suggested, ‘integral to the entire process of conducting 
research’ in the Lebanese PRCs. By ‘negotiating directly with prospective 
research participants, they accelerated the recruitment process,’ thereby, as 
Mc Areavy and Das (2013: 116) suggest, saving this researcher time and 
resources.  
Data Collection Methods 
The author sought to conform to a normative praxis of ethnographic 
research which examines humans in what Geertz (1973: 45) terms ‘webs of 
significance with their environments’, in an effort to understand the world 
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from the subject’s point of view, ‘to unfold the meaning of the subject’s 
experiences, to uncover their lived world’ as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 
1) suggest.’ Patton (1990: 278) suggests that ‘the perspective of others is 
meaningful, knowable and able to be made explicit.’ 
The use of interviews has the possibility to generate ‘thick descriptions’ 
which enable persons outside of a culture to make meaning of behaviours 
and beliefs (Geertz, 1973).  Observation is another tool in the collection of 
data. Chatman (1992: 3) classed the process of observation as a way which 
permits the researcher to gain an insider’s view, which affords 
understanding ‘in social settings that reveal reality as lived by members of 
those settings’. 
Interviews 
 The interview method was deemed the best way to foreground the lived 
experience of the respondents and uncover their lived world by recording 
their understanding of that world, in their own language. A number of 
factors guided this decision including ensuring that the perspective of those 
being studied was enabled to provide the point of orientation; the ability to 
gauge the connections of the participants to their social settings more 
accurately; the ability to investigate the respondents in natural 
environments; and qualitative research enabled this researcher to attempt to 
genuinely understand their lives through their eyes (Bryman, 2008: 393-
394). The questionnaire used as the basis for the interviews (Appendix ‘D’) 
was compiled, after consulting the extant literature on the subject of 
identity and the formulation of the research aims. 
Semi-structured interviews were utilised because as Bryman (2008: 436-
439) notes they allowed the researcher to be flexible and to ‘adjust the 
emphasis in responding to the direction in which interviewees gave 
answers.’ This method was deemed to provide a richer and more detailed 
dataset and enabled the researcher to follow up replies and to alter the 
order of, and wording of questions.  The researcher was conscious of the 
limitations associated with the interview process, especially when language 
barriers are present. It should be noted that not all respondents had a high 
268 
 
 
 
 
standard of English and interpreters were employed to assist in the 
interviews. Munroe and Munroe (1986: 120) highlight the difference 
between ‘equivalent meaning’ and ‘direct translation’ and the researcher is 
confident that this did not alter the veracity of translations to responses to 
the questions asked, during the interviews, as the advice of Berman and 
Tyyska (2011: 187) was heeded and interpreters were ‘reconceptualised as 
partners in the research process’.  
A secondary limitation is that of researcher bias. This research has adopted 
what Druckman (2005: 10) calls the etic approach, in that the researcher is 
observing the subject from an ‘outsider vantage point’ and is ‘focussing on 
the social consequences of actions’. All research is a pursuit for knowledge 
and this research has striven to be as objective as possible, in order to 
comply with normative standards. It would be pragmatic to accept that 
‘true’ objectivity is nearly impossible to achieve and as Stanley and Wise 
(1983: 174) state: 
‘Truth is a social construct, in the same way that objectivity is; and 
both are constructed out of experiences which are, for all practical 
purposes, the same as lies and subjectivity’  
 Furthermore, Fee (1983: 75-88) writes that objectivity does not 
necessarily involve the distancing of the researcher from the subject and 
accepts the impossibility of separating research from its socio-political 
background. Schuyens, Schuyens and Murray (2003: 192) make the same 
point and add that ‘the axes of our identity leave an imprint on the 
construction, organisation and execution of the academic process of 
research’.  
Observation 
Gorman and Clayton (2005: 40) suggest that observation is: ‘the systematic 
recording of observable phenomena or behaviour in a natural setting’. The 
purpose of observation in this research was to study and understand the 
Palestinian refugees in their natural environment. Acting as a participant – 
observer, this researcher was afforded the opportunity to discern meanings 
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which are not readily apparent to casual observers. Geertz (1973: 4-5) 
further states that 
 ‘the ability of researcher to take what they say seriously has less to 
do with… a factual look…. than it has with their capacity to 
convince us that what they say is as a result of their having 
penetrated another way of life… of having been there.’  
It is acknowledged that it was difficult to maintain observer detachment in 
PRC settings and “not cross into the friendship domain and remain 
strongly research oriented” as cautioned by Adler & Adler (1994: 380); 
however, as this danger was identified in a reflexive process and corrective 
measures were taken, when deemed necessary. Massey (1991: 24-29) 
states that places are little more than fragments of time, in a continued 
process of social relations, which stretch across space. It is in these places 
that Allan (2014: 27) states that ‘felt immediacies’ are most evident. As all 
aspects of landscape are representational, interpretation of cultural 
landscape did reveal social attitudes and led to a greater understanding of 
Palestinian identity. A limitation imposed due to time constraints involved 
in the research meant that observation methods were restricted, but were 
nevertheless possible. 
Data Analysis Methods 
The analysis of the data gathered was a continuous process from the first 
interview following the path suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998: 12), 
in order to develop theory from data collection and analysis. Codes were 
assigned to data from interviews in order to highlight any data which might 
form the basis for theory development. These codes were revised on a 
continual basis, in the field and further revisions were made as the analysis 
of data ensued upon return from the field of research. Using large sheets of 
paper, the codes were assigned headings and grouped together to form 
patterns. Transcripts were read and re-read and notes on the readings were 
made, especially where additional views on the data were identified. 
Variables were identified and noted. The researcher employed a system of 
segmenting the data into groups, and themes which spoke to the subject of 
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the research. Patterns were identified and grouped together, in separate 
classifications. The classifications were examined for commonalities of 
patterns and compared and contrasted with previous research in the broader 
area of identity. This enabled the researcher to develop theory and to make 
affirmative conclusions. The findings as a result of the analysis of the data 
collected is presented as Appendix ‘G’. 
Ethical Considerations    
Bryman (2008: 118) identifies four areas where ethical principles are 
paramount in research: 
• Harm to participants 
• Lack of Informed Consent 
• Invasion of Privacy 
• Use of Deception 
Harm to participants 
Every care was taken in carrying out the research in Lebanon. Goodhand 
(2000: 12) warns that ‘researchers like aid agencies may affect incentive 
schemes, and impact upon the coping strategies and safety of 
communities’. He goes on to make clear that ‘researchers have a moral 
responsibility for their interventions and that they may inadvertently do 
harm by infringing the security, privacy and well-being of the subjects’. 
Every effort was made to conduct this research taking into account the 
cultural, security, privacy and gender issues involved. Furthermore, the 
researcher was conscious that as Goodhand (2000: 13) states:  
‘researchers have to be constantly aware that while they are present 
for only a short time, their questions and the discussions which they 
provoke may reverberate for a long time afterwards’  
All interviews were anonymised and pseudonyms assigned to the 
participants. A master index of real identities was kept in the possession of 
the researcher at all times. Computers were secured in a safe when not in 
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use, as was the Dictaphone used as back-up in the interviews. The 
interviews were conducted in so far as possible in locations out of the 
public eye, in order to ensure confidentiality for the participants. 
Informed Consent 
No interview was conducted without the informed consent of the 
respondent.  An explanatory letter was given to each interviewee 
(Appendix ‘E’). Additionally, two copies of a consent to interview form 
were completed, one copy for the interviewee and one retained by the 
researcher (Appendix ‘F’). Where language problems became apparent, 
interpreters were used to translate the document and ensure that the 
respondent understood fully what each form contained; that they were not 
obliged to answer any or all of the questions asked of them; and that they 
were free to withdraw from the interview at any time.  
Invasion of Privacy 
All interviews were conducted in an overt manner. No covert methods 
were employed. One concern which the researcher had was about the 
dangers of re-igniting trauma. However, it has been previously found that 
Palestinians generally have no reticence in recounting the past and are 
accustomed to researcher’s questions. Many of the respondents reported as 
Newman and Kaloupek (2004: 383-394) suggest that they even found it 
beneficial.  In addition, Hutchinson, Wilson and Wilson (1994: 161-164) 
have suggested that ‘victims find it helpful to talk about their victimisation 
and to be heard and validated’. 
Deception 
No deception was involved in this research. 
Reliability and Validation 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest that there 
are four main measures for the testing the reliability and validation of 
qualitative research, which they group together under the heading of 
trustworthiness. These measures are credibility, transferability, 
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dependability and conformability. It should be noted that it is virtually 
impossible to replicate a body of research exactly, in other words to 
produce external reliability. Bryman (2008: 391) suggests that ‘it is 
difficult- not to say impossible to replicate qualitative findings.’ The 
personalities of the respondents; the personalities of the researchers; the 
location of the research; and the temporal conditions in which it is carried 
out are unique to that time and place. 
Credibility 
The credibility or internal validity of the research depends on complying 
with the norms of good practice, in carrying out the research and 
presenting the research findings to the subjects of the research in order to 
assure the accuracy and confirmation of those findings. This ensures that 
the researcher has a strong link between the observations of the researcher 
and the conclusions which he evolves. There was limited opportunity for 
providing feedback to the subjects of this research, due to time constraints 
and the geographical dispersion of the respondents. However, explication 
of the data was provided in most cases, and in particular where the 
researcher wished to clarify that the information and meanings of 
responses was correctly understood. The research sought at all times to test 
the validity of the conclusions reached and not just to verify the 
conclusions. It should be borne in mind that in most cases of the interviews 
conducted, it would be difficult for the respondents to authenticate the 
evaluation of the researcher, due to the language used, which is for a 
scientific audience. Nevertheless, in all cases where attempts were made to 
validate the data and analysis, simple terminology was used. No 
differences were recorded between the conclusions which the researcher 
arrived at and the inputs from respondents which were recorded.    
Transferability 
The transferability or external validity of the research is concerned with the 
concept of whether or not the phenomenon under research and the resultant 
findings ‘can hold true in some other context, at some other time’ (Lincoln 
and Guba 1985: 316). Geertz (1973) suggests that researchers produce 
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‘thick descriptions’ -thick, rich descriptions of the respondents and the 
context in which they are made- in order to ensure the transferability of 
findings to other contexts.  
Dependability 
The dependability or reliability of qualitative research relies on the keeping 
of complete records of all stages of the research process from research aim 
formulation, through selection of respondents and compilation of interview 
transcripts to analysis and conclusions. This research sought at all times to 
conform to the rigour of normative practices in this area. Extensive notes 
were kept at all stages of the development of the research aims and 
objectives; the conduct of the fieldwork in Lebanon; and at the analysis 
and conclusions reached stages.  
Conformability 
Conformability in qualitative research is concerned with the objectivity of 
the researcher. It is almost impossible to achieve complete objectivity in 
ethnographic research, especially where interview techniques are 
employed. The researcher for this study used a reflexive methodology to 
eliminate bias, subjectivity, personal values and theoretical leanings which 
might have influenced the design of the research and its findings. 
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Appendix ‘D’ 
 Aide Memoire for Interviews in Lebanon  
1. Interview Number:   
2. Date:  
3. Gender:   
4. Age:       
5.  Married/Engaged/Single:  
6. Religion:  Muslim, Sunni 
7. Camp: Area/Street:   
8. Original Village/Town Palestine:   
9. Mother: 
10. Father:  
11. Brothers: 
12. Sisters:  
13. Position in the Family: 
14. Relatives from al-Nakba still living:  
15. Education:  
16. Employment:  
17. Earnings:  
18. Access to Internet: 
19. How often do you leave the Camp? 
20. Where do you go outside the Camp? 
21. Is there anywhere you don’t go? 
22. What do you know about the Nakba? 
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23. How did you learn about the Nakba? 
24. How many rooms in your House/Apartment? 
25. Do You Own Your House/Apartment?  
26. How much Rent do you pay?   
27. Is anyone in your family sick often and if so how often?  
28. How much does it cost for Medical treatment and where do you get 
it? 
29. What do want for the future for yourself and your family? 
30. What do you think about tawteen? 
31. What do you understand by haq al-awda? 
32. What do you think about hijra? * 
33. How are your aspirations different from those of your parents and 
grandparents? 
34. What should the countries of the world do to help your situation? 
35. Is there anything that you want me to know, that I have not asked 
you? 
*The question on hijra was added to the questionnaire in Lebanon, as a 
result of preliminary interviews with NGOs and UNRWA officials and 
analysis of the data collected from them. 
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Appendix ‘E’ 
Information Sheet 
Researcher: Dermot O’Connor  
Faculty of Life-Health Sciences  
Ulster University          
Cromore Road         
Coleraine Co Derry        
  
T: +44 2870123456 
e-mail: oconnor-d5@ulster.ac.uk                                            
Research Title: “A Study of Identity and Belonging amongst the Jeel 
al-harb Generation of Palestinians in Lebanon.” 
Information Sheet 
This research is being carried out to ascertain if the concepts of personal 
and group identity are the same as the concepts of identity and belonging 
as previously understood by academics, relief agencies, politicians and 
laypeople.  
The importance for this research lies in its ability to throw light on any 
changes which might be uncovered and which could ultimately lead to a 
better understanding of the situation of the Jeel al-harb generation. 
A better understanding by the world in general, but specifically by Relief 
Agencies, NGO’s and Peacemakers will ultimately lead to formulation of 
better policies and an improvement in service provision for the Palestinian 
Refugee population as a whole. 
This research is entirely voluntary and you are free at any time to 
discontinue participating in it. 
All interview records are confidential and are encrypted. 
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 All records will be kept securely and remain in the possession of the 
Researcher and Ulster University. 
All records will be anonymised, so the individuals will not be identifiable. 
 
Dermot O’Connor 
Researcher 
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Appendix ‘F’ 
Consent Form 
Researcher: Dermot O’Connor 
e-mail: oconnor-d5@ulster.ac.uk                                 
 Faculty of Life-Health Sciences 
Ulster University 
Cromore Road  
Coleraine 
Co Derry 
T: +44 2870123456 
Research Title: “A Study of Identity and Belonging amongst the Jeel 
al-harb Generation of Palestinians in Lebanon.” 
CONSENT FORM 
I confirm that I have been given and have read and understood the  
Information Sheet for the above study and I have asked and  
received answers to any questions raised.                                           [      ] 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
Withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without my rights 
being affected in any way.                                                                    [      ] 
I understand that the researchers will hold all information and data  
collected securely and in confidence and that all efforts will be made 
to ensure that I cannot be identified as a participant in the study (except  
as might be required by law) and I give permission for the researchers to 
 hold relevant personal data.                                                                   [      ] 
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I agree to take part in the above study.                                                   [      ] 
 
 
____________________________________________________________
_________________________________ 
 
Name of Subject                                           Signature                                        
Date 
 
____________________________________________________________
______________________________  
Name of person taking consent                Signature                                     
Date 
 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
Name of researcher                                    Signature                                       
Date 
 
One Copy each to Researcher and Subject 
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Appendix ‘G’ 
Summary of Findings 
Total Interviewed: 61 
Religion 
Muslim, Sunni:  60 – 98.4% 
Christian, Catholic:  1 – 1.6% 
Gender Distribution 
Males:   32 – 53% 
Females:   29 – 47% 
Homes of Interviewees 
Shatila:   29 - 47% 
Burj al Barajneh:  16 – 26% 
Ein el Hilweh:  2 – 3% 
Mar Elias:   3 – 5% 
Gatherings:   5 – 9% 
City:    6 - 10% 
Total:    61 – 100% 
Interviewee Age Spread (in years) 
 18 – 25:   32 – 53% 
26 – 30:   16 – 26% 
30 -35:   13 -   21% 
Marital Status 
Married:   17 – 27% 
Single:    38 – 63% 
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Engaged:    4 – 6% 
Divorced:    1 – 2% 
Widowed:   1 – 2% 
Employment Status: 
Employed:   41 -67% 
Unemployed:   20 – 33% 
White Collar:   25 – 61% 
Blue Collar:   16 – 39% 
Employment by Gender 
Employed Males:  22 – 69% 
White Collar:   9 – 36% 
Blue Collar:   13 – 64% 
Employed Females:  19 – 66% 
White Collar:   16 – 81% 
Blue Collar:   3 – 19% 
Unemployed Males:  10 – 31% 
Unemployed Females: 10 – 34% 
Earnings ($ per Month, includes nil) 
0 – 400:   21 – 51% of those Employed 
      400– 1,000:  12 – 20% of those Employed 
     1,050 – 1,500:  5 – 12% of those Employed 
     >1,500:   3 – 8% of those Employed 
Earnings ($ per Month, includes nil), by Gender 
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Males: 
      0– 400:   7 – 32% of those Employed 
      400– 1,000:  8 – 36% of those Employed 
     1,050 – 1,500: 4 – 18% of those Employed 
     >1,500:   3 – 14% of those Employed 
Females: 
       0– 400:   14 – 74% of those Employed 
      400– 1,000:  4 – 21% of those Employed 
     1,050 – 1,500:  1 – 5% of those Employed 
     >1,500:   0 – 0% of those Employed 
Education  
Brevet (includes not completed):    16 – 26% 
Baccalaureate (includes not completed):   20 – 33% 
University (includes not completed):   25 – 41% 
Education by Gender: 
Males - Brevet (includes not completed):   12 – 37%   
- Baccalaureate (includes not completed):   9 -28% 
- University (includes not completed):  11 -35% 
Females – Brevet (includes not completed):   4 – 14% 
    - Baccalaureate (includes not completed)  11 – 38% 
    - University (includes not completed)  14 – 48% 
Education and Employment 
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Employed Males    22 (69%) 
 up to, and including Brevet: -  8 -36% 
 up to and including Baccalaureate: -  6 - 27%   
up to and including University:  -  8 -36% 
 Unemployed Males    10 (31%)  
up to, and including Brevet: -  4 -40% 
 up to and including Baccalaureate: -  3 - 30%   
up to and including University:  -  3 - 30%  
Employed Females    19 (65.5%) 
up to, and including Brevet: -  1 -5% 
 up to and including Baccalaureate: - 5 - 26%   
up to and including University:  -  13 -69% 
Unemployed Females   10 (34.5%) 
up to, and including Brevet: -   3 -30% 
 up to and including Baccalaureate: - 6 - 60%   
up to and including University:  -  1 -10% 
Total Both Genders Employed  41 
up to, and including Brevet: -  9   -22% 
 up to and including Baccalaureate: - 11 - 27%   
up to and including University:  -  21 - 51% 
Total Both Genders Unemployed  20 
up to, and including Brevet: -   7 -35% 
 up to and including Baccalaureate: -  9 - 45%   
up to and including University:  -  4 – 20% 
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Access to Mobile Phone, Laptop & Wi-Fi/ Internet 
Mobile Phone Males 32, (100%) Females 29 (100%)  – Total -100% 
Laptop/Computer Males 12 (37.5%), Females 12 (41.4%)  - Total – 39% 
Wi-Fi, Internet Males 24 (75%), Females 21 (72,4%)     -Total – 77% 
Those who said that they had no Computer/Laptop said that they couldn’t 
afford it. (61%) 
Those who said that they had no Wi-Fi/Internet said that they couldn’t 
afford it. (23%) 
Differences in aspirations from Parents/Grandparents 
Yes  
 Males    16 – 50% 
 Females   17 – 59% 
 Total Yes   33 – 54% 
No. the same 
 Males   12 – 37% 
 Females   11 – 38% 
 Total No the same  23 – 38% 
Didn’t know/no opinion 
 Males   4 - 13% 
 Females   1 - 3% 
 Total didn’t know/no opinion – 5 - 8% 
Tawteen 
For:      27 -44% 
Against     26 – 43% 
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Unsure     5– 8% 
Don’t Care     3 – 5% 
Tawteen Males: 
For:      15 -47% 
Against     11 – 35% 
Unsure      3–   9% 
Don’t Care     3 – 9% 
Tawteen Females; 
For:      12 -41% 
Against     15 –52% 
Unsure      2–   7% 
Don’t Care     0 
Hijra: 
Yes:      36 – 59% 
No:      6 -10% 
Unsure**:     19 -31% 
Males: 
Yes:      20- 63% 
No:      3 -9% 
Unsure**:     9 -28% 
Females: 
Yes:      16 – 55% 
No:      3 -10% 
Unsure**:     10- 35% 
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** This figure includes those who didn’t know whether they would or not 
emigrate or did not express an opinion on the matter. 
Haq al Awda 
Aware of ROR:    56 – 91.8% 
Don’t Know about:    4 – 6.6% 
Aware but don’t want:   1 – 1.6% 
Will happen in lifetime:   30 – 49% 
Not happen in Near/Med Future:  27 – 44% 
Haq al Awda Males 
Aware of ROR:    29 – 91% 
Don’t Know about:    2– 6% 
Aware but don’t want:   1 – 1.6% 
Will happen in lifetime:   16 – 50% 
Not happen in Near/Med Future:  16 – 50% 
Haq al Awda Females 
Aware of ROR:    27 – 93% 
Don’t Know about:   2– 7% 
Aware but don’t want:   0 – 0% 
Will happen in lifetime:   14 – 48.4% 
Not happen in Near/Med Future:  11 – 38% 
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Identity 
Retain Palestinian Identity:   35 – 57.4% 
Lose Palestinian Identity:   6 – 10% 
Don’t Care:     1 – 1.6% 
Happy to have a Double Identity**:  38 – 62% 
Ambivalent/Not Sure:   19 – 31%  
** The respondents said that they wouldn’t necessarily include a 
Palestinian identity here. 
Identity Males 
Retain Palestinian Identity:   20 – 62% 
Lose Palestinian Identity:   4 – 13% 
Don’t Care:     1 – 3% 
Happy to have a Double Identity**:  16 – 50% 
Ambivalent/Not Sure:   7 – 22%  
** The respondents said that they wouldn’t necessarily include a 
Palestinian identity here. 
Identity Females 
Retain Palestinian Identity:   15 – 52% 
Lose Palestinian Identity:   2 – 7% 
Don’t Care:      0 
Happy to have a Double Identity**:  22 – 76% 
Ambivalent/Not Sure:   12 – 41%  
** The respondents said that they wouldn’t necessarily include a 
Palestinian identity here. 
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Nakba 
Don’t know about:    8 – 13% 
Poor Knowledge:    17 – 28% 
 Fair Knowledge:    23 – 38% 
Good/Very Good Knowledge:  13 – 21% 
Blame British for:    34 – 56% 
Blame US for:    4 – 7%  
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Appendix ‘H’ 
Research Interviews Jeel ma Baa’d El Harb Lebanon 2016 
Number Date Location Gender Age Religion 
01 20.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
F 21 Sunni 
02 20.06.16 Beirut F 21 Sunni 
03 20.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 23 Sunni 
04 20.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 21 Sunni 
05 20.06.16 Mar Elias M 26 Sunni 
06 20.06.16 Mar Elias M 23 Sunni 
07 20.06.16 Shatila M 26 Sunni 
08 21.06.16 Beirut M 29 Sunni 
09 21.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 31 Sunni 
10 21.06.16 Beirut M 31 Christian 
11 21.06.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
M 31 Sunni 
12 21.06.16 Shatila M 21 Sunni 
13 21.06.16 Shatila F 20 Sunni 
14 21.06.16 Shatila F 20 Sunni 
15 22.06.16 Ein el Hilweh M 35 Sunni 
16 22.06.16 Ein el Hilweh F 27 Sunni 
17 22.06.16 Shatila M 27 Sunni 
294 
 
 
 
 
18 27.06.16 Shatila M 27 Sunni 
19 27.06.16 Shatila M 35 Sunni 
20 27.06.16 Shatila F 20 Sunni 
21 27.06.16 Shatila M 25 Sunni 
22 27.06.16 Shatila M 33 Sunni 
23 27.06.16 Shatila F 34 Sunni 
24 27.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 25 Sunni 
25 28.06.16 Mar Elias F 35 Sunni 
26 28.06.16 Shatila M 24 Sunni 
27 28.06.16 Shatila F 20 Sunni 
28 28.06.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 19 Sunni 
29 28.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 29 Sunni 
30 29.06.16 Shatila F 19 Sunni 
31 29.06.16 Shatila F 28 Sunni 
32 29.06.16 Shatila F 20 Sunni 
33 29.06.16 Shatila M 35 Sunni 
34 30.06.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
F 30 Sunni 
35 30.06.16 Shatila M 21 Sunni 
36 30.06.16 Shatila M 35 Sunni 
37 30.06.16 Shatila F 25 Sunni 
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38 30.06.16 Shatila F 20 Sunni 
39 30.06.16 Shatila F 30 Sunni 
40 30.06.16 Shatila M 28 Sunni 
41 01.07.16 Shatila M 27 Sunni 
42 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 25 Sunni 
43 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 28 Sunni 
44 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 21 Sunni 
45 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 23 Sunni 
46 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 23 Sunni 
47 01.07.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
F 22 Sunni 
48 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 19 Sunni 
49 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 21 Sunni 
50 01.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
M 24 Sunni 
51 02.07.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 35 Sunni 
52 04.07.16 Mar Elias F 22 Sunni 
53 04.07.16 Mar Elias M 35 Sunni 
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54 05.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 34 Sunni 
55 05.07.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 27 Sunni 
56 05.07.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
F 23 Sunni 
57 05.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
M 21 Sunni 
58 05.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 26 Sunni 
59 05.07.16 Beirut 
Gathering 
M 25 Sunni 
60 05.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
F 22 Sunni 
61 05.07.16 Burj al 
Barajneh 
M 24 Sunni 
 
